ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2797 4 January 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS FWD #1 - 0280) 1 January 1951
| PW NAME: | NAM, Il Suk (南日石) (남일석) (Korean) |
| RANK: | None |
| AGE: | 37 |
| DUTY: | Interpreter |
| UNIT: | 39th Army, 116th Div, 348th Regt, 1st Bn, 2nd Co |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School - 6 yrs |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | KORANGPORI, S. KOREA |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 24 Dec 1950 1600 hrs |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | MANCHURIA, CHILIN SHENG, YENCHI-HSIEN, KWANG KAI-CHU, KWANGSO-TSUN (吉林省 延吉縣 光開區 光昭村) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | Same as above |
| INTERROGATOR: | Cpl T. Kato (ATIS) |
PW was not very bright and military information was nil, Reliability - fair.
a. Chronology:
2 Oct 50: Drafted into the CCF due to his knowledge of Chinese (three were drafted from his village).
17 Oct 50: PW assigned to present unit at HAI CHENG (海城) as company interpreter.
21 Oct 50: 1st Bn (approx 500 men - 30 men per freight car) boarded train at HAECHENG and reached ANTUNG RR Sta 0300 hrs 22 Oct 50.
22 Oct 50: Crossed bridge to SINUIJU at 1900 hrs. 1st Bn walked eastward on outskirts of city, following the main highway for KUSONG (龜城) and then a trail for TAECHON (大川) and UNSAN where 1st Bn dug in.
29 Oct 50: Engaged in first battle against US Force. Then withdrew to TAECHON.
End of Nov: Began general offensive, passing through KUNURI, KAECHON, SUNCHON, crossing the TAEDONG River at NAMBURI (南部里) approx 12 km E of PYONGYANG where the river was split and iced over. Marched through SANGWON (沙里院), SINMAK (新幕), NAMCHOM (南川), KUMCHON (錦川).
20 Dec 50: Reached PANDURI located adjacent KORANGPORI near the IMJIN River. Unit dug in and rested here.
24 Dec 50: Captured by ROK Troops while resting.
b. Unit Organization:
39th Army - Composed of 3 Divs of which 116th Div was one.
116th Div - Composed of 346th, 347th and 348th Regts.
348th Regt - Composed of 3 Bns.
2nd Bn - Composed of 3 Cos.
c. Unit Strength:
| Original | Present | |
| 2nd Co | 160 | 110 |
| 1st Bn | 500 | 400 |
| 348th Regt | 2,000 | ? |
| 116th Div | 7,000 | ? |
1st Bns losses occurred in their first battle. The Bn did not lose many men during their march southward, none from air attacks. Unit met no opposition until crossing the 38th parallel. No replacements since crossing YALU River.
d. Equipment:
No ammo received after crossing CHONGCHUN River. No new weapons received after crossing YALU River. Source of ammo unk.
e. Communications:
One telephone in Company command post. Runners were used between company, platoon and squad level.
f. Intentions:
To await further reinforcement and to liberate all of KOREA.
Intentions of the Bn unknown except to stay out of sight of UN aircraft.
a. Food Supply:
During their march southward each company was responsible for their food. Coupons were received from Regt’l Hq which stated that the bearer of the coupon were Chinese volunteer force to free KOREA. These coupons were given in exchange for rice. The coupon could be turned in for money later on.
Considerable difficulty was met in finding food because most of the villages were deserted when the Chinese came in.
Food supply was obtained from Regt’l supply after reaching the 38th parallel also consisting of local products.
b. UN PsW:
Approx 30 US prisoners were sent to the rear by 348th Regt in UNSAN area o/a 30 Oct 50. They were loaded on captured US trucks, driven by a US soldier (due to lack of drivers). It was said that they would be sent to MANCHURIA. None of them were injured seriously, though one had his head bandaged.
c. Conscription of Chinese and Korean Personnel:
On 30 Sep 50 a call came from the local district (KWANG KAI-CHU (光開區) office to each village in the are to draft Chinese and Koreans who could speak both Korean and Chinese.
PW and three others were picked by the village head. The village head had been told that a factory in HARBIN needed workers who could speak both languages and that the workers would be sent there for a few months.
Eleven men (all Koreans) were dispatched, to YENCHI City from the district. Physical examinations were given here.
Approx 400 men (20 Chinese) were sent to CHILIN City with PW from YENCHI-HSIEN 4 Oct 50 and were sent to the city hall. Among the 400 men were farmers, merchants and students and most of these were between thirty and forty years of age.
PW and 400 others were sent to LIAOYANG (遼陽), in freight cars 9 Oct 50. They were all sent to a barracks located 200 m W of the RR sta (believed to be RR guard barracks). A total of 1,000 Korean and Chinese (10% Chinese) were gathered here from all over MANCHURIA. Tests were conducted on language ability, none on ideology.
13 Oct 50 PW and 130 others were sent to HAICHENG (海城) in the first group. The 130 men were all assigned to the 116th Div Hq located here.
Tests were conducted here to pick the most intelligent men to be kept for Div Hq.
25 men were assigned to each Regt. The 25 men were then split up with 5 men for each Bn. The 5 men in the Bn were assigned one per company with one remaining at Bn Hq.
PW’s duty was not defined, but the only use his company commander had for him was to get directions from the local Koreans.
d. Chinese Recruiting in MANCHURIA:
In PW’s village (approx 300 families - 95% Koreans) no conscription in 1949-1950. Prior to that, about 15 men had gone to the CCF, two returned wounded and three deserted. Fate of the rest of the men were unknown.
e. Psychological Warfare:
Did you surrender? No.
Did you see any UN leaflets or hear any loudspeaker broadcast?
PW saw leaflets and heard broadcasts from airplanes in UNSAN area.
What did the leaflet look like or what did the loudspeaker say?
Leaflet said - if you wish to live, give up to the UN force and you will be treated fairly. Give yourself up by coming out to a wide road during daytime. The broadcast was in the same view also.
What was the effect on you? PW was already very discouraged at the idea of fighting and wanted to give up and return to MANCHURIA but did nothing about it.
Did you hear any talk about leaflets or broadcasts? If so what was said and what happened? Conversation usually was limited to the trusted few. Though the soldiers often spoke of deserting or surrendering the officers spoke oftener of the fact that they would be killed if they surrendered. Soldiers usually did not know who or what to believe.
For the Commanding Officer:
BATEMAN
