포로신문
보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3072　30 January 1951

FIELD REPORT (528 MISPI - 0159)　18 January 1951

PW appeared to be in good physical condition at time of interrogation. PW was a farmer prior to entering the service. PW was cooperative and of average intelligence. Information was limited but considered fairly reliable. Not recommended for further interrogation.

PW volunteered into the CNA Jan 1944. Dec 49, PW captured by the CCF at KWANGSI (廣西) and integrated into the 39th Army, 115th Div, 33rd Regt, 3rd Bn, 7th Co. 39th Army crossed the YALU River from ANTUNG (XE1842) Oct 50 and marched to UNSAN (YL3927) arriving in 6 days. After remaining at UNSAN for 2 days, 39th Army proceeded to SEOUL via P'YONGYANG arriving approx 14 days later. From SEOUL, PW's unit continued to travel South and arrived at SUWON (CS2527) 13 Jan 51. PW deserted his unit because of lack of food and clothing and was captured by elements of the 27th RCT while on the MSR on 17 Jan 51.

PW stated that the casualties of 20 men from his Co was caused by frostbites, stomach ailments, and other ailments. No casualties were received by UN air strikes.

The 39th Army consisted of the 115th, 116th, and 117th Divs, and an Arty Bn.

ThE 115th Div consisted of the 33rd, 34th, 35th Regts, and an Arty Btry.

33rd Regt consisted of 3 Bns and Sig Co.

3rd Bn consisted of 3 Rifle Cos, Sig. Plat, and HMG Co.

PW's Co had 6 LMGs, 44 rifles (U.S. Chinese, & Japanese make), and hand grenades (10 in each Plat) 3rd Bn had 4 HMGS. Arty Btry (attached to the Regt) had 4 x 81mm mortars.

Objective of his Regt was SUWON. He heard from his Regt CO while at ANTUNG that the UN forces will invade CHINA and that they must defend CHINA by saving KOREA.

3rd Bn Hq was located approx 1.5 miles SE of SUWON (CS2527) on 13 Jan 51. (Exact location u/k)

Communications between the Bns and Regts by telephones. Couriers were used between Bns and Co's and bugles and whistles between Plats and Cos.

HUANG, Tsai-hai (Phonetic) Plat Ldr, 2nd Plat, 7th Co, 3rd Bn, 33rd Regt.

PW did not observe any tanks or arty pieces after entering KOREA.

Morale of approx 50% of PW's Co was low due to lack of food and clothing. PW stated that many men read UN surrender leaflets and wanted to surrender but were unable to do so because of strict surveillance by their officers.

Food was insufficient and was procured locally. No additional food received since entering KOREA. Ammo also insufficient and only 7 to 8 rds of ammo were issued to each man.

No replacements were received by PW's unit. PW was instructed by his Plat Ldr that in case he became a struggler, he should locate a CCF unit. If no CCF units could be found, he is to look for any NKA unit. Wounded personnel were sent to the rear for medical attention.

One Korean interpreter was assigned to each Co.

PW had no knowledge regarding the use of narcotics or drugs by CCF troops prior to or since entering KOREA.

For the AC of S, G-2: