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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3309　12 February 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 1482)　6 February 1951

PW was cooperative and precise in answering questions.

Info seems reliable.

11 Corps: 10th (Code No: 745), 7th and two other Div

10th Div: 25th, 27th, 29th Rifle Regt, Arty Regt. Tng Bn, Med Bn, Sig Bn, Engr Bn, Recon Co, Guard Co, and Political Unit.

Rifle Regt: 3 Inf Bn, Arty Bn, Recon Plat. and Guard Plat.

Training Bn: (Code No: 767): 2 Rifle Co. HMG Co. Mortar Co, AT Plat.

Inf Co, Training Bn: 3 Inf Plat

HMG Co, Training Bn: 3 HMG Plat

Mort Co, Training Bn: 3 Mortar Plat

Inf Plat, Training Bn: 4 Inf Sqd

HMG Plat, Training Bn: 4 HMG Sqd

Mort Plat, Training Bn: 4 Mortar Sqd

AT Plat, Training Bn: 4 AT Sqd

Inf Sqd, Training Bn: 2 to 3 men

HMG Sqd, Training Bn: 2 to 3 men

Mort Sqd, Training Bn: 2 to 3 men

AT Sqd, Training Bn: 2 to 3 men

Training Bn consisted of approx 140 conscripts. ranging between 17 to 18 years of age.

Training period is set for 6 months so the present course (it is assumed) will be completed May 51. The present course began o/a 15 Dec 50.

Training were composed of handpicked troops of the 10th Div.

No training was undergone by the unit as up to the time PW was captured, the Div was always on the move.

It was believed that the training will be resumed as soon as the situation becomes stable. Daily political training was also slated for the troops.

Upon completion of the course, the trainees were to be promoted to non-commissioned officers.

10th Division strength was estimated to be at 2,500 troops after suffering 5% casualties since its crossing the 38th parallel.

An average of 1 x 82mm mortar to each battalion was observed.

The 10th Div Hq arrived in the POHYON SAN (DR9501) area 30 Jan 51. The headquarters was in KALCHON NI in civilian homes at approx the central part of the village. Training Battalion Hq was located together with the Div Hq.

10th Div was in a 4 Km square area. Div proceeded E from KALCHON NI on 011900 I Feb 51.

It was believed that the Div will proceed to the PON YON Mountain and will begin its guerrilla activities.

It was heard that the NK 29th Regiment engaged a ROK unit in an area S of UISONG (DR7323) 27 Jan 51. The 29th Regt withdrew and proceeded S from another direction.

PW suffered of an unknown sickness and lagged behind his unit when he was captured, 1 Feb 51.

PW heard o/a 15 Dec 50 that the 10th Div objective was the general area of POHYAN SAN. Its mission was to disrupt the communication line and supplies of the UN troops In that area. 10th Div was to remain in the POHYAN SAN area until the main CCF forces advanced to there, when it was supposed to take part in the general offensive expected in the southern area.

Div was ordered against contacting UN forces for battle, due to the low amount of ammo on hand.

Conscripted into the "Volunteer" Army Aug 50 at PALPYON MYON.

PW and 400 others were undergoing training when they began retreating to the N on 28 Sep 50.

Approx 300 recruits departed together and passed through:

KUMSAN (CQ6495)

YONGDONG (CR9003)

SANGJU (DR2530)

MYUNGYONG (DR2165)

PUNGGI (DR5881)

YONGWOL (DSS415)

PYONGCHANG (DS4735)

ODAE Mt.

Approx 300 out of the original men arrived at CHONGBAN MYON (phonetic) o/a 5 Nov 50.

10th Div was already in CHONGBAN when PW arrived.

10th Div and the 80 men of the Volunteer Army departed o/a 5 Nov 50. and arrived at HWACHON (CT8818) o/a 15 Dec 50.

PW assigned to his present unit and duties o/a 15 Dec 50 and was made a captain of the cultural section.

Approx 40% of the troops of the 10th Div procured or received some warm clothing from the nearby civilian population.

10th Div departed HWACHON 26 Dec 50 and marched in the following order until the POHYON SAN area was reached.

(The 29th Regiment, reputed to be the best regiment) always was in the lead, with the 27th Regt next and the 25th Regt and Div Hq with its attached units followed in that order.

Arty regiment always followed in the rear.

The following places were passed by the 10th Div, while enroute:

YUDONG (DS2560)

PUNGAM NI (DS2874)

CHUCHON NI (DS3525)

A minor skirmish was engaged with some police and a ROK unit in this area 7 Jan 51.

The division crossed a railroad track believed to be in the area between SINNIMNI (DS1920) and CHECHON (DS3010) on 10 Jan 51.

TAEGANG (20 Km S of) CHECHON

PUNGGI (DR5881)

YEAN(DR8461)

Arrived in the POHYAN SAN area on 30 Jan 51.

10th Div was last seen proceeding towards the POHYON Mountain 1 Feb 51.

LEE Pang Nam (리방남); Maj Gen, CG, 10th Div.

He was trained in the CCF Army and was said to have arrived in KOREA during the early part of 1950.

KANG, Pyong Taek (강병택); Maj, Cultural Officer, Assistant Training Bn CO.

Received training at a political school in P'YONGYANG.

No replacements.

10th Div officers believed that before their unit suffers from too many casualties, the CCF will have advanced to that area.

Each soldier carried approx 2 days supply of food and occasionally 1 day supply of rice cakes. These were replenished from the villages and towns where the food was procured. The troops ate regular meals in sufficient amounts. No shortages were noted.

No ammo supplies, besides individual supplies were seen. 10th Div officers believed that before their ammo runs out, the CCF armies will have advanced to that area.

PW estimated that the ammo on hand now will not last more than 2 days if a full scale battle was fought.

No artillery pieces were carried by the 10th Div. Reason was that the division was to travel only through mountains, which were impossible for artillery pieces.

Companies and lower level units employed runners.

Battalion and above used Russian field telephone. It was stated that clear conversation could be held over these telephones.

No extra supply of batteries, besides those being used were brought by the division.

The troops realized they were surrounded by UN forces and many did not like the idea. Officers were always assuming a guise of not being afraid and of enjoying it, but inwardly, many were known to be concerned.

Morale was lowered considerably, since no communication or contact could be made with other NKA units.

Also, aerial attacks markedly lowered the morale.

PW believed that no troops will desert or surrender voluntarily due to the propaganda administered by the officers about the atrocities committed by the captors. Another factor was that most of their homes were in N KOREA and there was no way of getting there without having to pass through UN held territories.

However, most of the troops will not fight to the last man if they were surrounded in a smaller area and attacked.

An estimated 30% of the troops had not received any type of military training.

3 US PW were seen being escorted by an interpreter in the 10th Div bivouac area, 7 Jan 51. The 3 PW were believed captured by the 29th Regiment during their brief encounter with some UN units in the CHUCHON NI area 7 Jan 51.

PW believed that the 3 US PW were released, according to the new NKA policy of releasing PW after being interrogated. The reason, for propaganda purposes, was to induce other UN troops to surrender.

PW stated that the 3 PW did not seem to have been molested.

12 men of the Training Battalion suffered from eruptive typhus first contracted 15 Jan 51 in the TAEGANG MYON area.

5 men recuperated, 1 died and 6 are still ill. No medical treatment or medicines were received.

Approx 10% of the Training Battalion troops suffered of a skin disease (皮膚病) contacted from the 38th parallel area. Many are still suffering of it. No treatment or medicines were available.

Approx 30% of the troops were suffering from frozen feet. When the unit was near the 38th parallel area, severe cases were evacuated to the N. Presently, the severe cases are carried on stretchers or loaded on horses and oxen with the unit. There was an undetermined number of stragglers caused by frozen feet.

No medical treatment or medicine were available.

a. Did you surrender voluntarily?

a. No. PW was captured when he lagged behind his unit.

b. Did you see any UN leaflets or hear UN loudspeaker broadcasts?

a. Leaflets were seen being dropped, but none dropped In the division area. A plane with loudspeaker was heard on the same day but it was not understandable; the only words PW could hear clearly was UN "GUN" (army).

c. Can you describe what they said?

a. Negative.

d. What was your reaction to them?

a. Negative.

e. Did you hear other soldiers discuss leaflets or broadcasts?

a. Negative.

For the AC of S, G-2: