Intelligence Report
No. 5824
THE COMING ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (JUNE OR JULY 1952)
This material to be made available only by permission of the Chief, LR.
Date: March 3, 1952
This paper was based on available materials covering the period April 1951 to present, analysis of which was concluded on March 3, 1952 by Division of Research for Far East.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
| Page | |
| ABSTRACT | ⅰ |
| PREFACE | 1 |
| A. Background | 1 |
| B. Political Alignment in the Assembly | 2 |
| C. Rhee's Strategy and Intentions | 3 |
| D. Anti-Rhee Strategy | 5 |
| E. Consequences of the Election | 6 |
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ABSTRACT
With the Presidential election approaching, the political conflict between Rhee and his opposition has been increasing in intensity. The battle has recently centered around Rhee's attempts to force through the assembly a constitutional amendment which would take the election of the president out of the hands of the Assembly and put it directly in the hands of the people. The assembly's rejection of this proposition by an overwhelming vote prompted Rhee to organize a movement to recall the majority of Assembly members. This action has antagonized broad segments of the Assembly and has tended to off-set his gains in the February 5 by-election.
The outcome of this conflict for the presidency can be predicted only in very general terms. The political alignments in the Assembly are even more fluid than usual, and other candidates have not yet overtly identified themselves. All things considered, Rhee's chances for re-election appear to be less than 50-50. Almost on a part with him are two other possible candidates: CHANG Myon, Prime Minister and head of the delegation to the UN General Assembly; and SIN Ikhi, Speaker of the Assembly and a leader of the opposition Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP). Three other possible candidates have a lesser chance for election: CHI Ch'ongch'on, another DNP leader; Acting Prime Minister HO Chong; and YI Pomsok, former cabinet member and now vice-chairman of Rhee's Liberal Party.
The effects of a change in administrations would vary somewhat with the particular individual elected to the Presidency. CHANG and HO are of stronger pro-US orientation than the others; their election would effect general improvement in US-Korean relations. YI Pomsok, SIN Ikhi, and CHI Ch'ongch'on were associated with the Nationalist Chinese while in the "Korean Provisional Government"; their election, and particularly that of YI, would probably result in closer ties of the Republic of Korea to Nationalist China.
The election of any of the possible candidates mentioned, except Rhee or YI Pomsok, would probably result in a DNP-led loose coalition in the government. Inasmuch as the other elements of such a coalition are in many respects antipathetic toward the DNP, this coalition government would tend to produce increased contradictions in policies, and would ultimately afford broad opportunities for corruption. Initially, however, the change would tend to reduce the authoritarianism and corruption in the government and to improve Assembly-President relations.
Because of the prominence of business interest and of farmer landlord in the DNP, a new administration would be inclined to expedite payment for land expropriated under land reform and to adopt a relatively conciliatory policy toward Japan. In the face of strong opposition headed by Rhee, however, the new administration could not easily afford to deviate sharply from existing policies on these issues, and from other even more popular policies, such as demands for security guarantee from the US and strong opposition to a negotiated settlement of the current hostilities.
In the initial stages of a new administration the government would probably be susceptible to internal and external pressures for increased democratization and reform in government. However, the new leadership of the government probably would not undertake such changes on its own initiative. The new leadership, like that of the Rhee administration, would consist of small cliques, and would tend in the long range to deteriorate into a government by intrigue, unless in addition to democratization and reform in government, new political parties with broad popular base are instituted.
THE COMING ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (JUNE OR JULY 1952)
PREFACE
Constitutional Provisions for Election of the President
Article 53 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea provides that the President of the Republic shall be elected by the National Assembly voting by secret ballot. A two-thirds vote of a two-thirds quorum is required for election on the first ballot. If this procedure should prove indecisive a run-off is held between the two highest candidates. In this second balloting a simple majority is all that is necessary for election.
Article 55 sets the President's term at 4 years and limits the tenure of office to two consecutive terms. Article 56 stipulates that the Presidential election shall be held 30 days prior to the expiration of the incumbent's term of office.
There is some uncertainty as to whether Rhee's term of office is to be counted from the date of his election (July 20, 1948), or from the date of the establishment of the Republic (August 15, 1948). The 1950 election of the Second National Assembly does not serve as a clear precedent for interpretation of articles 55 and 56 because article 102 of the constitution defined the tenure of office of the First National Assembly as two years from its date of convocation, May 31, 1948.
Thus, depending on interpretation, the next Presidential election must be made either before June 20 or at the latest, before July 16.
A. Background
Political developments in south Korea during the past year have placed the long-standing question of succession to President RHEE in a new context. When the Republic of Korea was established in 1948, Syngman Rhee's prestige as a national leader and his strong political position made his election as the first President a certainty. However, in the following years, Rhee's age and infirmity has given rise to considerable -- although inconclusive -- speculation on his intentions to stand for reelection in 1952 and on possible successors. Since the outbreak of hostilities, and particularly in the last few months, speculation and political maneuvering on the 1952 presidential election has become increasingly evident. This activity is partially due to the proximity of the June election, but it is also a consequence of Rhee's declining prestige during the war and growing dissatisfaction with Rhee's domineering tactics among diverse political elements, particularly those in the National Assembly.
The first major blow struck at President Rhee reflecting the growing opposition to his re-election was the election as Vice-President in May 1951 of KIM Songsu, leader of the opposition Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP). Since that time, Rhee and the Democratic Nationalist Party have engaged in vicious political conflict, for a coveted prize -- the Presidency.
B. Political Alignment in the Assembly
Political alignments in the ROK Assembly are institutionalized in the form of highly fluid "negotiating groups," generally not closely tied to party and politically partisan organizations outside the Assembly. The present Assembly did not form its "negotiating groups" until February 1951, and since that time these groups have changed considerably. The only firm group alignment has been that of the Democratic Nationalist Party, (DNP) a disciplined organization of about 40 which works closely with the Party leadership. This "negotiating group," as in the first Assembly, has led the fight against Rhee, often receiving support in their opposition to him from all the political elements of the Assembly. This coalition thus far, however, has been confined to the single issue of opposition to Rhee.
Two other "negotiating groups" exist: the Republican People's Political Association, (RPPA) a professedly pro-Rhee organization which commands a theoretical majority in the Assembly, and a New Friends Association, of about 35 heterogeneous members, independent of the two main groups. The RPPA which was formed early in 1951 by a merger of the pro-Rhee New Political Comrades Association and the smaller generally independent Republican Club, has been torn by internal dissidence and has not afforded appreciable support to Rhee. The scandals concerning misuse of National Defense Corps funds involved some of the principals of the former New Political Comrades Association. The overwhelming vote in many of the Assembly's censures and actions against the President -- such as the rejection of Rhee's proposed constitutional amendments by a vote of 149 to 13 -- has clearly indicated that major elements of the RPPA voted against the administration on many critical issues.
The disunity of the pro-Rhee forces in the Assembly became clearly apparent, last fall, when Rhee tried to form a single pro-Rhee party. Vice Speaker CHO Pongam formed a Farmer's Council and maneuvered for a leading role in the new party. Others of the RPPA, however, stifled CHO's party-building efforts within the Assembly by proscribing the participation of the Speaker or Vice-Speakers in such activities. Later, when a pro-Rhee "Liberal Party" led by elements outside the Assembly was formed, RPPA members who had previously supported Rhee's new party drive refused to associate themselves with this movement and formed a Liberal Party of their own. This (Assembly) Liberal Party was specifically repudiated by Rhee in January 1952.
In the February 5 by-elections, for eight sections in the Assembly, however, Rhee began to make progress in a political come-back. His men carried seven of the eight districts, the eighth being won by an independent, even though the Democratic Nationalist Party had put up a vigorous contest backed by strong financial support. In this victory, Rhee gained much "face" at the expense of the DNP, and in terms of gains bearing directly on the Assembly election of the president, he secured seven additional votes and the entry of three of his principal henchment into the Assembly -- former Home Minister YUN Ch'iyong, who led the pro-Rhee forces in the first Assembly in the constitutional conflict of early 1950; former Social Affairs Minister CHON Chinhan, head of the pro-Rhee Korean Federation of Labor Unions; and PAE Unhui, head of the Civil Service Commission and long a leader in Rhee's National Society and other pro-Rhee organizations. These three may be expected to work with CHO Pongam and other pro-Rhee Assembly members in an effort to bridge the gulf between Rhee's former supporters inside the Assembly whom he has repudiated, and those outside the Assembly, with whom he has now become aligned.
The DNP has been courting the (Assembly) Liberal Party as well as other factions in the Assembly in an effort to preserve the disunity of the Rhee forces and to reach agreement with these dissident elements upon a single strong presidential candidate to oppose Rhee.
C. Rhee's Strategy and Intentions
Rhee's recent activities indicate that he clearly intends to secure re-election in 1952. To this end, he probably will continue to use combinations of campaigning, force, and compromise.
A principal element of strength for Rhee in the past has been the impression he has long fostered that he is the best man to secure what Korea needs from the US -- an impression that has been subject to increasing doubt among Korean political leaders since early 1950. Rhee would have liked a show of American support in his campaign. In the fall, before announcing his candidacy, he attempted to sound out the American Embassy's views concerning his re-election. Early in 1952, he said on several occasions that he was "thinking" of a visit to President Truman. Such a visit would of course have been greatly to his political advantage if it had been at all well received. The Embassy has suggested, too, that he may have been hoping for an open rejection of his visit with a statement that he was badly needed in Korea, which also would have been to his advantage. Neither of these efforts resulted in any show of support by the US. Consequently, Rhee has been endeavoring to sustain his reputation as the man to get things from the US, as well as to increase his general following, by increasing adamancy in his agitation against the cease-fire negotiations and continuing demands for security guarantees from the US. His position on these issues will continue, and may become more intense, during the campaign.
Rhee will unquestionably place every resource behind his political henchmen during the local elections to be held in April and May in an effort to gain much "Face." None of these devices however have direct impact upon the Assembly, which in the final analysis will elect the President.
Therefore, in an effort to get a firm grip on the Assembly Rhee, since late January, has resorted to direct intimidation of the Assembly by organizing a movement to recall the Assembly members who voted down his proposed constitutional amendment providing for direct election of the President.
Thus far, however, the threat of recall has resulted in tightening of alignments in the Assembly against Rhee. Antagonized by this movement, and by Rhee's specious defense of its constitutionality on the grounds that the Constitution does not specifically proscribe such action, the Assembly has abandoned other business to oppose the recall, and a minority of its members, presumably the DNP, are reported to be urging the initiation of impeachment proceedings. The American Embassy has estimated that if Rhee proceeds further with intimidation, the moderate elements that have thus far held this action back may well join in, resulting in a strong action of censure, although probably not effecting removal from office.
Having, pursued this risky course so far, Rhee can withdraw from it only with difficulty, and may proceed further to extreme intimidation -- even arreast of Assembly members. To insure direct election of the President by the people, he must "cow" the Assembly so thoroughly as to secure a two-thirds vote in favor of the amendment that was rejected only in January by a vote of 149 to 13. If he fails to accomplish this, his prospects for re-election by secret ballot of the Assembly he had intimidated in this manner would be slim. He may be overestimating the possibility of using the recall movement as a threat, to be supplemented by gains in strength made through general campaigning and compromises upon presidential powers and administration "spoils." It appears that he must now either deal with the Assembly through compromises, taking a calculated serious risk of defeat in the Presidential election, or proceed to extremes of intimidation, virtually eliminating hope of compromise, and risking all on the prospect of completely subduing the Assembly.
There have long been rumors that Rhee might, if he foresaw clear defeat in his campaign, put forward a candidate acceptable to him as a successor. Particularly mentioned in this context is YI Pomsok, who as a former cabinet minister, Vice Chairman of the Liberal Party under Rhee, and a close associate of YUN Ch'iyong and his anti-DNP clique has close ties with the President. During 1949, however, YI was at odds with Rhee and a source close to Rhee reports that Rhee has recently again become disillusioned with him. Moreover, Rhee is obviously now engaged in an all-out campaign for his own re-election. Consequently, the election of YI Pomsok as a Rhee-sponsored successor can be regarded only as a remote possibility.
D. Anti-Rhee Strategy
The oppositions plan of action is not known in detail. The DNP has led the Assembly's fight against Rhee. It has gone far "out on the limb," and cannot well recant. It is reported to have strong financial resources, which may be useful within and outside the Assembly. The coalition of other groups with the DNP is confined, however, to opposition to Rhee, and there is reported to be considerable opposition among them to a DNP president, other non-Rhee candidates are, however, even weaker than those of the DNP. The shutting-out of the DNP in the February 5 by-elections, despite its heavy campaigning and expenditures, has further damaged its position and high-lighted its lack of grass-roots support -- one of Rhee's campaign planks. A source close to Rhee has related, but discounted, gossip that an opposition candidate has been selected, to be put forward later on. In the context of Korean political intrigue, however, this report, is altogether plausible. The DNP and other opposition elements may have reached agreement on a candidate and be holding him back until too late for Rhee to stop him.
Despite feeling against the DNP, it is possible that SIN Ikhi may be the agreed candidate, or may emerge as a strong candidate. A member of the "Korean Provisional Government" in China, and a prominent though not trusted lieutenant of Rhee until he joined with the opposition in late 1948, SIN has been Speaker of the first and second Assemblies and is clearly acceptable to and influential among broad segments of the Korean political leadership. KIM Songsu the major leader in the DNP and in its predecessor, the Hanguk Democratic Party, is reported to have suffered a stroke shortly after his election as Vice President, and hence appears to be completely out of the running. CHI Ch'ongch'on, former military leader of the "Korean Provisional Government" in China, and later a pro-Rhee youth leader in south Korea until he joined with SIN Ikhi in leaving the Rhee camp in late 1948, is also a possibility, but does not appear to have broad enough backing to be a strong candidate. CHO Pyongok, Home Minister in 1950, and recently made Secretary-General of the DNP, probably lost any remote chance of being the DNP candidate by being roundly defeated in the February 5 by-election, having suffered a similar defeat in the 1950 elections.
The most notable of the possible candidates opposed to Rhee but not drawn from the DNP include CHANG Myon, Prime Minister now heading the ROK delegation to the UN General Assembly; HO Chong, who has held various ministerial posts and is now Acting Prime Minister; CHO Pongam, former Agriculture Minister and now Vice-Speaker of the Assembly, a former Communist who has long worked in the moderate fringes of rightist groups in the south; and CHANG T'aeksang, former Foreign Minister and now Vice-Speaker of the Assembly. CHANG Myon lacks the requisite experience in the delicate maneuverings characteristic of South Korean politics. He may very well emerge as a compromise candidate, however, and would have considerable strength in such a case. HO Chong is almost a lesser CHANG Myon in all these respects except his support would be narrower, and thus he is a less likely candidate. CHO Pongam and CHANG T'aeksang can almost be ruled out. CHANG T'aeksang appears to have too limited a following to be a serious candidate except as a compromise. CHO Pongam has been undercut in the recent Liberal Party bickerings and in the Communist spy ring scandal.
Thus, the possible outcome of the presidential election can best be set forth in the following general terms: there are three candidates with relatively strong and almost equal prospects -- Rhee, SIN Ikhi of the DNP (assuming he receives the support of all anti-Rhee groups), and CHANG Myon. There are several other candidates with only slim prospects: YI Pomsok, as a Rhee-picked successor; CHI Ch'ongch'on of the DNP; and HO Chong.
E. Consequences of the Election
1. The animosities and frequent clashes between the various political factions can be expected to continue well after the election. If Rhee is re-elected, the conflict between the executive and the Assembly is not expected to subside measurably, especially since Rhee will probably attempt to off-set any concessions he may have been forced to make in the pre-election period to the opposition group, Even if Rhee's powers have been restricted in the election period, he will probably continue to present diplomatic difficulties to the US. If he should be defeated, he would lose the greater part of his following, but would command enough strength to harrass seriously the succeeding administration.
2. The instability resulting from such political strife will probably not in the short run weaken ROK capabilities to resist the Communists. The composition of the Assembly and of political leadership in general is strongly anti-Communist, and the populace generally is firmly in support of anti-Communist policies. The Communists may seek to strengthen their position by infiltrating among the group of middle-of-the-road leaders -- such as AN Chaehong and CHO Soang -- returning from the north as civilian internees. However, neither the suppression of these groups nor their renewed political activity will appreciably benefit the Communists since the non-rightist leaders have little prospect of gaining any appreciable popular support in south Korea in the near future.
3. A change in presidents would in general have the following effects: Whoever succeeds Rhee will not have Rhee's popular reputation as a great national leader and, despite the extensive powers of the presidency, can scarcely dominate Korean politics in personal fashion as did Rhee. Assembly-President relations probably would generally be improved, with the Assembly playing a somewhat broader role in national policies. In view of the factional character of south Korean political organizations within and outside the Assembly, increased Assembly influence probably would result in increased contradictions and less continuity in national policies and would not necessarily reduce the corruption in government.
A change in administration could conceivably make democratization and reform more easily accomplished, but the new administration in all probability would not be more inclined than Rhee to initiate such reforms. A change in administration would probably initially contribute to popularity of the government by reducing authoritarianism and publicizing the ousting of corrupt officials. Unless followed by the formation of new parties with broad popular base, which would reflect popular demands, however, the new administration probably would in time deteriorate to rule through factional intrigue. This in turn would give rise to further growth of popular disillusionment, which might in the long run undermine the regime in terms of defeatism and subversive potentials.
4. The following results might derive from the election of particular individuals. CHANG Myon and HO Chong, because of weakness of leadership, and DNP supporters SIN Ikhi and CHI Ch'ongch'on would be influenced most strongly by the DNP. In view of prominent business and former landlord interests within the DNP, any DNP-dominated administration probably would be inclined toward a more conciliatory policy toward Japan and greater expedition in payment for lands expropriated under land reform than has the present administration. CHANG Myon is a leading Catholic layman, said to be subsidized in part by Catholic funds, and would strengthen the Vatican's connection with south Korea. In view of close ties in the past with Nationalist China, YI Pomsok, and possibly SIN Ikhi and CHI Ch'ongch'on, might align the ROK more closely with China than in the past. Both YI Pomsok or CHI Ch'ongch'on are rival political-military leaders of Chinese war-lord type. If one is elected the other is capable of attempting an attack against the regime. If elected President, either would interfere markedly in military matters and advance his own coterie of military leaders.
5. In terms of general US interests in Korea, CHANG Myon appears to be the most desirable successor to Rhee. He is known to be pro-US in outlook, and through Catholic associations has an approach to other Western powers that even Rhee lacked. He is more reasonable and pliable than Rhee, and, in contrast to the narrow factional support of other possible candidates, commands considerable respect among the various circles of south Korean political leaders. HO Chong is of much the same type, and is ranked beneath CHANG primarily because he is not on CHANG's level in government experience and reputation. SIN Ikhi may be rated third in preference. Alone among the factional candidates he could command broad support from the political leadership; in terms of prestige among both politicians and general populace, he is unquestionably stronger than CHANG or HO. He cannot be terms strongly pro-US, however, and there are dangers inherent in his opportunism. The election of YI Pomsok or CHI Ch'ongch'on would be highly disadvantageous to US interests. The election of CHANG or HO would improve general American-Korean relations, and would tend to improve the Korean government in terms of efficiency and of democratic processes. No President could, however, fu■ acquiesce to the cease-fire terms now formulated, although he might soften the opposition to them.
