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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2896　16 January 1951

FIELD REPORT (IX CORPS MISD – 0209)　31 December 1950

PW was very cooperative, intelligent and had a very pleasing personality. He answered all questions freely although most of his information was based on hearsay, there was no reason or indication to believe that he was enlarging upon or falsifying whatever information he divulged. His information is therefore considered fairly reliable. He has no further information to warrant further interrogation.

A. After entering KOREA at MANP’OJIN via KAIYUEN, SSUPING and TUNGHWA, MANCHURIA, the 38th Army advanced southward and engaged the enemy in the TOKCHON area o/a 27 Nov 50. It then marched to and remained in KUNURI for one week after which the unit marched and arrived at TONGCHON o/a 23 Dec. While at KUNURI, PW heard that the 40th, 42nd and 60th armies had passed KUNURI earlier on their advance south towards P’YONGYANG.

The night of 222200 Dec, as the entire 38th Army arrived at YONCH’ON, the 114th Div took up positions at an unknown area south of YONCH’ON. The 112th and 113th Div marched for 400 meters beyong YONCH’ON where it headed east through a mountain trail found at this point for a distance of 3 kms. The 112th Div continued on its march east to take up positions at an unknown area. The 113th Div moved south from this point and deployed its regiment in the following manner: the 339th Regt was deployed 8 kms SE of YONCH’ON, with the 337th and 338th deployed in line to the west of the PW’s Regt in their respective order forming a defensive line.

23 Dec 50, after dusk, the 112th, 113th (less the 1st and 3rd Bn of the 339th Regt) and the 114th Divisions made a withdrawal to the N of what PW described as the highest mountain in the area immediately east of YONGCH’ON. PW was told that this withdrawal was made because (1) of UN bombings and artillery fire, (2) temporary shortage of food, (3) they were to make preparation for the next operation, (4) they wished to deceive the enemy. The area in which these 3 Divs were deployed was unknown to PW except that he heard there were soldiers all over the area of this high mountain.

The 1st and 3rd of the 339th Regt which remained behind were deployed in the following manner: 1st Bn was deployed roughly 7-8 kms SSE of YONCH’ON immediately east of a river located at the time, while the 3rd Bn was deployed on a little bill 6 kms S of YONCH’ON. The 7th, 8th and 9th Co CPs were located within a 1 km radius of the 3rd Bn CP. The 8th Co was deployed to the south while the 7th and 9th Cos were deployed to the N of the CP.

The 38th Army was composed of the 112th, 113th and 114th Divs. The 113th Div was composed of the 337th, 338th and 339th Regts. The Divs strength was approximately 8,000 men. There were approx 1800 men to each Regt. In addition, there was attached to the Regt a 82mm Mortar (4 mortars) Co of a hundred men. There were approx 450 men to a Bn. Attached to the Bn was a Hvy Weapons Co of 120 men, with 2 x 82mm Mortars and an unknown number of water-cooled HMGs.

PW heard from a political officer (a Captain) that there are 4 howitzers (type unk) to an army but these were useless because of the shortage of ammunition.

29 Dec, the same political officer, who had just returned from a conference at the 113th Div Hqs, stated to a group of soldiers that the 38th Army was to move towards the front preparatory to an attack to commence either on 30, 31 Dec, or 1 Jan. Why these particular days were chosen for an attack was unknown. The officer said in addition to the 38th Army, the 40th and 42nd Armies were to participate in the joint all-out offensive. The 42nd Army was to lead the offensive followed by the 38th and the 40th Armies respectively. The mission of one of the Divs of the 38th Army was to make a sweeping, flanking movement towards the UN Forces MSR, utilizing whatever gap may be opened by the 42nd Army’s initial attack, thereby cutting off the enemy’s retreat route. This officer did not say where this all-out offensive was to fall except that the area immediately to the front of YONCH’ON was to be attacked. He stated that there was no doubt about the final outcome of the coming offensive since there was only one ROK Div and a Regt to their immediate front.

a. All food presently eaten, was confiscated or obtained at the homes of NK farmers or villagers. No new food any kind came from MANCHURIA. Prior to deserting his unit there was about a week’s supply of rye, hard biscuits and etc accumulated for the personnel of the division.

b. Heard from officers that the CCF intended to utilize ‘Human Wave Tactics’ to overcome whatever disadvantages might ensue from the lack of tanks and artillery support. The officers were heard to state repeatedly to disgruntled enlisted men, who questioned the absence of tanks and artillery in KOREA, that the situation here in KOREA is not suitable to tanks and artillery warfare. No explanation of the situation was made, however, he believes that this situation is due to lack of air power in support of the CCF in KOREA.

c. PW observed horses completely covered with white cloth, used in transporting ammunition during or after a snowfall. He also stated, he observed ammunition being stored and concealed under bridges during the day.

d. The morale of the EM of PW’s Co was low. However, he said that all complaints were kept to themselves, lest they be punished severely.

e. All homes, to PW’s knowledge, were filled with CCF soldiers during the night. He strongly recommended that all houses that remain standing be bombed at night by the use of flares for better results.

f. PW strongly urged that a greater volume of surrender leaflets be dropped. It was impossible to share and read a surrender leaflet with the others because they were watched by their officers. Should a leaflet be dropped in the midst of a heavy UN bombing or artillery barrage, it would induce more to surrender because, as the PW put it, everybody wants to live and it is only when he is fearful of dying that he sees the light in surrendering.

g. Road Signs:

For the AC of S G-2: