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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 703　23 August 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0521)　21 August 1950

Informant was fairly intelligent and talked very willingly. PW inquired if it was possible to volunteer for the S Korean Army, thereby help destroy the North Korean Communist regime who fed the public nothing but lies, such as US atrocities against PsW, US territorial designs of Korea and false promises of better living conditions. The lower ranking soldiers are slowly realizing the futility of this war, which had been glorified by their superior officers as a war of liberation, against the pro-US government of SYNG MAN RHEE.

Date inducted Dec 49 at SINCH’ON (850-1740)

Training - Received basic training with the 477 Unit (rifle Bn), stationed at SINUIJU, which was part of the 4th Inf Brig. Headquarters of the 4th Inf Brig was at CHINNAMP’O, at this time. Two other battalions of the 4th Inf Brig were also stationed at CHINNAMP’O. Mar 50, the 477 Unit joined the other two battalions at CHINNAMP’O and was then designated the 16th Regt.

A Korean Regt, recently arrived from CHINA, was designated the 18th Regt and stationed at KYOMIP’O (880-1780). The 5th Regt, transferred from an unidentified division, plus the 16th and 18th Regts formed the newly activated 4th Inf Div. 5th Regt, at this time, was stationed at P’YONGYANG. Since the start of hostilities, the 5th Regt was called the 17th Regt in communications and will be referred to as such hereafter.

4th Div was also known as the 485 Units; the 16th Regt as the 478 Unit. Code numbers of the other two regts, unknown. Details as to past movements and composition of the 18th Regts, made up of Koreans who had served with the CCF, unknown. There was no mass redistribution of personnel from the 18th Regt, as cadre, to the less experienced 16th and 17th Regts, however, some of the officers and NCO’s of the 16th and 17th Regts were ex-members of the CCF.

PW was assigned to the Signal Co, 16th Regt and received field training in wire laying technique and telephone communication system. Fired 6 rds on the Russian M1891/30 rifle for familiarization Russian indoctrination films were shown once a week. Russian industrial might, political history and economic conditions were depicted in these films. Documentary films of the last Russo-German war, were shown very often.

o/a 20 Jun 50 - 16th Regt departed CHINNAMP’O by rail.

o/a 21 Jun 50 - 16th Regt detrained at PYONGSAN.

25 0400 K Jun 50 - 16th Regt crossed 38 parallel. Strength of 16th including artillery and service units estimated to be approx 2,500. Whereabouts of the 17th and 18th Regts, unknown.

o/a 8 Aug 50 - 16th Regt arrived assembly area (exact location unknown) approx 200 M W of NAKTONG River. PW recalls SEOUL, TAEJON and KUMSAN, among the cities and villages that came within the sector of the 16th Regt in its advance southward. Up to this date, 16th Regt had received no replacements, and strength, including artillery and service units, was down to about 1,500. No tanks observed in this area. Whereabouts of the 17th and 18th Regts, unk.

o/a 9 2400 K Aug 50 - The entire 16th Regt, minus artillery, was shuttled across the NKATONG River on two Korean river boats. These two wooden boats, one with acted capacity of 30 and the other 60, were confiscated from nearby villagers (hearsay). The river crossing of the 16th Regt was completed without mishap by 0430 hrs. PW heard from his officer that the 17th and 18th Regts had also crossed the river in the vicinity. The size of the bridgehead was undetermined.

17 Aug 50 - 16th Regt was attacked by US forces. At time of PW’s captured, 16th Regt was completely disorganized with a casualty rate of over 50%. US artillery and aircraft accounted for majority of the casualties.

CG, 4th Div - LEE KWON MU (리권무), rank Maj Gen.

Rumored to have served in the Russian Army as a captain. Highly respected by his subordinates as a master tactician.

Original TO/E of Signal Co - Three platoons with approx 25 men each. Officers armed with Russian automatic pistols: EM with Russian rifles. Signal equipment included 1 x KOF-43 switchboard, 27 x field telegraph communication sets, 30 rolls of communication wires (one roll of wire measured 450 M in length, wire was made of copper insulated with hard rubber). Most of the signal equipment was either lost or damaged during the long march south. At the NAKTONG bridgehead, US walkie talkie and US communication wire were being utilized by this company.

Signal Co handles communications only between regt’l headquarters and its three battalion headquarters. No communication whatsoever, with any of the artillery units. Request for artillery support is handled by the division signal battalion, relaying the message through Div Hq, then to the artillery units concerned.

Prior to the captured of SEOUL, no regulated call signs were used. After SEOUL, a standard telephone call signal was put into effect by the 16th Regt which greatly improved the communication system. Following call signs (telephone) were in effect up to the time of PW’s capture.

16th Regt’l Hq - TORAJI (도라지)

Regt’l CO - TORAJI No I

Regt’l Bn Exec Off - TORAJI No II

Regt’l Political Off - TORAJI No III

1st Bn Hq - SONAMU (소나무)

1st Bn CO - SONAMU No I

1st Bn Bn Exec Off - SONAMU No II

1st Bn Political Off - SONAMU No III

2nd Bn Hq - PODONAMU (포도나무)

2nd Bn CO - PODONAMU No I

2nd Bn Bn Exec Off - PODONAMU No II

2nd Bn Political Off - PODONAMU No III

3rd Bn Hq - ORINAMU (오리나무)

3rd Bn CO - ORINAMU No I

3rd Bn Exec Off - ORINAMU No II

3rd Bn Political Off - ORINAMU No III

Call signs used by radio operators unknown.

Prior to his capture, PW heard from his officers, that PUSAN was to be the objective of the 4th Div.