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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1093　16 September 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - Sup 1 0755)　14 September 1950

(Ref to ATIS Rot No. 1092)

PW entered NKPA at NAJIN (羅津) 6 Mar 50, and was assigned to 15th Div, 45th Rest, 120-mm Mortar Co. PW had no active training for about 1 month. Thereafter, PW and approx 50 other recruits who formed the company were given basic infantry training every day except Sunday until 20 Jun 50. Approx 2 hours daily was spend in mortar training. The mortar training included nomenclature, functioning, characteristics and service of the piece. Training was handled by platoon leaders with the assistance of the NCO’s. Both officers and NCO's seemed to be well trained although none had served with any force except the NKPA. The only field training received was that of a rifleman. PW’s unit did not receive mortars until 25 Jun 50. Consequently PW had no experience in actual service of the piece or in preparation of ammunition for firing prior to combat. All mortar training was conducted by pictures and diagrams. PW had been assured that his training was sufficient but it proved to be inadequate in combat although crews learned quickly enough from the squad leaders. During training period, PW never saw any Russian Advisors although he had heard of them. PW is platoon leader training till PW's transfer was SO, Chu Gil (徐周吉) (서주길) Jr Lt (少尉); Age 24. Entered NKPA in 49. 2nd Plt Ldr was KIM, Yun Ch’an (김운찬); Age 25; Jr Lt (少尉) other personalities, unknown.

PW’s unit crossed the 38° Parallel 26 Jun 50, at CH’UNCH’ON (春川). Unit received 6 x 120-mm M1943 Mortars, drawn by 6 x GAZ-51 trucks. All men and equipment were transported in these vehicles. Co carried a total of 200 rounds. Unit was in combat at the HAN River, YOJU, P'ALGONG-SAN (八公山) and 10 km N of YONGCH'ON where PW was taken prisoner. When PW was transferred to the infantry, his unit had 4 x mortars and 4 x GAZ-51 trucks. Other 2 x mortars and 2 x trucks had been sent to unknown destination in rear, reason unknown. Unit bad suffered only 2 casualties until that time. PW and 23 others were transferred to the infantry because of large losses in the 45th Regt. All NCO's remained in unit, supposedly to train new crews from replacements, if and when they arrive.

Co CO - Lt (中尉)

One (1) Political Officer - Lt (中尉)

One (1) M/Sgt (特務上士)

One (1) Sgt (中士)

Command Squad (指揮分隊)

One (1) Jr Sgt (下士)

Nine (9) Privates (戰士)

Three (3) platoons of one (1) officer and fourteen (14) men. Each platoon two (2) squads. Squad composed of one (1) squad leader (Jr Sgt) (下士), one gunner (Cpl 上等兵). and five (5) ammunition bearers.

The M/Sgt in Co Hqs served as 1st Sgt of the organization. The other Sgt in Co Hqs was designated as unit chemical NCO (化學 指導員) but his duties were actually to assist the 1st Sgt in matters relating to personnel and ammunition supply.

The Command Squad performs duties similar to those of an artillery battery detail section i.e, reconnaissance, telephone installation, wire-laying, and observation of fire.

One man in each squad was designated driver for his section. In PW’s unit one driver was capable of performing repairs and adjustment higher than 1st echelon.

Carbine with 150 rounds, 2 hand grenades per EM. One pistol per officer.

6 x 120-mm Mortars M1943. These mortars were manufactured in 1948, 1949, or 1950. The dates were stamped on the mortar tubes. Two binoculars, power unknown. One instrument similar to BC scope used for observation of fire. 4 x TAM field telephones. 6 km of field wire with reels.

Mortars were drawn by GAZ-51 trucks on a carriage similar to the 120-mm Tubular-type Carriage. Ammunition was fuzed with GVM-2 Impact Fuse. One type fuze has a triangular fuze setting which may be used to obtain time fire, hearsay. PW never saw this type fuze. PW knew how to set fuze for impact or delay but his unit always used impact setting in combat. PW stated minimum elevation of piece was 45°-maximum elevation 80°. Range 5,700 m Maximum rate of fire 12-13 rounds per minute. Most efficient rate of fire was 7 to 8 rounds per minute.

During displacements by vehicles, the command squad rode in the first vehicle. The entire unit could be and was transported in organic transportation. PW does not know when or by whom the firing positions were selected. Mortars were generally emplaced at the base of a reverse slope. Company front was straight or slightly curved, covering a distance of approx 60 m and permitting of 10 m distance between pieces. Pieces were never staggered appreciably. The base was dug in from 12 to 15 inches. Ammunitions (approx 20 rounds per mortar) was piled on top of the ground 10 m to the rear of the emplacement. Personnel and ammunition was never dug in. The remainder of the ammunition supply (approx 70-80 rounds per piece, according to PW) was left in the trucks, which, depending on the terrain, are normally placed approx 200 m to the rear (never left or right) of the mortar positions. If possible trucks were separated by at least 50 m. Vehicles were always camouflaged with grass and/or tree branches and placed under cover of trees to lessen possibility of observation from the air. PW's unit carried camouflage nets about the size of a truck. Generally camouflage was laid on top of nets and not intertwined. These net could be lowered during firing.

The mortars are usually emplaced less than 4 km from the front lines. For this reason, the unit has no organic security weapons such as MG's rocket launchers, AT Guns or mines.

The Command Squad lays wire from the CP to the OP. One TAM field telephone is used to each location. The remaining two telephones were kept as reserve. Unit was originally supplied with wire of Russian manufacture. At CH’UNCH’ON (春川) the unit captured some US wire and discarded the Russian wire. A telephone operator told PW that US wire is superior but PW doesn’t know why. Only one line is laid between CP and OP. This line is constantly patrolled by members of the Command Squad. If this line becomes inoperative, no other means of communication is available. Lines are not burried at the mortar position.

The Co CO occupies the OP with members of the Command Squad who act as assistants and telephone operators. In case of emergency, the Command Squad leader can adjust fire. In PW’s unit, this NCO and the officers could adjust fire. Initial data for direction is obtained by compass. Range is estimated. The direction of fire is telephoned to the mortar positions as a base azimuth. Range is converted to elevation setting by a firing table kept by the CO. According to PW, the Co CO is the only man who carries a firing table. CO adjusts fire and gives commands based on calculations made with the mil relation formula. This adjustment is made with the base pier i.e. the piece located on the left flank of the mortar positions. All pieces follow commands and are brought in on fire for effect. Companies of mortars cannot give massed fires. PW heard that his CO effected liaison with supported units but does not know methods employed. In the mortar position fire commands are relayed to the pieces by the telephone operator. Duty of Plt Ldrs is to check operations of crew and to keep records on ammunition expended. No restriction was ever placed on firing. Ammunition was plentiful until the HAN River crossing operation, after which re-supply was sporadic. Average daily expenditure was 20 to 30 rounds per piece. At time of PW’s transfer to the infantry his unit had 25 rounds per piece.

Rate of fire exceeded 1 round per minute on one occasion only. O/a 11 Aug 50, PW's unit fired sustained fire for 1 hour (1600-1700) to support a NAKTONG River crossing operation. His crew expended 120 rounds.

PW’s unit had no smoke or incendiary shells. PW has never heard of gas shells.

PW’s unit never fired specific counter battery missions to his knowledge. However, he heard that other unit had done so.

PW’s unit received counter battery fire on 3 or 4 occasions, but it is uncertain whether it was artillery or mortar. PW’s unit displaced after 8 to 10 rounds of counterbattery fire. Displacements were always lateral, usually about 400 m. No prior reconnaissance was made for selection of alternate or dummy positions on initial occupation. PW’s unit sustained 1 killed in action and no W/A from counter battery fire.

PW’s unit never engaged in night firing.

PW’s unit used passive air defense only. Trucks Ware dispersed and camouflaged. PW stated his unit never occupied a position which did not provide nearby natural concealment for vehicles. Pieces were camouflaged. Unit personnel retied on concealment alone. No order were issued to fire on enemy aircraft with small arms fire.

PW’s unit was attacked twice by enemy aircraft on/about 28 Jul 50. 4 x F-51’s attacked mortar positions with MG’s and dropped 3 bombs. No damage to equipment or personnel.

O/a 27 Aug 50, 4 x F-80’s attacked mortar positions with MG’s and dropped 2 bombs. One base plate slightly damaged by MG fire. No casualties. PW stated all members of his unit were quite afraid of enemy aircraft.

PW has neither seen nor heard of 107-mm or 160-mm Mortar.

For the Commanding Officer: