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LIU, Ping Cheng 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 24 NO. 2843
    총위 미분류 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2843 12 January 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS Special Report - #011) 7 January 1951
(Ref to ATIS Rpt No 2737, 2745, 2758, 2842.)

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: LIU, Ping Cheng
PW NUMBER: 151
RANK: Capt
UNIT: CCF 66th Army, 197th Div, 590th Regt
DUTY: PW served as Regimental Operations Officer (S-3), 590th Regt

2. WEAPONS:
Artillery weapons mentioned during the course of the interrogation - three (3) types, all closely comparable to the Japanese made, model 91 (1931) 105mm Howitzer, mountain gun. All these were cited as being of Japanese manufacture. One gun was described as having a muzzle brake (the only variance with Japanese made artillery pieces noted).
Each weapon was described as having a maximum elevation of 45° and a maximum depression of 0° (horizontal or parallel with the ground).

3. ORGANIZATION:
Artillery battery supporting regiment - six (6) guns.
Three platoons - each platoon, two (2) guns.
Each platoon - one (1) sub-squad assigned as observers (4 men).
One (1) squad (12 men) assigned as observers for the battery in addition to the above noted.
Artillery battalion supporting division - eighteen (18) guns.
Three batteries, organized as above.
One (1) squad (12 men) assigned as observers for the battalion, in addition to those functioning for each of the three (3) companies.

4. FIRE CONTROL:
Artillery Battery:
Battery observed group (12 men), commanded by the assistant battery commander, maintaining an OP forward of the artillery battery. Distance varies according to tactical situation.
Telephonic (wire) communication is maintained by the OP with the Arty company commander.
Due to concern over aircraft detection of artillery pieces and consequent destruction thereof, artillery missions are usually fired between the hours of 2000 and 0300 in support of infantry assaults. Therefore, the principal function of the OP is to observe deployment of enemy elements and location of fortifications and communicate information of same to the battery commander. The battery commander, in turn, notified regimental headquarters which is responsible for the preparation of the night fire plan. Regimental staff designated the general and specific targets. One fire plan is prepared, no secondary plans or auxiliary plans. If, during the night, the enemy withdraws or shifts its position right or left, the prepared fire plan is abandoned and no substitutes or additional plans are formulated until the following day. (Interrogator’s Note: Complete lack of flexibility.)
In preparation for the attack, the artillery battery is deployed not closer than 200 yards from the enemy line of defense. The first wave of infantry troops is situated immediately to the front of the artillery battery. Successive waves are echeloned in depth to the rear of the artillery battery. No preparatory fire is laid by the artillery battery. At H hour, the initial wave commences its assault. Artillery barrages occur when the assault wave reaches a point approximately 100 yards from the enemy line of defense and continues firing until the objective has been neutralized.
During the attack, the forward artillery OP is charged with the responsibility of maintaining artillery fire ahead of the advancing elements. Information is relayed to the battery commander who, through the use of messengers, informs gun crews to lift or shift fire. The observer sub-squad assigned to each platoon, computes the necessary corrections.
Normally, during the attack, infantry battalion commanders channelize specific requests for artillery support to the regimental staff (by telephone or portable radio - “walkie - talkie”). However, if the situation is urgent and communication cannot be established with regiment, requests are made (by telephone) to the assistant battery commander who, in turn, notifies the battery commander. Forward artillery OP maintains a telephone line to each battalion CP.
Artillery battery weapons fire, as a unit, on one section of the assigned target. Shifting to other sections of the target is accomplished as a unit. None of the six guns, organic to the artillery company, operate individually within the target area. Fire is mass and centered collectively upon one target or a portion of one target. Control of fire power is obtained by verbal (those weapons nearest the battery commander) and written (messenger - for those weapons beyond the range of oral commands) communications. As a consequence of the above, firing is irregular although concentrated.
During night operations, distances between pieces vary according to the terrain and the tactical situation. Generally, the guns on the right and left flanks of the battery are separated by a distance of approx 200 - 300 feet and the depth of the company is approx 100 feet.
Fire power of the battery is massed. Interdictory and harassing types of fire are not employed by the CCF.

5. ARTILLERY BATTALION:
For night operations, the divisional artillery battalion is assigned to that regiment considered to have the most difficult mission. For all practical intents and purposes, the regiment assumes control of the artillery battalion and prepares the battalion fire plan in accordance with the regimental mission.
The division commander reserves the right to divert the divisional artillery battalion to the support of another regiment but rarely exercises this prerogative. Once the plan is formulated it is considered immutable and should it fail to disperse the enemy it is discarded. No additional plans are made until the following day. The regimental artillery battery operated independently of the divisional artillery battalion. Whereas, within the artillery battery - normally supporting regiment - the forward OP assumes only the responsibility of preventing artillery shells from falling upon the advancing units, the divisional artillery battalion forward OP is charged with actually controlling the fire, shifting it - within the target area - according to requirements of the situation. In this instance, observer groups assigned to each of the platoons within each battery of the divisional artillery battalion provide only assistance to the gun crews, rather than actual corrections.
Within the divisional artillery battalion, inter-battery communication is by telephone. Portable radios are used to maintain contact with regimental staff and the infantry battalions.
The only coordination effected between the divisional artillery battalion and the regimental artillery battery is that of simultaneously laying and lifting of fire upon their respective targets at the initial and concluding phases of the assault.
During night operations, the divisional artillery weapons are no closer than 600 yards from the enemy line of defense. Areas of deployment, for each battery within the divisional artillery battalion, approx that of the regimental artillery battery.
Normally, the eighteen (18) guns of the divisional artillery battalion are assigned one general target approx 200 feet in diameter. If the target area exceeds 200 feet then the artillery battalion awaits specific requests from the infantry battalions, through regiment, as to priority to be given to different sections of the targets. As with the artillery battery in support of regiment, fire power of the battalion is concentrated upon one section of the target.
Infantry battalion commanders are not, normally familiar with the divisional artillery battalion fire plan. As a consequence, unit mortars are seldom initially coordinated with the artillery battalion concentrations. Additionally, it is the doctrine of the CCF that the primary mission of the mortars be that of destroying personnel and the primary mission of artillery, destruction of enemy fortifications. Hence, as PW expressed it, “why coordinate?”

6. DAYTIME ASSAULTS:
Principal differences from night operations:
1. Guns on right and left flanks of regimental artillery battery (including those of divisional artillery battalion) spaced approx 400 - 500 feet apart. Depth, 300 feet.
2. Guns remain relatively immobile, taking full advantage of natural cover - to counter aircraft observation. At night, however, the general practice is for each weapon to fire five (5) rounds and move 100 - 200 feet.

7. EQUIPMENT:
Artillery Battery (in support of regiment):
One Japanese made range finder, similar to Japanese made 75cm base range finder, inverted coincidence type with 12 X magnification, vertical field of view 2°, horizontal field of view 3°, calibrated to measure ranges up to 10,000 meters.
Assigned to assistant company commander; One battery commander’s telescope, Japanese made, similar to Japanese Model 93, permitting measurement of angle of site from -300 to 300 mils, as well as measurement of azimuth. Cannot be placed in a horizontal plane for better stereoscopic vision. Has an 8 X magnification and a 6° field of view.
Assigned to assistant company commander.

Arty Battalion:
One above described range finder to Bn observer group (forward OP).
Four battery commanders telescopes. One to each company forward OP and one to the Bn forward OP.
Notes Applicable to Regimental Artillery Battery and the Divisional Artillery Battalion:
1. Smoke shells, for preparatory screens, not used.
2. Only HE shells.
3. No proximity fuse or any other method of predetermining exploding of projectiles.
4. No meteorological information utilized in computing fire data.
5. U.S. artillery positions located by visual methods. No compass azimuth-direction by sound and flash.
6. No fire grid or firing chart used.

For the Commanding Officer:

SHAPPELL

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