ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1035 14 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - Supl. No. 1 to No. 0700) 12 September 1950
(Ref to ATIS Rpt No. 895)
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | KIM Song Jun (金成俊) (김성준) |
| PW NUMBER: | 63 NK 581 |
| RANK: | Major |
| DUTY: | Regt’l Operations Officer |
| UNIT: | 13th Div (Code No 715), 19th Regt (Code No 717), Regt’l Staff |
| INTERROGATOR: | Sfc INOMOTO (ATIS) |
Contents of report is almost wholly based on PW's opinion and should be taken as such.
3. SPECIAL EEI:| a. Ground Forces: | To the best of PW’s knowledge, there are no Chinese or Soviet Communist forces in any part of KOREA. PW has never heard of reinforcements from these sources. |
| There are no well trained organized units south of the 38th parallel, only scattered, poorly armed replacements. If a formidable penetration is made anywhere along the NKPA’s first line of defense, and said penetration is exploited to the fullest, the NKPA, at least south of the 38° parallel, will be powerless. However, the 38th parallel, and north thereof, will be defended tenaciously. PW estimates that there are at present at least six (6) divisions, although poorly equipped, undergoing training in N. KOREA. If the UN decides to send forces north of the 38th parallel and such plans are carried out, this alone, will probably set off the 3rd World War. Current N. Korean propaganda advocates the defense of N. KOREA, if and when it is attacked, to the last man, woman and child. Furthermore, the free people of N. KOREA will be given full support of material and men, by her allies (CHINA and USSR). | |
| Another important factor to be considered, in the event that N. KOREA is successfully occupied by UN Forces, is the formation of guerrilla units out of the disbanded NKPA elements. The great number of die-hard N. Korean communists and the excellent terrain which affords uninhibited guerrilla operations, presents a very serious problem. | |
| b. Air Forces: | At present, N. KOREA has no formidable air force which is one of her greatest obstacles. During period 46-48, PW knew of at least 300 N. Korean youths (civilians Who were selected, after careful screening, for air training. These potential air men were sent to the USSR and according to last reports (time of PW’s capture) had not returned to N. KOREA. According to rumors among NKPA officers, these men will return to N. KOREA in the near future to organize a strong air force, materially aided by the USSR. |
| c. Naval Forces: | According to various sources, the N. Korean Navy is almost wholly composed of Russian PT boats, with main base in NAJIN. These boats are kept in reserve at present to be utilized in the defense of the N. KOREA in the event of UN amphibious operations against her coastlines. |
| d. Main Supply Routes: | Up to start of hostilities, all heavy equipment from USSR, such as trucks, tanks and artillery pieces, were transported over rail, entering the Korean border N of RAJIN. Lighter equipment, such as small arms and ammunition was transported by sea with RAJIN, CHONGJIN and WONSAN as major receiving ports. Supplies from CHINA and MANCHURIA flowed through SINUIJU. It is believed that the transportation of Russian and Chinese arms still utilizes the same supply routes. |
For the Commanding Officer:
WEELDREYER
Executive
