ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1791 12 October 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1075) 8 October 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | PAK Sun Hui (朴順熙) (박순희) |
| RANK: | Jr Lt |
| AGE: | 23 |
| DUTY: | Plt Ldr |
| UNIT: | 10th RR Security Brigade, 12th Bn, 3rd Co |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School (6 yrs) |
| OCCUPATION: | Porter in a hotel |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | MIWON-NI (미원리) (1060-1530) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 2 Oct 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | P’YONGAN PUKTO, PAKCH’ON GUN, PAKCH’ON MYON, SOBU DONG, #35 (平安北道 博川郡 博川面 西部洞 三五番地) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | MANCHURIA, MUKDEN-HSIEN, MUKDEN NANPEI SHIHKOU, PEISHIH T’UNG #16 (滿洲 奉天省 奉天市 北市區北市街 一六號) |
| INTERROGATOR: | KAJIWARA (FEAF) |
Previously interrogated by 164th MISD. Report number unknown PW was very cooperative. He seemed to be quite intelligent and readily gave information. No further interrogation recommended.
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:Chronology:
29 May 48: PW entered the security service at P’YONGYANG, and assigned to the prison guard in P’YONGYANG.
o/a 17 Oct 48: Promoted to Sgt (中士).
o/a 27 Sep 48: Transferred to the P’YONGYANG Constabulary Bn.
o/a 25 Apr 49: Promoted to Sr Sgt.
1 Oct 49: Transferred to the 10th RR Brigade and promoted to Lt (少尉).
o/a 1 Dec 49: PW’s RR Guard company was transferred to SINUIJU and was assigned guard duty at CH’ONGJU
o/a 20 Apr 50: PW’s platoon was transferred to SONGCH’ON (成川).
o/a 1 Jul 50: Departed SONGCH’ON.
o/a 5 Jul 50: Pw’s Bn arrived in KAESONG.
o/a 5 Aug 50: Transferred SEOUL and performed guard duty at RR station. The brigade Hq was at that time in SEOUL.
30 Aug 50: The PW’s Bn arrived in TAEJON. The RR Guard Bn was supposed to establish its Hqs in KUMCH’ON, but since the condition on the line was still unstable, the Bn waited for a month.
29 Sep 50; The Bn Hq staff left TAEJON without leaving orders with its subordinate units. They headed toward SEOUL.
30 Sep 50: PW heard that UN troops were in CHOCH’IWON. The company commanders then ordered that their respective units were to be dissolved and the troops to split up in squads and try to go N of the 38th parallel. PW led a squad of 5 men and headed north.
2 Oct 50: PW arrived near the town of MIWON-NI (1060-1530) and asked what would happen if he should surrender to UN Troops. He was told that he would be safe, so he surrendered to ROK troops in MIWON-NI. Enroute to his place of surrender the others (5) were killed or lost.
Organization and Strength:
The strength of the 10th RR Security Regt as of 29 Sep 50 was roughly 700 in each of the three (3) Bns. On 30 Sep 50 the 12th Bn was dissolved and troops were told to head for the 38th parallel in small groups. The 11th Bn had approximately 700 men and was till in TAEJON on 30 Sep 50. The 700 men in the 10th Bn had departed for CHOCHIWON on 27 Sep 50.
Supply:
When the Pw’s 12th Bn dissolved on 30 Sep 50 the one month’s supply of rice that was on hand in the Bn supply was divided among the troops. Each man carried one weak’s supply of rice.
Other Units:
On 1 Oct 50 PW observed about one company of NKA troops at a point 28 km NE of TAEJON. Only half of the company carried rifles. No heavy weapons were seen.
Morale and Propaganda:
The morale of the PW’s Bn was high until they entered TAEJON. At TAEJON they were detained for one month for NKA to occupy the TAEGU Area. During this time they heard of numerous NKA setbacks and of the INCH’ON landing. They were under constant air attack. The general morale of the troops became low. Troops read UN Safe Conduct leaflets, but majority of them would not believe them because of effective N Korean counter-propaganda.
PW stated that there are many troops scattered in the hills, but are unable to surrender because of fear of being shot by ROK troops who would not give NAK troops a chance to surrender. PW stated he bought civilian clothes from a farmer and walked into town to surrender. He claims otherwise, ROK troops would shoot at the sight of a NKA uniform.
Strategic Information:
RR traffic from MANCHURIA to KOREA: PW was stationed at the RR stationed at SONGCH’ON (24/1150-1670) from 20 Apr 50 to 1 Jul 50. He observed the following traffic toward SINUIHU:
1. One express passenger train in the morning and one local passenger train in the afternoon, prior to 25 Jun 50. After commencement of hostilities passenger traffic was curtailed to one local train daily.
2. Prior 20 Jun 50 one or two freight trains daily loaded with sheet iron coke, lumber and ore. After 20 Jun 50 only empty trains were observed heading toward SINUIJU.
Traffic form SINUIJU to East:
1. Passenger train traffic same as west bound.
2. Prior to 20 Jun 50 there were one to two freight trains daily Cargoes were generally crated, but PW believed they were clothing an paper products from the SINUIJU paper mill.
Military Traffic on the RR:
From 20 Jun 50 PW observed only military traffic on the east bound train. From 20 Jun 50 to 1 Jul 50 PW observed 3 to 4 trains with about 15 freight cars pass SONGCH’ON every 24 hrs. PW observed that about 3 of the 15 freight cars had troops. Rest were loaded with trucks, horses, and arty pieces. PW observed 45mm AT gun, 122mm Howitzers and 76mm Field guns. PW noted that all troops wore NKA uniforms and thought these troops were from the division stationed at SINUIJU. He saw no evidence to show these troops came from the COF. All RR freight cars on the east bound train had Korean markings. believes if any troops from the CCF entered KOREA, they must have entered after 1 Jul 50.
PW occasionally saw Chinese civilians on the east bound express but never saw any other nationalities. The N Korean Security guard was posted on the N Korean side of the border at SINUIJU and the CCF at ANTUNG on the Manchurian side of the border. Custom officials were also present. To cross into MANCHURIA one must have a permit from the supreme Peoples Party.
4. GENERAL:1. PW stated that marshalling yards were used only at night, so daylight raids on the yards caused only damage to the tracks and could be repaired within 24 hrs. During the day the trains and cars were hidden in tunnels.
2. The RR traffic and marshalling yards were controlled by the NKA and the RR Security force acted only as guards.
3. The 10th RR Security Brigade was the only RR Security unit in N KOREA. As of 25 Jun there were twelve (12) Bns in the 10th Brigade with 700 men in each Bn. N of the 38th parallel, prior to 25 Jun 50, all principle RR stations, all bridges and tunnels had one squad guarding them.
For the Commanding Officer:
WEELDREYER
Executive
