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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2730　18 December 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS FWD NO. 3 - 0003)　13 December 1950

Reliability: Fair

Apr 49 - Inducted into CNA at home address and served for about 7 mos in the CNA.

Sep 49 - Captured by CCF in SZECHWAN Province.

30 Oct 50 - Assigned to the 26th Army, 76th Div, 288th Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Co. Prior to this PW's unit used their CNA unit designation.

o/a 19 Nov 50 - The entire 26th Army arrived at UNKIANG (臨江) MANCHURIA. There were many other CCF units there but PW did not know their designations. PW heard from his Co political officer that the 4th Field Army was scheduled to follow the 3rd Field Army to which the 26th was assigned. That night 76th Div crossed the YALU River on a large steel bridge. Then the 76th Div continued marching and arrived at a small village. The Div stayed in this. area for several days.

Early Dec 50 - The entire 76th Div arrived at KOT'ORI and were deployed in the neighborhood mountains. There were many other CCF Divs in this area. On the march from the Manchurian border to KOT'ORI the 76th Div was subjected to air attacks almost every day and movement was only at night. The number of casualties due to air attacks was small in the 76th Div. PW observed CCF wounded and stragglers mostly with trench foot going back toward the Manchurian border.

At KOT'ORI the 76th Div and other CCF units had surrounded an UN unit, but due to severe air attacks and Arty, the CCF units suffered heavy casualties and did very little fighting. PW believes that the 76th Div was practically annihilated and those who retreated left their weapons behind. PW with a large number of CCF troops, including men from other Divs, were surrounded by US troops for tow days and during this two days there were hundreds of CCF casualties. 5 Dec 50 PW and about 100 other CCF troops surrendered to US troops.

There was a Korean interpreter in PW’s Co. He stayed with the Co CO. He was a member of the NKA and was sent to join PW's Co at LIAOTUNG Province (遼東省), MANCHURIA Nov 50. PW believes that there was a Korean interpreter in each Co of the 76th Div.

26th Army: CHU KYANG (珠江)

The CCF Army consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Field Armies. The 3rd Field Army, to which PW's Div was assigned consisted of the 9th and 4 other unknown Army Groups.

The 9th Army Group consisted of the 26th and 2 unknown armies. The 26th Army consisted of the 76th and 2 unknown Divs. The 76th Div consisted of the 228th and 2 unknown Regts. The 228th Regt consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Bns. The 2nd Bn to which PW was assigned consisted of the 4th, 5th, 6th rifle Cos and a HMG & mortar Co. The 4th rifle Co consisted of 3 Plats. Each rifle Plat consisted of three rifles Sqds and a mortar Sqd. PW was assigned to a mortar Sqd.

When the 76th Div departed SHANGHAI for KOREA there were the following number of men in the various units. However, the figures are now same in all the units. Some units had a larger number of men than other units.

Sqd: Approx 15 men

Plat: 40 - 50 men

Co: Approx 180 men

Bn: Approx 700 men

228th Regt: Approx 2,800 men

76th Div: Approx 10,000 men

Following are the weapons in the 76th Div:

HMG: 1 or 2 in each Sqd

SMG: Carried by Sqd leader

US carbine: Carried by Plat leader

LMG: 2 or 3 in a Plat

Mortar: 2 in a Sqd

The 76th Div was comparatively well equipped and the men carried bolt action rifles. Each rifleman was provided with about 100 rds of ammo and 5 hand grenades. The machine guns had approx 800 rds of ammo. There were about 150 rds for the 2 mortars in a Sqd. Horses transported the machine guns.

When the 76th Div was about to leave SHANGHAI a lecture was given by a political affairs officer. They were told that they were being sent to the Korean-Manchurian border to prevent the UN forces from entering MANCHURIA. However, when the 76th Div arrived at the Manchurian border the men were told that they were going to battle the UN troops and drive them out of KOREA, which was for the security of CHINA. Many men had no desire to come into KOREA, but they could not do anything about it as they were closely watched by the officers. If a CCF soldier was found roaming in a village he was likely to be caught and sent back to his unit by communist party members.

Since entering KOREA the men were fed only 2 meals a day and the quality was poorer than the food they received in CHINA. Only severe cases of the trench feet were sent to the rear and mild cases of the foot disease were kept on duty.

While in the KOT'ORI area in early Dec PW observed other CCF soldiers with surrender leaflets, but has not seen any being dropped from above. He has not read any surrender leaflets. Whenever a soldier picked up a surrender leaflet he had to turn it over to the officers.

On the night of o/a 19 Oct 50 while crossing the steel bridge near UNKIANG, MANCHURIA PW observed 8 UN PWs crossing the bridge heading toward MANCHURIA. As it was a moonlight night PW could readily see that they were UN PWs. These UN PWs appeared to be in good physical condition, but walked slowly. They had their original US uniforms. PW heard other CCF soldiers saying that most of UN PWs were sent to SHEN-YANG (瀋陽) MANCHURIA and about 3,000 US PWs were interned here. PW also heard that the UN PWs were treated fairly and they ate white rice and tea while the CCF soldiers ate millet or maize.

PW heard that about 100 PWs were taken prisoners by the CCF in the KOT'ORI area and were being sent to the rear. PW believes a fairly large number of Wpns, and ammunition loaded trucks were captured by the CCF.

PW heard from his comrades while in CHINA that Munitions factories were located in FEIPING and SHANGHAI and these factories were manufacturing rifles, machine guns, mortars, hand grenades, and even Arty.

Also a chemical plant was rumored to be located in FEIPING area and Japanese, Chinese and Russian technicians were employed here. Cosmetics for women and gunpowder was believed to be manufactured. Further de tails unknown.

PW stated that if the UN did not have any airplanes or artillery the CCF could easily drive the UN forces out of KOREA. He believed that US troops were afraid of the hand grenades when surrounded. He states that CCF troops are harder and more capable fighters. They could do without food for 1 or 2 days and are used to hardships.

For the Commanding Officer:

TEN EYCK