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OH, Sok Chang 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 5 NO. 1045 1950-09-08
    전사 중등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1045 14 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 0787) 9 September 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
NAME: OH, Sok Chang (吳錫昌) (오석창)
RANK: Pvt
AGE: 18
ORGANIZATION: 13th Div, Signal Bn, 3rd Co, 4th Plt, 1st Sqd (Battalion code: 728)
EDUCATION: 7 Years
OCCUPATION: Farmer
ADDRESS: PYONGAN NAMDO, PYONGWON GUN, KOM SAN MYON, SONGYANG NI, #745 (平安南道 平原郡 檢山面 松揚里 745)
DATE AND PLACE CAPTURED: 8 Sep 50. 1½ Km SW of TABU-DONG (多富洞) (1150-1460).
INTERROGATOR: Sgt SHIMABUKURO


2. ASSESSMENT:
Cooperative, but possessed a poor memory. PW seems fairly reliable. Not recommended for further interrogation.
PW was captured by U.S. “A” Company, 8th Cavalry Regiment on 8 Sep 50 (0600 hours), while sleeping in the mountains (1½ Km SW of TABU-DONG).
PW was separated from his unit, the Signal squad of 8 men who were assigned to 23rd Regiment, 13th Division, about ten days before capture while stringing telephone lines for the 23rd Regiment Headquarters (location unknown) 3 Km north of TABU-DONG area.

3, T/O & E OF PW’s UNIT:
Signal Bn, 13th Div: 350 men
Signal Co, 13th Div: 100 to 150 men
Signal Plt, 13th Div: 20 to 24 men (4 plts to Co.)
Signal Sqd, 13th Div: 7 to 9 men (3 sqds to pit.)
All signal personnel were armed with M1891/30 rifles, 100 rounds each, one grenade.
Squad Leaders: Sub-machine guns, two 70 round drums, two grenades.
Officers: M-1933 Pistols, one grenade,
Present Strength of 3rd Signal Company - 50 men (approx.) 3 Sep 50.
The Signal Bn last observed 700 - 800 meters south of TABU-DONG village on 5 Sep 50,
According to PW, the 23rd Regiment, 13th Division lost in battle most of its men (about 75%) somewhere near ANDONG vicinity on 21 Aug 50.

4. PERSONALITIES:
Signal Bn CO: KIM, Bong Han (김봉한)
Rank: Captain
HEARSAY: PW heard from fellow soldiers that Captain KIM was wounded 3 Km north of TABU-DONG on 5 Aug 50 by artillery shell.
3rd Signal CO: KO, Tok Pom (고덕범)
Rank: Lieutenant
Age: 40
HEARSAY: Lieutenant KO was wounded on 5 Aug 50.
HEARSAY: PW heard from fellow soldiers of the signal unit that 13th Division CG was wounded.

5. PERSONAL & UNIT HISTORY:
PW was inducted 20 Mar 50 at SINUIJU and assigned to the 13th Division on the same day. Received one week of basic infantry training, SINUIJU. Training included only rifle and close order drill. After receiving his training PW worked as laborer in the training area at SINUIJU.
On 15 Jun 50, PW’s unit (3rd Signal Company - 150 men) departed SINUIJU by rail and arrived at CHORWON on 18 Jun 50. About two or three days later they were joined by the two other companies (1st and 2nd Company) of Signal Battalion. On 25 Jun 50 the Battalion departed CHORWON, marched, arrived at UIJONBU on 29 Jun 50. On the same day (29 Jun 50) the Battalion marched and arrived at SEOUL on 1 Jul 50. After spending three days at SEOUL they marched to SUWON, arrived on 3 Jul 50.
Departed SUWON - 3 Jul 50 - marched - arrived CHUNGJU - (?) Jul 50.
Departed CHUNGJU - ? Jul 50 - marched - arrived - MUNGYONG ? Jul 50.
Departed MUNGYONG - ? Jul 50 - marched - arrived - HAMCHANG ? Aug 50.
Departed HAMCHANG - ? Aug 50 - marched - arrived - SANJU ? Aug 50.
Departed SANJU - ? Aug 50 - marched - arrived - KUMCHON ? Aug 50.
Departed KUMCHON - ? Aug 50 - marched - arrived - TABU DONG 1 Sep 50.
Between KUMCHON and TABU DONG the Signal Battalion, which was marched alone from the time it left CHORWON to TABU DONG, was constantly attacked by ROK forces and U.S. Aircraft. These attacks caused great casualties (number unknown).

6. FOOD AND AMMO SUPPLIES:
PW received average of two meals per day.
Ammunition last received at CHCRWON on 18 Jun 50 (100 rounds per man).

7. MORALE:
Troops’ morale was very low; lack of food and the long march, together with confusion resulting from the reasons for which they fighting, were the contributing factors.

8. U.S. PW’s:
HEARSAY: PW heard from fellow troops that there were American PW’s at SEOUL.

9. CAPTURED EQUIPMENT:
PW's were told not to use captured equipment because of the possible confusion in distinguishing between ROK troops and themselves.

For the AC of S, G-2:

SAKAMOTO

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