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FUNG, Kang 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 40 NO. 3622 1950-12-18
    전사 중등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3622 27 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS SPECIAL REPORT - 022) 15 February 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: FUNG, Kang (馮坤)
PW NUMBER: 67 NK 700322
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
AGE: 38
DUTY: Ammunition Bearer
UNIT: 3rd Field Army, 20th Army, 60th Div, 180th Regt, 3rd Bn, 7th Co, 3rd Plat, Mortar Sqd
EDUCATION: 7 yr Primary School
OCCUPATION: Clerk
PLACE OF CAPTURE: HWANGCH’ORYONG (黃草嶺)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 18 Dec 50
PLACE OF BIRTH: CHINA, KUANGTUNG-SHENG, CHINGYUAN-HSIEN, PICHIANG, TANGTANGHSU (中國 廣東省 淸遠縣 港江溩 堂圩)
HOME ADDRESS: CHINA, KUANGTUNG-SHENG, YINGTE-HSIEN, HANKUANGHSU (中國 廣東省 英德 ■洸圩)
INTERROGATOR: Pvt Jick Lee (ATIS)

2. ASSESSMENT:
Cooperative; memory appeared fair, but answers appeared to lack conviction. Reliability of info furnished fair to poor.

3. MARCHES:
a. Security: Used sentries and buglers to give air warnings. Each battalion sent one squad forward approximately 100m ahead of the columns. In event of contact with UN forces the Sqd Ldr sends one or two EM to report to the commander. Each Regt had approx 6 bazookas for use against tank attack.
b. Night marches began at approx 1800 hours.
c. Generally, PW unit traveled over main roads on marches to HWANGCHORYONG (  ). Part of the way over mountain trails.
d. When marching on main roads, PW unit moved in two columns. When over trails move in one column.
e. Halts were made for 20 minutes to 30 minutes. No security measures were taken during halts.

4. BIVOUACS:
a. All men prepared fox holes before sunrise, and remained in them during daylight hours as precaution against air attack. Size of the fox hole was approx 5′ x 2′ x 2′. Sentries were posted around the bivouac area to guard against ground attack.
b. Each plat sent one sentry to stand guard. Sentries posted approx 60 m from bivouac area. One sentry at each point.
c. Breakfast at 0500 hours. Personnel then returned to fox holes to sleep. At noon, lunch sent to each fox hole.
d. Used blanket to cover fox-hole when windy, and used snow to camouflage the area.
e. For camouflage purposes when marching and during bivouacs, every man turned his uniform inside out where there was snow on the ground. (CCF uniforms are made reversible for camouflage purposes). Usually used trees or snow to camouflage around bivouac area, depending on the terrain.

5. PATROLLING:
a. When the CCF unit changes position, each company sends out a patrol to survey the area before establishing the bivouacs. Subsequent to the organizing of the bivouac area, company sends out one patrol of 4 men twice a day (at dawn and at dusk for security).
b. The strengths of the night patrol is the same as that of the daylight patrol. Each company dispatches one night patrol of 4 men, to maintain contact with other companies and for security purposes.
c. The patrol leader is equipped with one SMG and two hand grenades. Each member of the patrol had one rifle and is supplied with 100 rounds ammunition and 4 hand grenades.
d. Before the patrol goes out, members are given instruction by the company commander. In case patrols are ambushed or cut off one member is to be sent back immediately for help. If impossible to send for help, they are given orders to remain and fight. In the event of tank attack, concentrate all hand grenades against the tank.

6. DEFENSIVE TACTICS:
a. PW unit used individual for holes and emplaced machine guns on defense.
b. Battalion defense position: Set up the OPLR with two company strength. Each company equipped with three 60 mm mortars. Each mortar supplied with approx 25 rounds. Two 30 cal HMG. Nine 30 cal LMG. Twenty (20) Tommie guns and to each EM a Model 38 Japanese rifle. Mortars, HMG and LMG are extended along the line, emplaced at contain points, so as to concentrate fire at any road junction. Also set up about 4 individual OP approx 60 m in front of the OPLR for observation. The Bn heavy weapon platoon was approximately 100 m behind the OPLR under control of the Bn commander. Hvy Wpn plat is equipped with two 82 mm mortars, one 30 cal HMG and four Tommie guns. The MLR was approximately 200 m behind the OPLR with one company strength, the reserve company is equipped with three 60 mm mortar, nine 30 cal LMG and 18 Tommie guns. This company is held in reserve in case the OPLR is penetrated by enemy, in which event the reserve company immediately goes into the OPLR. If the enemy action is stopped, the reserve unit will counter-attack on the flanks in an effort to encircle the enemy. The gun positions are camouflaged with snow and white sheet are used to cover the guns.
c. Pick and shovel used to dig individual fox holes.
d. The normal depth of a defensive position is approx 200 m. The depth of a line is approximately 15 m.
e. Each battalion reserves one company as a covering unit. Each company reserves one platoon as covering force for company and each platoon reserves one squad as covering unit.
f. If enemy defeated, the reserve unit will await the Bn commander’s order to counter-attack, and report to regimental Hq for additional troop, if needed. (See diagram below). Small units are instructed not to cross highway to assault the enemy because of fear of tank attacks. If enemy strength appears weak, attempts are made to encircle and capture them.

7. ANTI-TANK TACTICS:
a. The regimental Hvy Wpn Co had 6 bazookas placed on the hill, along highway, and camouflaged.
b. Rocks were employed to build road blocks across highways. Behind the road blocks, two men, with dynamite sacks, were concealed. If the tanks break through the road blocks, dynamite sacks are thrown at the tanks. The depth of obstacle is approx 2′. The height is approx 5′.
c. Each squad had one “tank-killer” team composed of 4 men. Each team is equipped with 3 hand dynamite sacks. Each sack contains 12 oz yellow dynamite (See sketch below). The team is instructed to get as close as possible to the nearest tank before throwing the dynamite sack at the treads or climb to the top of the tank and throw a hand grenade into the tank while the other two men cover.
c. Used large dynamite sacks as mines, emplaced on the highway (weight and specifications or means of detonation unk).

8. AMBUSH AND ENCIRCLING TACTICS:
a. Usually composed of one platoon posted approx 50 m from both side of highway.
b. Used dynamite sack and hand grenade in ambushes.
c. Let the enemy unit pass through first, and then attack from the rear and encircle enemy unit.

9. SUPPLY:
a. Each man carried 5 cattys (1.3 lb per catty) Chinese hardtack (a salt flavored dough bread). This ration was for period of two days.
b. They have sufficient ammunition resupplied as needed from Regt Hq and carried to the front on horses and mules. Stored ammunition in piles under trees or caves.
c. Personnel were issued cotton padded uniforms. Clothing was adequate. If lost or worn out, can not replace in front lines. If in the rear, it could be replaced.
d. Cannot wear civilian clothing except members of Reconn company.

10. COMMUNICATIONS:
a. PW heard regimental headquarters used radio.
b. Used runners to carry written and verbal messages. Most of the time messages were verbal. Runners employed up to distances of a mile.

11. TRAINING:
a. PW received approx one year of training.
b. Normal training period approx 3 months.
c. While PW on training, wherein live ammunition was used, only fired once and then only two rounds.
d. Lacked ammunition for training.

12. MEDICAL:
a. While PW unit in SHANGHAI (上海), about 50 men were ill with Japanese encephalitis.
b. PW was given Japanese Encephalitis immunization in SHANGHAI (上海).
c. Approx 2/3 of PW unit have frost bite and frozen feet. No treatment.

13. DISCIPLINE:
Maintained according to three main principles and eight important points. If any officer or soldier violate regulations, the violator’s own unit would call a meeting to criticize the offender and determine, by majority vote the nature and degree of punishment. In minor cases, punishment is given by offender’s own unit (usually given seven days hard labor). In serious cases, judgment is rendered by military court, sometimes resulting in confinement or death sentence.
Not many deserters in PW unit. There were about 10 men in PW unit who intended to desert, but were apprehended, and brought back to their own unit.

14. RELATIONS WITH KOREANS:
The Korean civilians dislike the Chinese and do not cooperate with the CCF.
The CCF used Korean civilians as road guides.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROBINSON

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