헌 정 사
자료DB

FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECURITY: RESTRICTED

PRIORITY: AIR POUCH

TO: Department of State

FROM: SEOUL 295 March 22, 1950

REF: EBMTEL 332, March 14, 1960

SUBJECT: DEFEAT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

The Embassy transmits herewith summaries of proceedings of the Korean National Assembly for March 9 through March 14, covering debate and voting on the Constitutional Amendment proposal. Debate began on the morning of March 9 with a surprise call for consideration of the amendments being made by the anti-amendment group: continued with delaying tactics by the pro-amendment Democratic Nationalist Party as it attempted to regain the initiative; broke up in a fist fight on the Assembly floor Saturday afternoon March 11: and ended when secret balloting was forced on the evening of March 13. The voting stalled midway, in disorder, with DNP's charging that the anti-amendment group was violating the secrecy of the ballot by openly failing to mark its ballot slips. With added precautions for secrecy, the balloting started over again in a hushed, packed Assembly chamber the following morning, March 14. Results were as described in the reference telegram: 79 affirmative, 33 negative, 66 abstentions and 1 invalid ballot. (The measure needed 132 affirmative votes to pass.) Attendance on the final day reached 179 Assemblymen, only 6 short of the maximum possible. Total Assembly membership is 198, but 13 are under sentence on National Security Law charges.

Various indications during the proceedings (including an abortive abstention attempt by GKNP's on March 13) showed clearly what sources most votes came from. The affirmative votes were generally DNP (although some DNP's were opposed and may have abstained); negative votes were mainly from the Ilmin Club members who remained loyal to the President and did not join a scattered Ilmin defection to the GKNP, and the abstention group was comprised chiefly of GKNP's. According to LEE Chae Hyung, who acted as a sort of GKNP ■hip during floor maneuvering, the GKNP was not satisfied with Administration conduct of the government but at the same time wished to defeat the "untimely" amendment movement. A more cynical view is that the GKNP followed its opportunistic Assembly leader. YOON Ch'i Yung, in a try at having its cake and eating it too. A GKNP delegation did go to the President February 22, where, according to one participant, they demanded administrative reforms of the President. By plainly abstaining from the vote on the amendments, the GKNP "saved" the President and at the same time did it in a qualified way, pointedly reminding the President of his chief source of Assembly support in the crisis.

The aftermath of the amendments' defeat has been quiet so far. Opposing sides issued routine statements. President RHEE, who had throated a plebiscite (not provided for in the Constitution) should the amendment pass, announced his intention of asking the next Assembly for Constitutional amendments to provide popular election of the President and a bi-cameral legislature. (Enclosure No. 2) What is behind the latter suggestion is not known at the moment, but will be reported later.

The amendments came to the Assembly floor in an atmosphere of crisis. For the week of February 27 to March 4, the Assembly indulged in morning and afternoon field days of anti-Administration oratory, as the Assembly's first "Inspection of the National Administration" came up for discussion. (A report of the inspection is being despatched separately.) President Rhee appealed to the lukewarm Assembly - that only rose in respect to the President after Chairman SHIH Ik Hi motioned members to do so - to bring its complaints to him, not to the public. The Assembly disregarded the request. Paring the week, the President throated to go over the heads of the Assembly to the people, and the Home Minister, at Kaesung, warned the police to be ready for an emergency. The Seoul Police Chief KIM T’ae Sun, who told Embassy officers he calculated the probable vote on the amendments daily, feared at least 116 votes in favor of Constitutional revision. Clarence RYKE, director of the Office of Public Information, had a report (evidently unreliable) that a major shift among formerly anti-amendment GKNP Assemblymen made passage of the amendments almost certain. Eleven newspapermen were arrested. The police chief said they were members of a Communist intelligence network whose instructions included inserting pre-amendment articles in the papers the worked for. Six members of the family of the pre-amendment Assemblyman LEE In, including his brother and son, were arrested on subversion charges. Lee claimed it stemmed from his stand on the amendments. On March 8, the Federation of Patriotic Organizations staged a rally and then marched to the Capital, where 3,000 men demonstrated and amplifiers beside a police box throw anti-amendment shouts across the street at the empty Assembly chamber. In a show of internal solidarity, however, the Assembly voted to reject the written resignation of CH'A Kyung Mo, a pre-amendment Assemblyman who had once been charged with subversion but later released, and voted the release for the session's duration of Assemblyman KANG Ki Moon, once charged with subversion also but more recently with profiting from an illegal import transaction. (Kang, who had been in Jail continuously since August, 1949, came to the Assembly on March 9, barely able to walk. Other Assemblymen said that Kang, who had previously appeared vigorous and healthy, had been given electric shock torture.

DMP sources now indicate that their party Intended to bring the amendment proposal to the Assembly fleer Saturday, March 11. GKNP leader Yoon, however, reportedly hold a strategy meting in the Bright Moon Restaurant in Seoul Wednesday night March 8, and on the following morning GKNP Lee Chae Hyung and 21 others submitted a written urgent motion (forcing mandatory action) that the amendments be taken up that day. Approximately 130 Assemblymen were present, but during the next too hours, more thou 40 more hurried in. The DNP began delaying tactics immediately. SUH Sang Il, proponent of the original proposal for Constitutional revision introduced into the Assembly January 27, indulged in a long explanation of the amendment's intent, ^註01 read the amendments word for word, and then moved, with support of Chairman SHIN a DNP, to postpone discussions until the next day. The move did not succeed but the DNP did manage to avoid an afternoon session.

Even as the debate began, chances for the amendments' passage appeared almost gone. Administration pressure, however exerted, had forced public repudiation by eight of the original 79 signatories of the amendment proposal (including Lee In, who said "circumstances were now different") as early as March 8. As discussion continued, many Assemblymen who had privately told Embassy officers or informants that they favored the amendments came out publicly against them. The Moscow-trained ex-Communist CHO Pong Am, a strong Assembly figure who once termed the amendments "the only chance", was among those. The Assembly secretary-general LEE Chong Sun literally a rabid revisionist, admitted on the opening day that the defeat was "already settled" and predicted that the amendments would gather less than 100 votes in open balloting, and only a little more than 100 in secret balloting.

The debate developed no new arguments for either side beyond those described in previous Embassy despatches, except for the DNP contention by SUH Sang Il in his ■■■ming speech that the framers of the Constitution had changed from an agreed-upon cabinet-responsible system in June, 1948, upon the threat of the then Assembly chairman, Dr. Syngman Rhee, that he would lead a national movement if they did not change in favor of a president-responsible system. This ■eomeranged when KWUN T'ae Hi, Ilmin, chairman of the Committee on Education and Social Affairs, read the record of Assembly proceedings for those days, quoting words of Suh and other present revisionists favoring the president-responsible system as "imperative" for stabilization of domestic conditions. The anti-amendment group emerged during debate as being composed of those with strong personal loyalties to the President (Louise YIM and others), opportunists who saw profit in loyalty, and these with fears, of varying degrees of sincerity, that the amendments were premature would endanger ECA aid to Korea, or afforded too much chance for the hard-center Hankook Democratic Party core of the DNP to establish a "dictatorship" of its own. Pro-amendment forces included opportunists also, plus the business interests behind the DNP (standing for a greater DNP share of the control of government, and at the same time better administration from a business point of view) and a few idealists who saw in the amendments the hope of something better than the stalemated present Outstanding among the latter was KIM Seo Sun, a former primary school teacher who broke with the GKNP over the amendment issue. Kim has a high-pitched, unattractive voice but, in the opinion of many Korean listeners, he exerted an enormous affect on the Assembly in a 70 minute speech Friday afternoon March 10, warning against seeking "stability" of the sort enjoyed by Nationalist China before its fall. The DNP later printed and distributed Kim's speech. Inevitably, the President himself became an issue. SUH Chung Hi, an elderly DNP who was with the Korean provisional government in China, was in tears reminiscing of how, "53 years ago a group of young progressives led by Dr. Syngman Rhee framed a 'Hankook Association' which aggressively attempted to overthrow the monarchy of the Lee Dynasty." Rhee was imprisoned and he (Suh) was beaten by the Korean king's police. Suh invoked the dangers of a current tread toward "monarchy."

By Saturday morning, March 11, the anti-amendment group asked for an end to debate, after the elderly Suh Chung Hi - playing on his own prestige as eld-time patriot - cautiously suggested (unquestionably at the provocation of other revisionists) an Assembly motion to release all the arrested Assemblymen except ■O Il Hwan, LEE Moon Wan and KIM Yak Soo. The suggestion set off an uproar and Suh withdrew his motion. The two main protagonists, the GKNP and DNP, could not come to an agreement on the member of speakers to allot to each party in ■…■ry debates. The DNP still demanded more hearings; and when Vice Chairman KIM Tong Wan, a DNP, adjourned the Saturday afternoon session with the effect of giving the DNP its desired added time over the weekend, GKNP's and DNP's started hitting and kicking each other in disputes over Kim's alleged biased conduct of the meeting. Parties reached an agreement on speakers on Monday - two from the two major parties, and one from the Ilmin Club (which thereupon announced it was passing up its opportunity: presumably its mind was firmly made up in the negative.)

When it came time to call a vote, late Monday afternoon, it was evident that the secret ballot, once seen by pro-amendment groups as the amendments' chief hope of victory, now would serve to spoil the Anti-amendment group's hope of profiting politically from defeating the amendment - that is, would leave in doubt whether announced oppositionists actually had voted in opposition to the amendment. The DNP's carried a motion to vote on the amendments as a group (which left in the bait of a year's "emergency" prolongation of Assemblymen's term.) A secret ballot was then declared by Chairman SHIN to determine the method of voting: a GKNP motion for a standing ballot lost, and a DNP motion for a secret ballot with a screened polling both, carried 102 to 75 out of 178. A screen was set up at one side of the Assembly chamber, and voting began in order, Ilmin's going first, then GKNP's. Yoon Ch'i Yung and twelve other GKNP's following him walked past the ballot-marking table quickly without stopping (to mark their ballots) and a DNP poll-watcher cried that this way the opposition had voted openly, not secretly. Voting got no further than that Monday night. There was an hour of argument over whether or not the GKNP had voted "unfairly", during which 40 Assemblymen (including about 20 DNP's) left the hall, and at 7:30 p.m. Chairman Shin adjourned the meeting until the next day. When voting was started over again from the beginning, the next morning, added screens were put around the ballot-marking table: but because the GKNP intention to abstain was by then obvious, there were no complaints about the voting. At the end, there was scattered applause from the GKNP seats, and the Assembly adjourned quietly. (On March 16, the GKNP publicly announced, according to the DNP daily Tong A Ilbo that it had east the abstaining ballots.)

From the decision on the Constitutional amendments, and events leading up to it, several conclusions can be drawn:

1. Although the President defeated an immediate threat to his position, he gained no prestige from the showdown. The Abstaining ballots which assured defeat of the amendments were too conditional to count as clear pro-Administration votes.

2. Anti-amendment arguments failed to answer the strongest argument of the revisionists - that administration of the government is nearing a breakdown, with no means of calling responsible officials to account for maladministration. The stability of the present government ever a longer period depends a great deal on whether or not it can correct the situation revealed by inspection of the administration, the situation which provided the pro-amendment group with most of its ammunition.

3. Since large parts of even the anti-amendment faction, to say nothing of the pro-amendment group, feel that the present state of administration of the government is dangerously poor, some change has to be made. The concentration of power, responsibility and administrative detail from the office of the President seems in order. In this connection, the attached memorandum of the legal adviser to the FXJA Mission to Korea, suggesting that administrative reforms might be accomplished through simple change of the Government Organization Law, might offer a solution (easy of attainment since it would require only a majority Assembly decision to carry out).

4. The amendment proposal, offering a change, had a great deal of popular appeal both inside and outside the government (despite Administration-induced "popular" rallies to the contrary) and unless the Administration does something to capitalize on this feeling, the Communists may utilize it for their ends.

5. As regards Assembly parties, the GKNP, although it showed discipline throughout the Constitutional amendment debates, hung together only because its members had an issue in common. The GKNP otherwise represents no clear line of thinking in any particular direction: the DNP, which to a large degree represents conservative landed and business interests, is still cohesive.

Enclosures:

No. 1 Analysis

No. 2 News item

No. 3 Summary, March 9, ten copies

No. 4 Summary, March 10, ten copies

No. 5 Summary, March 11, ten copies

No. 6 Summary, March 13, ten copies

No. 7 Summary, March 14, ten copies

Prior to the enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea the question was discussed in great detail in the National Assembly as to whether Korea should adopt a Presidential system similar to the type of government existing in the United States of America, or a cabinet system similar to the type of government existing in Great Britain, France, Holland and other European democracies. The original draft of the Constitution provided for a cabinet system. According to the original draft, the National Assembly had the authority to express its confidence or non-confidence in the Prime Minister and the members of the cabinet: in case of a vote of non-confidence the Prime Minister and his cabinet, or the minister involved, had to resign. The original draft was substantially changed, however, and the entire executive power was vested in the President of the Republic of Korea, except that the President needs the consent of the National Assembly for the appointment of the Prime Minister (Article 69) and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Article 70).

At the time at which the final draft of the Constitution was under discussion, the proponents of the system of government finally adopted in the Constitution justified their proposals by reference to the governmental system in force in the United States of America. It is misleading, however, to compare the Presidential system of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea with the American type of government. Nothing comparable to the power of the Senate of the United States to consent to the appointment of executive and judicial officers (with the exception of the Prims Minister and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) can be found in the Constitution of this country. The absence of both a federal system of government and a system of autonomous, municipal self-government vests in the President of the Republic of Korea executive powers on all levels of government. These overall powers can by no means be compared to the powers of the President of the United States which are checked and balanced by powers of the executive officers of the various States and municipalities. The fallacy of the frequently repeated statement that Korea adopted in its Constitution the Presidential type of government in force in the United States becomes apparent if one compares the command of the President of the Republic of Korea over all police forces in this country with the divided control over federal. State and municipal police in the United States.

The Constitution of the Republic of Korea is implemented by the Government Organization Law (Law No. l) promulgated on 17 July 1948. The Government Organization Law substantially reinforces the tendencies towards the Presidential system in Korean. In order to understand fully the problems at present under consideration by the National Assembly it is indispensable to examine both the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Government Organization Law on the Jurisdiction and authority of the President of the Republic of Korea.

According to Article 51 of the Constitution, "The President of the Republic shall be head of the executive branch of the government and shall represent the government vis a vis foreign powers." The Constitution does not state whether in his capacity as "head of the executive branch of the government" the President shall exercise merely nominal functions or whether he is vested with the authority to run the administration on the various levels of government. Section 2 of the Government Organization Law answers this question by providing that "the President, as head of the executive branch, shall direct and control all organizations of the executive branch in accordance with the laws and ordinances." Since the President is vested with the power to direct and control the various ministries, departments and other government organizations, the Prime Minister, the ministers and the chiefs of the organizations subordinate to the Prime Minister (Director of the Office of Administration, Director of the Office of Public Information, Director of the Office of Legislation and Director of the Office of Planning) are merely the agents of the President when they perform their duties as nominal heads of their respective departments. Section 2 of the Government Organization Law seems to indicate that the President is also authorized to direct and control the activities of the Government agencies on the provincial and local levels, subject to such restrictions as are or may be provided in the laws on municipal self government. The power of the President to direct and control all organizations of the executive branch is not restricted to inspection and supervision of the activities of the chiefs of the various government departments. According to Section 2 of the Government Organization Law, second sentence, the President "may suspend or repeal orders or decisions established by the Prime Minister, department chiefs and heads of local administrative bodies in case such orders or decisions are deemed improper or illegal." Special emphasis should be laid on the fact that the suspending power of the President as established by Section 2 of the Government Organization Law refers not only to acts of the chiefs of government agencies (including the Prime Minister and the ministers and the heads of municipalities) which are illegal but also to acts of these government officials "which are objectionable from the point of view of expediency." i.e. improper. Accordingly, the President exercises a veto power over the routine administration of all administrative agencies in this country, and he is authorized to interfere at will with the routine administration of all administrative agencies in this country.

It is of course correct that according to Article 73 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister shall control and supervise the heads of the various departments of the Government. This authority of the Prime Minister is qualified, however, by the provision that when controlling and supervising the heads of the departments, the Prime Minister shall set "under the orders of the President."

The subordinate position of the Prime Minister and the various ministers is underlined by the provision in Section 9 of the Government Organization Law that the President "may suspend or repeal orders or dispositions of each Ministry of the Executive Branch which are deemed illegal or improper." The Prime Minister and the ministers, as heads of the various Ministries, are not only subject to a veto power of the President: the President is authorized by the Government Organization Law (Sections 3 and 7) to determine by Presidential Decree regulations pertaining to the chart of the various government agencies, the classification of government agencies and the compensation of government employees; moreover, the President may determine by decree the establishment and scope of jurisdiction of subordinate administrative agencies. Accordingly, the various ministers are not free to organize their departments in accordance with their own decisions; they rather are in all these questions dependent on the decisions of the Chief Executive. From this it follows that it is misleading to call the chiefs of the various government departments "ministers." When performing their functions they are, at best, secretaries of the Chief Executive. The nominal heads of the various ministries have no discretion in personnel questions. According to Article 62 of the Constitution, the President is authorized "to appoint and remove government officials in accordance with the Constitution and the Law." The Government Organization Law does not provide for any restrictions of the powers of the President in personnel matters or provide for the right of the Prime Minister or the ministers to select members of their staffs.

Although the Government Organization Law provides in Sections 14 - 25 for the jurisdiction of the various ministers in matters pertaining to their respective departments, the Constitution obliges each minister to refer to the State Council decisions related to "the establishment and direction of important policies of the various branches of the Government." Accordingly the President, as head of the State Council, directs and controls the policy decisions of each department of the executive branch of the Government. Since the Prime Minister and the ministers are subject to orders of the President, the State Council is at best an advisory body.

An effort was made in the Constitution to divide the responsibility between the President and the Ministers by the provision that "the acts of the President pertaining to State affairs shall be executed in written documents and all such documents shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister and the ministers concerned." The constitutional theory and practice of counter signature of all acts of the Chief Executive by the Prime Minister or by a minister originated during the nineteenth century in constitutional monarchies: its purpose is to vest constitutional responsibility for acts of the Chief Executive in the Prime Minister or the minister concerned. Under this system the signature of State documents by the Chief Executive is a more formality. The decision rests with the Prime Minister or minister who advises the Chief Executive to sign a certain State document. Under the Korean system of government the President is authorized to direct the activities of all officers and agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government, including the Prime Minister and the chiefs of the various ministries and departments. Since the final decision rests under the Korean system of government with the President, his signature is the decisive act and the countersignature by the Prime Minister or the minister concerned becomes a more formality.

Section 2 of the Government Organization Law emasculates also the right of the Prime Minister and the ministers to present, at their discretion certain matters to the State Council for decision. Endowed with the authority to direct and control the activities of the Prime Minister and the ministers, the President can easily evade decisions of the State Council and prohibit the Prime Minister and the ministers from submitting important matters to the State Council.

If the President decides to appoint certain persons his personal advisers and organize an Office of the President responsible exclusively to him, it is most likely that the Office of the President which is in daily contact with the Chief Executive becomes the real center of a governmental power. Under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, as supplemented and implemented by the Government Organization Law, it is almost inevitable that the powers of a "kitchen cabinet" will overshadow the powers of the State Council as established in the Constitution.

The Draft amendment to Article 51 of the Constitution provides that the President shall no longer be the head of the Executive Branch of the government. The President would be a figurehead and would exercise merely nominal and ceremonial functions.

It is contemplated under the draft amendment that the State Council shall no longer be presided over by the President but rather by the Prime Minister (Article 70, paragraph 1 of the amendment to the Constitution). Under the contemplated amendment the President shall have the authority neither to influence nor to veto the decisions of the State Council. The President is rather under a Constitutional duty to approve the decisions made by the State Council (Article 70, paragraph 3 of the amendment to the Constitution). The execution of all acts of the President pertaining to State affairs shall be dependent on the approval of the State Council and the State Council assumes the full responsibility for them. (Article 66 of the amendment to the Constitution). The powers of the President in personnel matters are abolished in all cases in which the head of a government organization has been invested by law with the power to appoint and remove public officials (Article 68, paragraph 3 of the amended Constitution). Most important is the suggested substantial change in Article 61 of the Constitution which provides that the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the National Military Forces. According to the contemplated amendment to the Constitution, matters pertaining to military affairs shall, in the future, be executed only with the agreement of the State Council.

marking table: but because the GKNP intention to abstain was by then obvious, there were no complaints about the voting. At the end, there was scattered applause from the GKNP seats, and the Assembly adjourned quietly. (On March 16, the GKNP publicly announced, according to the DNP daily Tong A Ilbo that it had east the abstaining ballots.)

From the decision on the Constitutional amendments, and events leading up to it, several conclusions can be drawn:

1. Although the President defeated an immediate threat to his position, he gained no prestige from the showdown. The Abstaining ballots which assured defeat of the amendments were too conditional to count as clear pro-Administration votes.

2. Anti-amendment arguments failed to answer the strongest argument of the revisionists - that administration of the government is nearing a breakdown, with no means of calling responsible officials to account for maladministration. The stability of the present government ever a longer period depends a great deal on whether or not it can correct the situation revealed by inspection of the administration, the situation which provided the pro-amendment group with most of its ammunition.

3. Since large parts of even the anti-amendment faction, to say nothing of the pro-amendment group, feel that the present state of administration of the government is dangerously poor, some change has to be made. The concentration of power, responsibility and administrative detail from the office of the President seems in order. In this connection, the attached memorandum of the legal adviser to the FXJA Mission to Korea, suggesting that administrative reforms might be accomplished through simple change of the Government Organization Law, might offer a solution (easy of attainment since it would require only a majority Assembly decision to carry out).

4. The amendment proposal, offering a change, had a great deal of popular appeal both inside and outside the government (despite Administration-induced "popular" rallies to the contrary) and unless the Administration does something to capitalize on this feeling, the Communists may utilize it for their ends.

5. As regards Assembly parties, the GKNP, although it showed discipline throughout the Constitutional amendment debates, hung together only because its members had an issue in common. The GKNP otherwise represents no clear line of thinking in any particular direction: the DNP, which to a large degree represents conservative landed and business interests, is still cohesive.

To assume that the adoption of the draft amendment would result in a governmental system comparable to the British system is, however, as misleading as the assumption that the present governmental system in Korea corresponds to the governmental system in force in the United States. The British system of government is based on tradition and its functioning depends on the existence of well organized and responsible political parties. A cabinet dependent on the confidence of a legislative body can function efficiently only if it can depend on the support of a clear majority in Parliament. The history of France during the last eighty years is ample evidence that whenever numerous loosely organized political parties are in existence the stability of a government dependent on the confidence of the legislative branch of the government is not guaranteed, and the adoption of a cabinet system may result in continual governmental crises. It goes without saying that the adoption of the draft amendment may result in an unstable government in this country. Korea lacks a parliamentary tradition, political self-discipline and strong well organized parties which would guarantee the functioning of a system of government similar to the British system. The history of the Weimar Republic indicates that a nos-functioning parliamentary system, far from removing the dangers involved is an autocratic regime, may pave the road to the establishment of a presidential dictatorship. This raises the question whether it is not possible to find a solution which short of an amendment to the Constitution duly restricts the powers of the President without falling into the extreme of a "cabinet system" as proposed in the draft amendment.

The sponsors of the amendment to the Constitution are motivated by the desire to curb th powers of the President and to eliminate his personal regime. Although it must be admitted that the Constitution of the Republic of Korea vests large powers in the President of the Republic of Korea, it should be emphasized that by a radical change of the Governmental powers in the President could be weakened considerably.

The Governmental Organization Law at present in force does not refer to Article 66 of the Constitution which provides for countersignature of all acts of the President pertaining to State affairs. The national Assembly would act within the framework of the Constitution if it amended the Government Organization Law to the effect that the President, when acting in his capacity as head of the Executive Branch of the Government (Article 51 of the Constitution) shall be bound by a majority decision of the State Council and shall be dependent upon the approval and countersignature of the Prime Minister and the minister concerned whenever he makes a decision in matters pertaining to State affairs. No amendment to the Constitution is necessary to provide in a revised Government Organization Law that the appointment and removal of government officials by the President as prescribed in Article 63 of the Law is dependent on the majority decision of the State Council and the countersignature of the Prime Minister or the minister concerned. Since Article 63 restricts the power of the President to (appoint and remove government officials by reference to a "law" it is possible to provide in revised Government Organization Law that in case of a removal of the Prime Minister, the latter is authorized to perform his functions until such time as the National Assembly approves the appointment of a new Prime Minister. Moreover, it would not require a Constitutional amendment to provide that pending an impeachment of the Prime Minister, a minister or ether official concerned, the President is obliged to suspend or remove the impeached government official. Since Article 71 of the Constitution provided specifically that the decisions of the State Council shall be by majority vote, a revised Government Organization Law could provide that the President is obliged to carry out the decisions of the State Council. Article 72 of the Constitution which provides that the Prime Minister stall "under the orders of the President control and supervise the heads of the departments" may be implemented by a revised Government Organization Law to the effect that such orders of the President require the consent of the State Council whenever they are concerned whith matters of important policy in the meaning of Article 72, No. 12, No. 12 of the Constitution or are presented by the Prime Minister to the State Council in accordance with Article 72, No. 13 of the Constitution. A revised Government Organization Law may also provide that all orders issued by the President within the framework of the powers delegated to him and all orders necessary for the enforcement of laws shall require the approval of the State Council whenever the Prime Minister or the minister who is supposed to countersign such orders refers the matter to the State Council in accordance with Article 72 of the Constitution.

A revised Government Organization Law may deal with the power of the Prime Minister or the Minister of National Defense to countersign acts of the President pertaining to his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the National Military Forces: it may provide that under certain conditions to be specified in this law, the Prime Minister or the Minister of National Defense may submit such questions to the State Council for a majority vote. It is, of course, realized that in all matters related to the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the National Military Forces, the situation is different from regular administrative decisions.

The National Assembly is free to provide in a revised Government Organization Law for the organization and functions of the Office of the President. It is not by chance that the office of the President is not mentioned at all in the Government Organization Law. It does not require an amendment to the Constitution to provide that the Chief of the Bureau of the President and the staff members of the Bureau of the Office of the President shall be appointed and discharged by the President on recommendation of the Prime Minister and with the approval of the State Council. Such an amendment to the Government Organization Law might be sufficient to eliminate the influence of persons who serve at present as inofficial advisers to the President and exercise de facto powers superior to the powers of the State Council.

When implemented by a revised Government Organization Law written in the spirit of divided authority and animated by the principle of "checks and balances" the Constitution of the Republic of Korea in its present form may prove a document satisfactory to the proponents and opponents of the amendment now pending in the National Assembly.

(TONG A) On the heels of the amendment bill defeat, President Rhee made a statement in which he specifically suggested that after the coming general election, the Assembly amend the Constitution for the purpose of adopting direct presidential election system and bicameral system.

"I consider it very fortunate for the nation that, after many days of debate, the Constitutional amendment deliberations came to a fair and just conclusion. Both the pros and sons were sincere in their fight until its final outcome. I certainly admit that the contributions made by the cons are very great.

The achievements, which Assemblymen have made in upholding the Constitution and in their efforts to build up and save the Republic of Korea from a crisis, thus further strengthening the foundation of our country, will have good effects later on.

The Constitutional amendment fight has been a valuable experience, and consequently the attempt to seek unjustified change in the Constitution will not happen again. Under democratic system, it is a rule for every one to have a conviction, fight against each other, and finally draw decision by a vote. Once a decision is made, both pros and cons must cooperate with each other to uphold that decision.

I, therefore, believe that with Constitutional Amendment issue as a God-given opportunity. From now on, all the Assemblymen will give up their grudges and complaints against each other and cooperate further in relation to the state affairs. I am determined through this experience to establish bicameral system after the coming general election, so as to prevent may groups or individuals from attempting unjustifiably to amend the Constitution. furthermore, it i■ wise to have the election of President by a plebiscite. The cooperation of the general public in this respect, is urgently wished for.

SECURITY: UNCLASSIFIED

TO: Department of State

FROM: SEOUL 267 March 15, 1950

REF:

SUBJECT: MEETING TO PROTEST　CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

Approximately three thousand people, including two hundred provincial "representatives," gathered at the Municipal Theater in Seoul at noon on March 8 to hear speeches and resolutions opposing amendment of the Korean Constitution. Following the meeting, the "representatives" and numerous young men obviously Youth Corpsmen but not wearing identifying insignia or carrying identifying banners proceeded to the National Capitol and the President's residence, to demonstrate with shouts, placards, and loudspeakers against the amendment. (The Defense Minister had prohibited the participation of Youth Corpsmen as such.)

The gathering and demonstration were sponsored by the Federation of Patriotic Organizations, which is a loose federation of over two score political and social groups, dominated by the quasi-governmental National Society. Both the sponsorship and the presence of PAE Eun Hi, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (who led the "mansei" cheer) implied Administration interest in the affair.

Program for the gathering in Municipal Theater (Enclosure 1) included brief anti-amendment statements by provincial representatives; talks by Assemblyman LEE Hang Pal of the Ilmin Club and YOON Ch'i Yung, Assembly Vice-Chairman and leading figure of the pro-Administration Great Korea Nationalist Party: and the "passing" of an anti-amendment resolution (Enclosure 2).

Lee's talk stated the Ilmin Club's unquestioning devotion to the President and Administration. An employee of the Embassy, present at the meeting, paraphrased him as saying, "We never criticize the Administration because if we criticize anything it will be immediately known by foreign countries… Our great President is worrying for the welfare of our thirty million people day and night with whole-hearted devotion… The amendment is absolutely wrong; we have many other things to do now which are more important… The amendment will destroy the good foundation which was built up by our President."

YOON was similarly paraphrased to the following affects: "Our Constitution is perfect; our President is good, and our government is also good; but some foreign countries criticize us as a second CHIANG Kai Shek government. Why? Because even though our government is good, yet some of the Cabinet members are bad. Then we will replace the bad members only; it is not necessary to change the government," He continued with a justification of Assembly criticism of the Administration, especially in connection with the recent inspection. The President, he felt, was not aware of many of the troubles of Korea. He "thinks the public is at peace and the Administration running smoothly because he sees only crowds of people in the streets, welcoming him with 'mansei' cheers. None of the Cabinet members give him any advice, and they are eager to protect their positions." He concluded. "It is hard to tell now whether the amendment will pass or not; but I am afraid it will not help, and may be worse than the present system. It is easy to repeat the old party strife which occurred at the end of the Lee dynasty."

At the close of the meeting, it was announced that two representatives of each province would stay in Seoul until action on the amendment was completed.

Sponsors: Federation of Patriotic Organizations

Time: Noon, March 8, 1950

Place: Municipal Theater, Seoul

Gathering: About 3,000 people, including about 200 representatives Meeting presided over by MYUNG Che Sei.

Opening

Salute to the National Flag

National Anthem

Prayer for the Deceased Patriots

Opening speech, by MYUNG Che Sei

Election of chairman and vice chairman:

Chairman　　　MYUNG Che Sei

Vice Chairman　YANG Kang

Public opinions of local districts on constitutional amendment, reported by the provincial representatives.

Speech: LEE Hang Pal, Ilmin Club

Reading of the Resolution of the Ilmin Club on the constitutional amendment

Encouraging speech by YOOK Ch'i Yung, GKNP

Passing of resolution.

"Manssi" cheer, led by PAE Eun Hi

Meeting closed at 2:00 p.m.

1. We rouse ourselves to action to keep our sacred Constitution.

2. We distrust and criticize the Assembly members who proposed the Constitutional amendment, because it is against public opinion.

3. The amendment is a resolution which is very close to transfer of national sovereignty, because the whole administrative power will be given to the premier, making the President's position an idle existence. Suppose such an important change is the only way to make a harmonious administration; then the Assembly members must apologize to the nation and retire for their mistakes in the making of the Constitution, before they insist on the amendment.

4. We exclude the amendment conspirators who are dreaming of one-party despotism and autocracy.

5. We absolutely exclude the amendment because it would cause a dissolution in the nationalist camp.

6. We absolutely oppose the impure amendment which was proposed from the selfishness of political power.

7. We will try members preparing the amendment at the anti-nationalist trials, and will exclude them at the next general election.

8. We shall defeat the amendment, the mask of term extension, and push forward for the general election.

9. We expect realization of the recovery of lost land and anti-communist attitude under the leading of the father of our country, President Rhee.

SECURITY: UNCLASSIFIED

TO: Department of State

FROM: SEOUL 267 March 15, 1950

REF:

SUBJECT: MEETING TO PROTEST　CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

Approximately three thousand people, including two hundred provincial "representatives," gathered at the Municipal Theater in Seoul at noon on March 8 to hear speeches and resolutions opposing amendment of the Korean Constitution. Following the meeting, the "representatives" and numerous young men obviously Youth Corpsmen but not wearing identifying insignia or carrying identifying banners proceeded to the National Capitol and the President's residence, to demonstrate with shouts, placards, and loudspeakers against the amendment. (The Defense Minister had prohibited the participation of Youth Corpsmen as such.)

The gathering and demonstration were sponsored by the Federation of Patriotic Organizations, which is a loose federation of over two score political and social groups, dominated by the quasi-governmental National Society. Both the sponsorship and the presence of PAE Eun Hi, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (who led the "mansei" cheer) implied Administration interest in the affair.

Program for the gathering in Municipal Theater (Enclosure 1) included brief anti-amendment statements by provincial representatives; talks by Assemblyman LEE Hang Pal of the Ilmin Club and YOON Ch'i Yung, Assembly Vice-Chairman and leading figure of the pro-Administration Great Korea Nationalist Party: and the "passing" of an anti-amendment resolution (Enclosure 2).

Lee's talk stated the Ilmin Club's unquestioning devotion to the President and Administration. An employee of the Embassy, present at the meeting, paraphrased him as saying, "We never criticize the Administration because if we criticize anything it will be immediately known by foreign countries… Our great President is worrying for the welfare of our thirty million people day and night with whole-hearted devotion… The amendment is absolutely wrong; we have many other things to do now which are more important… The amendment will destroy the good foundation which was built up by our President."

YOON was similarly paraphrased to the following affects: "Our Constitution is perfect; our President is good, and our government is also good; but some foreign countries criticize us as a second CHIANG Kai Shek government. Why? Because even though our government is good, yet some of the Cabinet members are bad. Then we will replace the bad members only; it is not necessary to change the government," He continued with a justification of Assembly criticism of the Administration, especially in connection with the recent inspection. The President, he felt, was not aware of many of the troubles of Korea. He "thinks the public is at peace and the Administration running smoothly because he sees only crowds of people in the streets, welcoming him with 'mansei' cheers. None of the Cabinet members give him any advice, and they are eager to protect their positions." He concluded. "It is hard to tell now whether the amendment will pass or not; but I am afraid it will not help, and may be worse than the present system. It is easy to repeat the old party strife which occurred at the end of the Lee dynasty."

At the close of the meeting, it was announced that two representatives of each province would stay in Seoul until action on the amendment was completed.

Sponsors: Federation of Patriotic Organizations

Time: Noon, March 8, 1950

Place: Municipal Theater, Seoul

Gathering: About 3,000 people, including about 200 representatives Meeting presided over by MYUNG Che Sei.

Opening

Salute to the National Flag

National Anthem

Prayer for the Deceased Patriots

Opening speech, by MYUNG Che Sei

Election of chairman and vice chairman:

Chairman　　　MYUNG Che Sei

Vice Chairman　YANG Kang

Public opinions of local districts on constitutional amendment, reported by the provincial representatives.

Speech: LEE Hang Pal, Ilmin Club

Reading of the Resolution of the Ilmin Club on the constitutional amendment

Encouraging speech by YOOK Ch'i Yung, GKNP

Passing of resolution.

"Mansei" cheer, led by PAE Eun Hi

Meeting closed at 2:00 p.m.

Enclosure 2

SEOUL 267

RESOLUTION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES MEETING

1. We rouse ourselves to action to keep our sacred Constitution.

2. We distrust and criticize the Assembly members who proposed the Constitutional amendment, because it is against public opinion.

3. The amendment is a resolution which is very close to transfer of national sovereignty, because the whole administrative power will be given to the premier, making the President's position an idle existence. Suppose such an important change is the only way to make a harmonious administration; then the Assembly members must apologize to the nation and retire for their mistakes in the making of the Constitution, before they insist on the amendment.

4. We exclude the amendment conspirators who are dreaming of one-party despotism and autocracy.

5. We absolutely exclude the amendment because it would cause a dissolution in the nationalist camp.

6. We absolutely oppose the impure amendment which was proposed from the selfishness of political power.

7. We will try members preparing the amendment at the anti-nationalist trials, and will exclude them at the next general election.

8. We shall defeat the amendment, the mask of term extension, and push forward for the general election.

9. We expect realization of the recovery of lost land and anti-communist attitude under the leading of the father of our country, President Rhee.

SECURITY: CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Department of State

FROM: SEOUL 253 March 11, 1950

REF:

SUBJECT: IMPENDING CRISIS OVER　AMENDMENT　TO CONSTITUTION

The movement to amend the Korean Constitution, defeat of which seemed highly probable during past weeks, has grown in strength. The President and Administration evidently are alarmed over the present possibility that the amendment will pass, and have shown signs of planning to take strong action if pro-amendment forces muster the necessary two-thirds majority when the matter comes to a vote in the Assembly. The amendment was called up for debate on March 9 in a surprise move of the Great Korean Nationalist Party, which opposes it. It is now expected that the issue will not come to a vote before March 13 or 14.

The amendment, which could establish a semi-parliamentary instead of a presidential form of government, with the Premier chosen by and responsible to the Assembly, has been pushed in large part because of irritation among members of the Assembly at the general tendency on the part of the President and his Cabinet to act independently of the Assembly, and sometimes, as in the expenditure of funds, beyond the law. The strongest and most cohesive party, the Democratic Nationalist Party, which numbers among its membership some of the ablest men in the Assembly, has come to become more and more antagonistic towards the President because of what they consider to be his inexcusable failure to accept an appropriate number of DNP members in his Cabinet or even to consult the Party leaders on major issues. For a long time the Party leaders avoided a showdown with the President for fear of the effect which internal political struggles would have in strengthening the Communists and other anti-Republic elements. They finally became so exasperated, however, that they decided it preferable to risk this danger because of what they considered of greater importance, the elimination of the Presidential powers, and thereby a complete change in government in which their Party would come to take the leading role,

Other Assemblymen were even more hostile to the President, apparently some of them fearing that they might be arrested for being in opposition to government policies, although the allegations would be Communist sympathy and support.

The Embassy has taken no official stand in regard to this controversy but when asked their views privately Embassy officers have indicated a concern lest the controversy over the Constitutional amendment, and indeed the success of the amendment itself, might lead to unstable government, which Korea could not afford at this time. Additionally, it has been suggested that it would be more appropriate if there were to be so fundamental a change in the form of government if the new Assembly, elected in the coming May 10 elections, should decide on that change rather than having it determined by the same men who created the present Constitution in June and July. 1948.

The President has had three possible avenues of compromise presented to him. but so far as is known has rejected all three. The first would have been an agreement to support extension of the Assemblymen's terms for another two years, by abandoning the prospective May 10 elections on the grounds of insecurity. Since perhaps half of the present Assemblymen are unlikely to get reelected, such an agreement would have been likely to secure the President plenty of votes to defeat the amendment.

The second compromise would have been to get rid of the Home and Agriculture Ministers, and possibly the Justice and Prime Ministers, replacing them by DNP man.

The third would have been to guarantee monetary and other government support to a selected list of opposition Assemblymen.

The President relied chiefly on a single argument in discussing this issue with Assemblymen who approached him: that the proposed change would lead to instability and weakness of government at a critical time, and that the U.S. Congress was unlikely to continue aid to such a government since the Congress was likely to decide such aid would be wasted.

The Government forces seemed to have the necessary votes to defeat the amendment by March 1, but suddenly over the weekend, March 4-6, the Government administration forces managed to develop unexpected strength, and by March 7 administration forces were seriously contemplating defeat. It was not until March 9 that the anti-amendment forces again came to believe they had recaptured sufficient strength to defeat the amendment.

The seriousness with which President Rhee finally came to view the situation may be gauged by his statement of March 3, published as a press release by the Office of Public Information (Enclosure 1). The statement possibly was a covert threat to appeal directly to the Korean people over the heads of the Assembly, should the amendment pass. (The Korean Constitution provides for no further action on an Assembly-passed amendment beyond the specification that "When an amendment to the Constitution has been adopted [by the Assembly] the President shall promulgate it immediately.") On the other hand the statement could represent only an appeal to the electorate to put pressure on their Assembly representatives.

According to the President's recent appointee, Home Affairs Minister PAEK Sung Ook (as reported in Tong a Ilbo, of March 3), the State Council decided that "all the Cabinet members and public employees should support the intention of the President, who is opposed to the amendment of the Constitution." This decision Home Minister Paek implemented with instructions to "all the police organs and local government units" on "the attitude to be taken by all the government employees toward the proposed Constitutional amendment." On March 3, Minister Paek on a visit to the 38th parallel gave out an impression of crisis, hinting at possible emergency action by the Administration. As quoted by Yunhap Sinmoon, a newspaper which often speaks for the President, Minister Paek instructed the police to be "always ready to carry out any order that may come from the President, especially at this juncture when the proposed Constitutional amendment is going to be discussed by the National Assembly… Accordingly police officers, who are public officials, should lead and enlighten the people in compliance with the policy of the government. I instruct you to stand fully prepared to take action on any order that may come from the President." (Enclosure 2)

On March 7 the Director of OPI stated privately to an Embassy officer that matters had, in his opinion, reached the crisis stage, and that the Administration had open to it three means of heading off the opposition group in the Assembly: (1) for the President to agree to and throw his support behind the movement to extend the Assemblymen's terms, which would secure him votes as a quid pro quo: (2) to change the Cabinet (to satisfy those revisionists who see amendment to the Constitution as the only remedy for maladministration, and to placate them with political plums): or (3) to bribe pro-amendment Assemblymen. The Embassy officer urged that the Administration should avoid use of alternatives number 1 and 3, but that it might give serious consideration to alternative number 2. By March 9, however, Dr. Ryee estimated that the amendment would be defeated without need of resorting to drastic measures.

In this connection, it is understood that the Minister of National Defense, SHIN Sung Mo, who has strongly opposed the amendment, has privately proposed to some Cabinet colleagues that the Cabinet resign en bloc, to give President Rhee a free hand in effecting a reorganization which could satisfy his political enemies.

Atmosphere in the Assembly recently had become even more markedly anti-Administration as a result of discussion of the Assembly's investigation of the Administration, and of Executive reaction to it. (Translated abstracts of the printed report on the inspection and summaries of open discussion on the report, are being forwarded separately upon completion.) Recently there have been two clear manifestations of the Assembly's anti-Administration attitude: the President's request in his appearance before the Assembly on February 28 that discussion of the inspection report be secret failed even to be seconded when introduced as a motion; and on March 7 the Assembly rejected, 117-17, the resignation of Assemblyman CH'A Kyung Mo, submitted February 23. Ch'a, originally arrested in August, 1949, with others on charges of subversion, reportedly was offered his freedom in exchange for resignation during the course of judicial investigation. (Both events will be covered by separate despatches.)

One of the major weapons in the Administration's defense against the amendment has been veiled reference either to ECA disapproval or more generally to probable adverse U.S. Congressional reaction to instability in government in Korea, leading to opposition to further aid to Korea. As a result, there have been several attempts to sound out the American position, among which Assembly Chairman SHIN Ik Hi's conversation with the Ambassador on February 23 is noteworthy (Enclosure 3). OPI Director Ryee, called before the Assembly March 2 to explain a sharply anti-amendment press release over his name, made remarks which some interpreted as suggesting that the Economic Cooperation Administration would withdraw aid should the Constitutional amendment pass. In a letter to Prime Minister LEE Bum Suk, a copy of which he also sent to the Chairman of the National Assembly. (Enclosure 4). Dr. Arthur C. BUNCE, Chief of the ECA Mission in Korea, took exception to Ryee's remarks and restated the traditional ECA position that "American economic assistance is not to be used to influence the political decisions of the people of any participating country." A copy of this letter was distributed in the National Assembly by the ardently pro-amendment Assembly Secretary-General, LEE Chong Sun on the following day. Proponents of the amendment feel that Dr. Bunce's letter has assisted their case by refuting the threat of ECA withdrawal.

Since estimations of votes on the proposed amendment pro and con have shifted from day to day, it is difficult to make a clear estimate of the actual vote when it is taken. As of this writing, however, there is reason to estimate that the necessary vote on the amendment will not be secured by its protagonist. Among other factors is the public announcement within the past two days by eight of the original signers of the petition for the amendment that they now will vote against it.

There would seem to be two possibilities if the amendment passed: (1) that the President would refuse to accept the verdict, and would attempt to rule by decree under his emergency powers, with strong police and possibly army action to back him up, or (2) that he would acquiesce, and that the National Assembly would attempt to rule through their own man, a Premier. Since he could be forced out of office from day to day by capricious and hostile votes, and since Koreans are notoriously cliquish with a general tendency to group against anyone who has achieved eminence and authority even by their previous efforts and support, most likely there would be a constant series of governmental changes, leading to extreme weakness in government, until either the government collapsed, or far more likely until a given Premier refused to be thrown out, and seizing power, ruled by decree with the support of the police and army. The third alternative would be that somewhere in this chain of events the President would find it possible to reassert himself with greatly increased powers.

None of these hypothetical possibilities would seem helpful to American interests in Korea, excepting insofar as some new and active Premier was able to develop a more efficient government than that now in authority. But it would seem unlikely that such efficiency would not be accompanied by less desirable features of government.

Enclosures

No. 1 OPI press release

Home Minister's a comments

Conversation, Ambassador Muccio and Shin Ik Hi

Letter from Dr. Bunce to Prime Minister

TRANSLATION, OPI PRESS RELEASE (From Tong A Ilbo, March 1950)

President Rhee again expressed his positive opposition to the proposed amendments to the Constitution on March 3. The President, maintaining that the matter ie so important in its consequences that it should be "decided by the whole people," warned that "nobody should stir up the people's state of mind before a fair and just way of decision is carried through."

His statement follows:

I am not going to add anything to the comments which I have previously made on the question of the proposed constitutional amendments, but I would like to make clear my point of view of the consequences of the question.

I still hold the belief that most of the members of the National Assembly are patriotic, conscientious leaders, and that therefore they will cast their most votes on any question of national importance which they must decide, completely in compliance with the will of the people. I am resting quite assured in this belief. I only want to make fully known the grounds I stand on in pledging to protect the Constitution as a Presidential responsibility.

It is generally held as proper that, in view of its own prestige and of the dignity of the Constitution, no National Assembly should make any amendment to the Constitution which it itself established, before new members of the Assembly are elected. It is this Constitution which provided us with the foundation of establishing the democratic Republic as against autocracy. Thus the import of the Constitution is so great that the democratic government will be shaken to its very foundations should the Assemblymen try to make amendments to it disregarding or ignoring the great import of the Constitution. And the resulting situation will be that the National Assembly will have the liberty to upset it (the democratic government) whenever it likes, and, then, the national foundation of the Republic itself will be shaken. This is why it is impossible to regard the question of the proposed amendments to the Constitution just as an ordinary matter,

A democratic nation stands on its Constitution. Should the people fail to protect their Constitution firmly, the political parties and politicians will arbitrarily make amendments to the Constitution in their own interests. which will lead to the creation of a chaotic state of things, and eventually they will struggle among themselves even with deadly weapons. This is the picture of what happens every year in a certain country in South America. If things go on in a nation in this way, the nation will come to ruins and the people will lose their civil rights. A nation may become an autocracy or a Fascist or a Nazi State while the clique of militarists or factional leaders are disregarding the Constitution and trampling upon the civil rights of the people, and thus making weaker and weaker the nation's foundation. In a South American country revolution can succeed revolution because there exists the Monroe a Doctrine preventing other countries from interfering in that country.

Our country today is in such a situation that the nation will be unable to maintain its life and, moreover, the people will lose their civil rights and will become as unhappy as they were during the past forty years, if any political party or clique of militarists should always make amendments to the Constitution from the morn to night. Therefore, the people must understand this well, and make up their minds that protecting the Constitution is the only way to the protection of national life and to the assurance of their civil rights. Thus they must realize their spirit and capacity of protecting the Constitution even at the cost of their own lives.

As for me, I am now living the remainder of my life which for fifty years has been dedicated to the revolution for democracy. I regard it as important as my own life to found the solid foundation of democratic government so that our coming generations may enjoy freedom and prosperity for the common good and hand the civil rights of the independent people down also to coming generations. If there exists any fear that the fundamental foundation of democratic government which we have been constructing should be shaken by any action by any political party or person, I can not help feeling keener and keener my responsibility to eliminate that fear.

Therefore, it is rather the action of proposing any amendments to the Constitution than the contents of the proposed amendments themselves, which is important. Therefore, everybody should not regard the matter as not deserving great attention, but make up his mind to protect the Constitution, But it is unjust under a democratic government that any protective measure should be carried out either by governmental power or by violence of any group of people. It is up to the people to freely express whether or not they like the idea of the proposed constitutional amendments. This is the only just way of protecting the Constitution.

Now is the high time when the people should express their will and thus oblige the members of the National Assembly to decide upon the matter completely in compliance with the expressed will of the people, realizing that they have the responsibility of representing the people's will in the National Assembly. Even if unfortunately such important amendments should be passed, the matter will be voted on by the whole people, because any question of national importance can eventually be referred to the public opinion of the whole people. In that case everybody shall regard the matter as important, cast his vote on it out of his true conscience and public morality, and obey the decision arrived at. This being a just way, people shall absolutely refrain from any speech or action tending to stir up or offend the people's state of mind unnecessarily.

It is not that no amendments whatsoever should be made to the Constitution, but that things must be remedied solely in the spirit of the Constitution. We are insisting on this. The people, as well as the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government, should absolutely protect all the important provisions of the Constitution, and never let any one shake up the fundamental basis established by the drafters of the Constitution. If there is anyone who tries to shake it, the whole nation will be informed of the fact, and then, the entire people shall promptly perform their duty as well as express their right to prevent it. If the people perform this national duty, then there will be no one who will try to make any amendments to the Constitution merely out of his personal feelings or for any factional purposes. I hope that my patriotic fellow-countrymen understand this thoroughly.

Translation of Article in Yunhap Sinmoon. March 6, 1950:

(Kaesung) - Mr. Paik Sung Wook, Minister of Home Affairs who left Seoul on the morning of March 3 on his inspection tour of the police installations in the 38th parallel areas, inspected the police stations of Pajoo, Kaesung, Paikchun and Yunbaik. After expressing his appreciation of the efforts being made by the policemen and officers there, the Minister instructed then to be "always ready to carry out any order that may come from the President, especially at this juncture when the question of the proposed constitutional amendments is going to be discussed by the National Assembly."

His instructions follow:

It is politically traditional that any legislative body organized to establish a Constitution should dissolve itself after it has established the Constitution. But in the case of our country, the National Assembly has been given a 2-year term of existence. However, it is legally unreasonable that the National Assembly should now try to make amendments to the Constitution. Moreover, any attempt of making any amendments to the Constitution now would do harm in the future of the nation, as our President has repeatedly pointed out.

In the past one and a half years of its existence, the government of our republic has developed remarkably and now become strong enough to meet any kind of a political change. The President, elected by the people according to the Constitution, has the duty of protecting the Constitution. It is in this view that the President expresses opposition to the proposed amendments to the Constitution and, also, the State Council has decided to oppose the proposal.

Accordingly, the police officers, who are public officials, should lead and enlighten the people in compliance with the policy of the government. I instruct you to stand fully prepared to take action on any order that may come from the President.

Subject: Constitutional Amendment

Participants: SHIN Ik Hi, Chairman of National Assembly Ambassador MUCCIO

I dropped in on Chairman Shin Ik Hi this afternoon following my return from Bangkok, I had a general chat with him regarding his proposed trip to the United States. The Secretary of the National Assembly brought up the possibility of having two of his bureau chiefs invited to the U.S. under the exchange of persons program so that they might study procedures in the Congress;

Mr. Shin then did what I expected him to do. That is, ask me what I thought of the pending constitutional amendment. 1 replied that as an outsider I preferred not to comment on internal factors which were spurring on the clamor for change. I was glad to have the opportunity of mentioning its effect outside Korea. The constitution was drawn up by the 200 men elected by the people of Korea less than two years ago. Now some of these same men were clamoring for a change. In the eyes of the U.N. and the world at large this might accentuate the impression that exists in some circles abroad that the Koreans really don't know what they want, that they are emotional, blow hot one day and cold the next and have no consistency. I went on that since elections were being held this May 10th a real effort should be made to maintain internal order and stability during the period prior to the elections. The new National Assembly which would convene shortly after that could consider the need for such an important change much more leisurely and dispassionately.

That same afternoon I had an opportunity of expressing the same views to LEE Hoon Koo, leader of the so-called farmer and labor group in the Assembly.

This morning (February 25th) I had a long visit from Dr. CHOUGH Pyung Ok. He evidently had called mainly to get my feeling regarding this problem. In addition to the above views we agreed that the proposal of having the cabinet responsible to the National Assembly would simply not work in a country where there were no well-organized, responsible political parties. We concurred that the constitution as drafted is adequate and the provision that major policy decisions be made by a majority vote of the cabinet in council was good. The difficulty the Korean Government finds itself in is not due to constitutional provisions but to the President's disregard thereof.

Office of the Chief

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am informed that the Director of the Office of Public Information on March 2, made a statement before the National Assembly which appeared to express an official view of the Government that economic assistance being supplied to the Republic of Korea by the United States through the Economic Cooperation Administration would be withdrawn should the pending amendment to the Constitution be passed.

His statement, if correctly quoted, was and is totally without foundation. The use of United States assistance to support political movements which are the sole concern of the Korean people and their government would be explicitly contrary to the policies of the Economic Cooperation Administration. I find it difficult to believe that the Director of the Office of Public Information would intentionally employ the name of the Economic Cooperation Administration to further a political and unconnected with economic assistance.

It is a basic principle of the Economic Cooperation Administration frequently expressed by its administrator, Mr. Paul Hoffman, that American economic assistance is not to be used to influence political decisions of the people of any participating country. The United States, as you are aware, is a firm supporter of the right of peoples everywhere to determine freely their own form of government, its structure and organization.

It is requested that the policy of the United States in this matter be called to the attention of the Director of the Office of Public Information and that immediate action be taken to correct any misunderstanding by the National Assembly on this subject.

His Excellency

LEE, Bum Suk

Prime Minister Republic of Korea

SUBJECT: President's Views on Constitutional Crisis

1. During the past month I have had several occasions to discuss the proposed constitutional amendment with both President and Mrs. Rhee, usually separately. Earlier I gathered from some remarks of the President that he was not too concerned about the prospect of the successful passing of the amendment because should the amendment pass he intended to appeal directly to the people. I discussed this first with Mrs. Rhee and then, upon her urging, with the President, expressing my opinion that there being no provision for an appeal to the people by plebescite or otherwise over the head of the National Assembly on matters of constitutional revision, an attempt to do so by the President would be a revolutionary act. I said that in my opinion such an act would be very harmful to orderly government in Korea and so I believed would adversely affect the program of American aid. I thought at that time my argument had been effective.

2. By March 1 it appeared that the anti-amendment forces had secured sufficient pledge votes to make passage of the amendment impossible. I received information to that effect from leading protagonists on both sides. The impact of Dr. Bunce's letter to the Prime Minister, which he also transmitted to the Chairman of the National Assembly and which was circulated throughout the National Assembly, seemed to have the effect of reviving the chances of passage of the amendment. Various persons remarked to me that the members of the National Assembly concluded from a reading of that letter either that ECA, and so the Mission, was completely indifferent to the question, or was actively in support of the amendment. In any case from the beginning of this week there was a great flair up of activity in connection with the amendment and as late as last night such balanced observers as Captain Shin Sung Mo, Minister of Defense, believed that the amendment was likely to pass unless the President was able to satisfy his opponents by significant political concessions. Captain Shin's suggestion was that all the members of the Cabinet should turn in their resignations giving the President a free hand, and that in appointing a new Cabinet he should replace incumbent Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Agriculture, and possibly the Prime Minister with persons satisfactory to the Democratic Nationalist Party. I talked with Captain Shin this afternoon, however, and he thought that if the amendment came to a vote tomorrow, as it is now scheduled, it would be defeated.

3. On March 3 President Rhee issued a long statement through OPI which I interpreted as being a scarcely veiled threat to refuse to accept the amendment if adopted by the National Assembly, and to be an expression of his intention to appeal directly to the people over the heads of the National Assembly. I called on Mrs. Rhee on March 8 and discussed the implication of the statement. I said that in my opinion there not only was danger of lose of American support if the Government became too unstable as a result of passage of the amendment but equally there would be danger of loss of such support if the Government became authoritarian. I said that the President's thought of appealing to the people through a plebescite against the decision of the Assembly when no plebescite was provided for under the Constitution would only be achieved both in violation of the Constitution and through excessive use of the police power. Mrs. Rhee said she agreed with me and urged that I speak to the President giving him this advice since she felt it would be more effective coming from me than from her. She left the room and soon returned with the President.

4. The President quite frankly told me it was his intention to appeal to the people through a plebescite. I asked whether he meant a vote in connection with the May 10 election, but he said that he meant a specific plebescite which he could arrange to hold at any time. The President then went into a discussion of his views of government, part of which I had heard from him several times during the past two years. I wish to say that I believe Dr. Rhee is completely sincere in his expression of these views and that he is sincere in his belief that they represent a democratic process. In my view Dr. Rhee has a mystical conception of his own role in history and of his relationship to the Korean people and he truly believes that he today represents the feelings and longings of the Korean people just as he has ever since 1919, whereas the National Assembly, being made up of selfish power hungry persons, does not.

5. The President said that when the Assembly was elected he also was elected and that the Assembly chose him as its first Chairman. Under his chairmanship they gave careful thought to the question of form of government and ultimately adopted the Constitution creating the form of government as it now exists in Korea. He was then elected President and he took an oath swearing to uphold that Constitution. He intended to maintain this obligation. If the members of the National Assembly were so lacking in a sense of responsibility to the Constitution that they would use a legalistic trick to bring about a fundamental change in the form of government, he did not intend to permit them to violate their trust. If they attempted to do so, it was his duty to appeal to the people from whose authority the Constitution came and to whom the Government belonged. He said he had full knowledge as to what the will of the people was.

6. I was unable to persuade the President that however unwise their action might be the members of the National Assembly were within their constitutional rights to so amend the Constitution as to change the form of government. I therefore reported to you and urged that you call upon the President to try to persuade him to make the necessary political concessions so that the crisis would disappear without resulting in either an extremely weak and unstable government or authoritarian rule.

Harold J. Noble

NO: 245

SUBJECT: Economic Provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Government Organization Law.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON D.C.

SIR:

The clauses of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, adopted at Seoul on 12 July 1948, which are primarily economic in character or of considerable importance in their implications for the economy, are the following:

Chapter II - Articles 8, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19;

〃　 IV - Article 57;

〃　 VI - Articles 84 through 89;

〃　 VII - Articles 90 through 95.

Chapter II of the Constitution, entitled "일꾼s and Duties of Citizens", sets forth in general terms the framework in which it is intended the economy should develop and provides the bases of economic equality before the law. Article 8 says in part, "No discrimination, in any field of political, economic and social life, derived from sex, religion, or social position shall exist." Article 14 provides for copyright, patents and the safeguarding of artistic property. Article 15 asserts a guarantee of the right of property, within limits defined by law and the public welfare, and provides compensation in cases of expropriation or other infringement upon private property for public purposes. Article 17 states the "right and duty" of all citizens to work, under labor conditions determined by law and with the extension of special protection to the labor of women and children. Article 18 guarantees "Freedom of association, collective bargaining and collective action of laborers … within the limits of the law," and proclaims the right of workers employed in profit-making enterprises to share in the profits of such enterprises, in accord with conditions later to be provided by law. Article 19 lays the groundwork for old-age insurance and social security, on terms to be provided by law. The economic bill of rights incorporated in Chapter II of the Constitution is entirely consonant with the political bill of rights in that while both appear secure against executive infringement, neither is protected from legislative restriction which may in the end entirely vitiate the principles on which they seemingly rest.

Chapter IV, Section I, of the Constitution establishes the office and powers of the President. Although this part of the document is primarily political, Article 57, providing emergency powers, could be of far-reaching economic effect. It says, in part, "When in time of civil war … or on account of a grave economic or financial crisis it is necessary to take urgent measures for the maintenance of public order and security, the President shall have the right to issue orders having the effect of law or to make necessary financial dispositions …" Although this power is to be exercised only in case there is not time to convoke the National Assembly, and any acts performed under it are promptly to be submitted to the Assembly for confirmation, the terms are sufficiently discretionary to furnish, under appropriate and easily imaginable conditions, the opportunity for presidential action in the economic field which might be very difficult for the Assembly to undo, even assuming it had the will and were not hampered by other clauses of the Constitution tending to restrict its authority.

The specifically economic portions of the Constitution are Chapters VI and VII. Chapter VI, entitled "Economy", echoes the Weimar Constitution in proclaiming in Article 84 "The principle of the economic order of the Korean Republic shall be to realize social justice, to meet the basic demands of all citizens and to encourage the development of a balanced economy." Within these limits, individual economic freedom is to bo assured. Article 85 states that mines "and other important mineral resources" (presumably yet unexploited or undiscovered), marine resources (including privately owned fishing grounds), water power and any other natural source of power which may be put to economic use, shall be owned by the nation. However, the government may "in case of public necessity" grant licenses to private persons in order to utilize and develop such resources, for limited periods of time and in accordance with the provisions of law; licenses shall likewise be cancelled in accordance with provisions of law. It appears from the terms of this Article that the major natural resources of the country, many of which are now vested and will eventually pass to the control of the Korean Government, will remain permanent state property and may become a prime object of political patronage and graft particularly when "licensed" to private persons. It should be particularly noted that the word "persons" is used rather than the word "citizens" thus permitting licensing to foreign individuals or corporations.

Article 86 declares that "Farmland shall be distributed to self-tilling farmers." The terms of distribution, however, are left to subsequent legislative action, and there is no hint furnished upon which to base an estimate of the extent to which present landlords may be affected. The record of the South Korea Interim Legislative Assembly with regard to land tenure and the composition of the present National Assembly, are not such as to encourage hopes for vigorous, independent and liberat action in this regard. However, the successful distribution of former Japanese-owned farmland to self-tilling farmers, carried out under the military occupation, and the inevitable dissatisfaction that reform has inspired among farmers not benefited by it, should prevent serious delay on the part of the Korean Government in dealing with this problem. On purely political grounds there is reason to believe that future legislation in this respect can hardly be less generous in its terms than the distribution decreed by the Military Governor.

Article 87 is potentially the most dangerous politico-economic provision of the Constitution. It provides that "important" transportation and communications enterprises, financial and insurance institutions, electricity, irrigation, water supply, gas and "any enterprises having public character shall be managed by the government or juridical persons of public law." However, "when required by public necessity", such enterprises shall be licensed to private operators under conditions similar to these governing the licensing of natural resources. By the terms of this Article, it is conceivable that the railway system, the post-office, every bank and insurance company and public utility in South Korea could become subject to allocation as a reward for political service, with disastrous results to the public interests. It is worth noting that no mention is made in this Article of the question of ownership of the enterprises listed. The great majority of them are now vested and will in time be transferred to the Korean Government. There would appear to be no hindrance to the Government's selling any or all of these utilities to one group of persons and licensing their operation to another group, since Article 87 deals exclusively with management. A final clause states that foreign trade shall be under the control of the government; this presumably means that there will be foreign exchange controls and possibly licensing of imports and exports.

Article 88 provides for emergency transfer to the state of ownership or management of any private enterprise, "in order to meet urgent necessities of national defense or national life …" Such transfer is to be effected in accordance with the provisions of law; until the law is actually enacted, however, it is impossible to guess what loopholes might be embodied in it to permit punishment of political enemies through confiscation of their property.

The final Article of Chapter VI, Number 89, provides that in the case of cancellation of a license, expropriation, use or restriction of property, compensation shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of law.

Chapter VII of the Constitution, "Finance", echoes not only the Weimar Constitution but traces its ancestry even more remotely to the Bismarck Constitution of 1871. Article 90 states that items and rates of all taxes shall be determined by law. Article 91 provides that the Government shall submit to the National Assembly at the beginning of each annual session (in December) for "decision" a budget covering all revenues and expenditures for the fiscal year next ensuing. Special funds may be established by the National Assembly on a continuing basis for expenditure over more than one fiscal year. The final clause of this Article, directly modeled after a similar provision of the Bismarck Constitution, says, "The National Assembly shall neither increase items of expenditure, nor establish new items of expenditure without the concurrence of the government." The power of initiative in fiscal matters, therefore, is entirely removed from the legislature, and the National Assembly itself can have no more funds for its own operations than the government chooses to allow it. The Assembly can do no more than reduce or eliminate items budgeted by the government.

Article 92 requires that floating of a national loan or the conclusion of any extra-budgetary contract obligating the national treasury, shall be submitted to the National Assembly for "decision." The nature of this "decision" is unspecified, but it would appear that it must be in the nature of a legislative veto or ratification as in the case of the budget itself.

Article 93 provides for the creation of a reserve fund to defray expenditures outside, or in excess of, the budget, a such expenditures to be confirmed by the session of the National Assembly next ensuing. No indication is given of what action might follow if the legislature should fail to confirm expenditures of this sort.

Article 94 states that the National Assembly shall enact the budget before the beginning of the fiscal year (l April). In the event that the budget has not been enacted in time, the National Assembly is to establish a temporary budget for a period not to exceed the first month of the fiscal year, during which time the regular budget shall be enacted. This provision is directly modeled on a similar Article of the Bismarck Constitution, and differs from the Japanese law which brings the preceding fiscal year's budget back into force if the new budget is not enacted in time.

Under Article 95, government accounts are to be investigated annually by a Board of Audit; and the latter's report is to be submitted to the National Assembly during the following fiscal year. The organization and functions of the Board of Audit, however, are to be determined by law and are not specified by the Constitution; implicitly, the Board is responsible to the executive, unlike the General Accounting Office of the United states, and would appear to afford no true legislative check on government expenditures.

II - Changes in the Economic Provisions of the Constitution from the First to the Final Draft.

The original draft of the Constitution which was presented to the Constitution Committee of the National Assembly for consideration was a basically different document from the form in which the Constitution was finally adopted. Major modifications were made in Committee and the draft which reached the floor was in nearly all important economic respects closely similar to the final form.

The first draft, which provided among other things for a cabinet directly responsible to the Assembly, outlined a modified socialist state. Chapter II, "The Rights and Duties of Citizens", declared, in Section 4, that citizens of Korea should enjoy the rights of equality, founded on the following provisions:

(1) A planned economy guaranteeing a minimum standard of living;

(2) Controlled management of the principal commodities necessary to life, and a "rational price policy";

(3) Reform of the tax structure and institution of a system of progressive taxation;

(4) Redistribution of farmland with priority given to farmers;

(5) Government management of principal industries and mines;

(6) A minimum wage system;

(7) Participation by labor delegates in the management and administration of factories;

(8) Institution of a "family bonus system" for wage earners;

(9) Provision of health and sanitary facilities in principal factories;

(10) Social security, unemployment, health and accident insurance.

Other economic provisions of the first draft of the Constitution are less important than those cited above, except perhaps Chapter 3, Section 12, which stated that the Legislative Assembly which "shall be highest in authority, holding power which cannot be overruled", shall have "the final decision of the budget." Most other Articles touching the economy are similar in tone to corresponding portions of the final draft.

It has been reported that the original draft of the Constitution made an attempt to consolidate the political desires of the Han Kook Democratic Party, including a cabinet directly responsible to the Legislature and a figurehead president, with the superficially more liberal economic tenets of Syngman Rhee's Rapid Realization of Independence Party. The original document, which pays Homage at least to liberalism, was altered beyond recognition in committee, and the resulting compromise draft which made its way to the Assembly floor provided for a presidential dictatorship rooted in an economic oligarchy.

Few substantive changes were made as the result of debate on the floor once the Constitution Committee's draft was presented to the Assembly. The first of consequence had to do with Article 87 (Article 86 in the Constitution as adopted), which read originally as follows: "As a matter of principle, farmlands shall be distributed to farmers…" Debate made it clear that many members felt the qualifying clause would place the Assembly's good faith in question, and that it was their intention to institute land-reform measures in fact as well as in principle. The change was made accordingly, although the conditions of distribution await the passage of appropriate legislation.

Article 18 was modified, following debate, to include the provision that workers employed in profit-making private enterprises should be entitled to share in the profits, according to the provisions of law. The first form of this modification was to the effect that workers should share "equally" in profits; this ambiguous adverb, however, was later removed.

Initially, Article 93 (Article 94 in the final draft) provided that in the event the Assembly failed to establish a budget for the ensuing fiscal year, the government should reinstate the budget of the fiscal year just concluded. This was modified, as we have seen, to cover the first month of the fiscal year only.

III - Economic Provisions of The Government Organization Law.

The Government Organization Law, apart from creating the usual executive departments concerned with economic affairs, provides for an Economic Board, very roughly analogous to the present National Economic Board, to be established within the Planning Office, which is one of the four Offices directly subordinate to the Prime Minister. The Director of the Planning Office is to be chairman of the Board, and the members, all appointed by the President, are to be chosen as follows: one each from the Departments of Agriculture and Forestry, Commerce and Industry, Finance, Transportation, Communications, Social Affairs, and Internal Affairs; four persons to be selected from industrial and financial circles; two persons to be selected from among members of learned societies. It is interesting to note that labor representatives are conspicuous by their absence. The seven government members of the board will constitute a majority capable of voting down the "public" members. It appears that the functions of the board are to be largely advisory, and probably honorific. Its duties are vaguely defined as the preparation of an over-all economic and financial "plan" and advising the State Council. Its inclusion is probably in deference to the existing National Economic Board, whose specific authority it will presumably in no sense inherit.

To The Department in original and ozalid

c.c. Polad

Con. Gen.

PJSturm/w