ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1426 27 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0896) 24 September 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | PANG, Chong Yong (方正容) (방정용) |
| PW NO: | 63 NK 3773 |
| RANK: | Sgt (中士) |
| AGE: | 23 |
| DUTY: | Repaired Telephone Equipment |
| UNIT: | 1st Div, 3rd Regt, Ordnance Unit |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School (6 years) |
| OCCUPATION: | Telephone Repairman |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | POK KOK-DONG (卜谷洞) appox 24 Km N of T'AEGU |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 17 Sep 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | HAMGYONG PUKTO, CH'ONGJIN, P'OHANG-DONG #130 (咸鏡北道 淸津市 浦項洞 一三0 番地) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | HAMGYONG PUKTO, CH'ONGJIN, SINJIN-RI #11 (咸鏡北道 淸津市 新津里 一一班) |
| INTERROGATOR: | NAGAO (FEAF) |
PW spoke freely but his knowledge of military information was limited. Captured by ROK forces. Physical condition good. Not recommended for further interrogation.
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:Chronology:
12 Dec 46 - PW volunteered and entered the NKPA at KANGGYE (江界). Received 2 years of training with a signal unit. After finishing 5 months of basic infantry training, he was given intensive training on wire communication.
Jun 48 - The 1st Div moved out of KANGGYE by train and only the 3rd Regt arrived at NAMCH'ONJOM. PW heard that Div Hqs remained at P'YONGYANG (平壤). PW was attached to the Ordnance unit until Jul 49.
Jun 49 - The 3rd Regt arrived by train at KUMCH'ON (金川). PW was there for a year.
27 Jun 50 - The 1st Div arrived at MUNSAN (汶山) after encountering some resistance enroute.
29 Jun 50 - Arrived at SEOUL and immediately departed by foot.
2 Jul 50 - Arrived at ICH'ON (利川). Entered combat immediately after departure.
15 Jul 50 - Arrived CH'UNGJU (忠州). Enroute from ICH'ON, the advance units of the 1st Div encountered enemy resistance but casualties were light. The bridge was damaged at CH'UNGJU and it took the 1st Div 3 days to cross the river in boats and by fording. Div was subjected to artillery fire during the crossing.
20 Jul 50 - 1st Div arrived MUN'GYONG after encountering stiff resistance enroute. Heavy casualties were sustained but no replacements received.
30 Jul 50 - 1th Div arrived HAMCH'ANG (咸昌). The combat units of the Div encountered resistance all the way from MUN'GYONG and heavy casualties were sustained. Observed approximately 1,200 replacements.
10 Aug 50 - Arrived at AN'GYE (安溪) and bivouacked for 5 days.
20 Aug 50 - Arrived KUNWI via PIAN (比安). 1st Div engaged in battle at PIAN (比安). Heavy casualties suffered.
10 Sep 50 - Arrived POK KOK-DONG (卜谷洞), approximately 24 km N of T'AEGU. Encountered light resistance enroute from KUNWI. 1,000 replacements joined the Div there.
PW was engaged in repairing damaged rifles and MGs recovered from the front. The repaired equipment was issued to replacements. Also repaired US M-1 rifles and carbines which were issued to replacements.
PW heard that the main combat units of the 1st Div were located at a point 12 km N of T'AEGU and they were engaged in battle. However, the first line of attack was composed of inexperienced replacements who were equipped with only rifles and hand grenades. They were outflanked. The major units of the 1st Div were surrounded with the supply lines cut.
17 Sep 50 - PW, and 2 other men, were ordered to destroy their ammunition dump at the foot of the mountain before it fell to ROK forces. However, enroute to the dump, two (2) men were wounded by rifle fire and subject was captured while treating the wounded men.
Unit Organization and Strength:
The Ordnance Unit was composed of 11 men assigned to the 3rd Regt. PW states that the two other regiments of 1st Div also had ordnance units. These ordnance units were trained to repair rifles, LMGs, Mortars, 45-mm AT Guns, SMGs, and telephone equipment.
Equipment:
The only heavy equipment observed at POK KOK-DONG was 2 × 120-mm Mortars, 15 Sep 50.
Communications:
1st Bn was equipped with 9 × UNA F-31 field telephones, and PW was responsible for repairing all the telephone equipment in the 3rd Regt.
Personalities:
Div CG was wounded in battle and PW heard that he was replaced 10 Jul 50. 3rd Regt CO was replaced several times.
Morale and Propaganda:
Morale of the troops was very low because majority of the units were composed of untrained replacements.
PW saw US propaganda leaflets but did not believe the contents. PW was told that he would be killed if captured and he believed it.
4. GENERAL:PW observed 10 US PsW at POK KOK-DONG being evacuated to the rear.
For the Commanding Officer:
WEELDREYER
Executive
