ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1915 18 October 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1160) 16 October 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | MUN, Che Won (文済源) (문제원) |
| RANK: | Col (大佐) |
| AGE: | 26 |
| DUTY: | Regimental CO |
| UNIT: | 13th Div 23rd Regt |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School (6 yrs) |
| OCCUPATION: | Laborer in Steel Mill |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 16km S of NAKTONG-NI (24/1160-1610) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 1 Oct 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | HAMGYONG NAMDO, HAMHUNG, PBOGO-RI (咸鏡南道咸興市保古里) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | Same as above |
| INTERROGATOR: | KAJIWARA (FEAF) |
PW was highly nervous and answered each question after much deliberation. He appeared confused and often had difficulty recalling events and names. He planned to surrender his entire regt to the UN Force but regrettable circumstances prevented him from doing so. PW was interrogated twice, on the second time he came on his own initiative stating he wanted to make corrections of statements he made during the first interrogation.
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:Chronology:
30 Dec 45 - Entered service at CHINNAMP’O, and received 4 months basic infantry training.
1 May 46 - Promoted to Sgt and Squad Leader in the training camp.
1 Aug 46 - Assigned to the cadre of the CHINNAMP’O Training Center.
31 Aug 46 - Transferred to the P’YONGYANG Training Camp.
15 Sep 46 - The troops trained at the P’YONGYANG Training Camp became the cadre for other training camps. Promoted to Sr Lt and transferred to HAMHUNG and was made the Arty Battery CO of the 3rd Brigade.
o/a 30 Sep 46 - The 3 Arty Bns of the 3rd Brigade were moved to HUNGNAM.
o/a 20 Oct 48 - The 3rd Brigade was reorganized into the 3rd Div of the NKA. Assigned as Battery Commander of 45mm AT Gun Battery of the 9th Regt. Promoted to Capt.
o/a 20 Dec 49 - Transferred to the 3rd Div, 45mm Arty Bn as Training Officer, and promoted to Maj.
25 Apr 50 - Entered the 1st P’YONGYANG Military Academy and took a course for staff officers.
15 May 50 - Assigned to the 13th Div as Chief of Operations of 13th Div Arty which was located in SINUIJI.
18 Jun 50 - The 13th Div Hq left SINUIJI and deployed along the 38th parallel, South of CHORWON.
o/a 10 Jul 50 - Arrived in SEOUL
o/a 12 Jul 50 - The 23rd Infantry Regt and 2nd Arty Bn went to INCHON to act as a defensive force against possible landings by ROK Troops at INCHON, meanwhile the rest of the 13th Div stayed in SEOUL.
o/a 22 Jul 50 - The 23rd Inf Regt and one Arty Bn remained in INCHON. PW and one Arty Bn departed INCHON by truck. Original orders were to go to CHUNGJU, but enroute the orders were changed to go toward HAMCHANG.
o/a 15 Aug 50 - At a point about 20 km NW of HAMCHANG the PW’s Arty Bn joined the 19th and 21st Regts of the 13th Div and encountered the enemy for the first time. They Arty Regiment’s total casualties after this initial battle were about 30 men. The Div Arty lost 4 x 76mm Field Guns, 2 x 122mm Howitzers and 15 trucks by air and arty attack.
o/a 18 Aug 50 - The 13th Div occupied HAMCHANG and rejoined the 23rd Regt from INCHON.
o/a 20 Aug 50 - The 13th Div fought its way to NAKTONG-NI and met stiff resistance from UN troops.
o/a 29 Aug 50 - Arrived at KUNWI-DONG (軍成洞). Up to this point the Div Arty had lost the following equipment, 16 trucks, 6 x 122mm Howitzers, 14 x 76mm Field guns. In addition the Div Arty suffered 120 casualties. Up to this point one Bn of the 23rd Div had been wiped out.
o/a 28 Aug 50 - The 13th Div fought in the vicinity of HAJANG-DONG (下場洞). After the battle near HAJANG-DONG the Div Arty had 8 trucks, 12 x 76mm, and 5 x 122mm guns left. Oxen were used to move the Arty pieces.
o/a 31 Aug 50 - The Regimental Commander of the 23rd Regt was wounded. PW was called in by the CG of the 13th Div and verbally told he was to be the CO of the 23rd Regt. He reported to the 23rd Regt with a written order from the CG appointing him to the new 23rd CO. GHQ memorandum of 15 Aug 50 stated that all personnel to be automatically promoted to the rank his particular job calls for, so PW automatically became a Col. The Regt was located on the hill immediately S of HAJANG-DONG. When PW reported, all Hq personnel except the Engineer Officer were casualties. The 1st Bn CO was temporarily acting as Regimental CO. Total strength of the Regiment was then about 640 men.
2 Sep 50 - The Regt received orders to attack and advance to TAEGU. An offensive was started at 1800 with 21st Regt on the right and the 19th Regt was on the left flank.
3 Sep 50 - The 23rd Regt and the 21st Regt advanced without meeting any resistance to a hill immediately W of TABUDONG. At TABUDONG they met UN troops.
4 Sep 50 - The UN Troops in TABU-DONG withdrew, so the 13th Div occupied a position 2 1/2km S of TABU-DONG. When the 13th Div was south of TABU-DONG, PW heard that UN Tanks entered TABU-DONG by the road from WAEGWAN (倭館).
6 Sep 50 - Received orders to move to a hill 2 km to the NW for tactical reasons to improve the poor communications between the 23rd Div Hq and its Bns.
8 Sep 50 - The 23rd and 21st Regt advanced about 6 km without meeting any resistance. At this point PW heard from a soldier that the cultural officer of his 1st Bn had a note which was addressed to the 23rd Regtl Commander asking him to surrender. This note was supposedly dropped by US Aircraft. PW know the cultural officer would not show him this note, since PW as not a Labor Party member and was not trusted by the cultural officers in his Regiment. PW strongly suspected that his note was dropped through the influence of the former 13th Div Arty CO who had earlier surrendered to UN Troops. He decided to surrender his entire Regt to the UN Force.
He ordered two of the Bns to advance to the next hill to the South (KUMHODONG PAL TAL-DONG). He then intended to take the other Bns and the Reg’t Hq to join the 2 Bns and surrender in force.
12 Sep 50 - Before the PW could join the 2 Bns which were then at KUM HO-DONG (琴湖洞) he received a reprimand from OG for advancing his troops too far without orders.
The two Bns which the PW had advanced to KUMHO-DONG received an Arty and air barrage and retreated. The total strength of the 2 Bns which retreated was about 150 men. At this time the 23rd Regt was awaiting. 200 replacements from the rear. PW still intended to surrender if he could find the opportunity when the UN Arty and Aircraft broke up his surrender plans.
o/a 16 Sep 50 - The 23rd Regt was ordered to retreat about 12 km to straighten the line. The 23rd Regt had two Bns as close as 4km from TAEGU at one time.
The 23rd Regt was in the area between TABU-DONG and WAEGWAN. Here the Regt was boxed in from 3 sides.
20 Sept 50 - The 23rd Regt lost all contact with the Div Hq on 19 Sep 50 so PW ordered all Bns to assemble at PAEKUN SAN (白雲山). He intended to surrender the Regt which then had a strength of 600 men.
However, the Regt could not be assembled and was annihilated. PW and his staff tried to make a run to the North. All were killed except PW and 3 others. PW hid near TABU-DONG for five days.
25 Sept 50 - Arrived at a point near SONSAN (善山).
1 Oct 50 - Surrendered at point 16km S of NAKTONG-Ni.
Organization and Strength:
PW believes that the present strength of the 23rd Regt is nil. When PW tried to assemble the Regt on PAEK UN SAN’s northern slope on 20 Sep 50, it was scattered by UN tank fire. PW lost contact with the Bns and believes they were annihilated or scattered in small groups.
Personalities:
OH’OE, Yong Jin (최영진), Maj Gen (少佐), CG of 13th Div, military training received in Russia.
CHONG, Pong Uk (정봉욱), Lt Col (Acting Col) (中佐), CO of 13th Div Arty.
CH’AE, Huk Ku (채훅구), Sr Col (總佐), 13th Div Chief of Staff.
T’AE, PYONG YOL (태병열), Col (大佐). Former 23rd Regt CO, injured and PW replaced him.
LEE, Man Bok (李萬福), Capt (總尉), 23rd Regt, S-2, joined the 23rd Regt after PW became Regtl CO.
4. GENERAL:PW expressed his desire to aid the UN forces. He stated he was born and raised in HAMHUNG and knows the city throughly, and would like to contribute his knowledge on the HAMHUNG Area when the UN Forces operates there. He states he is also very familiar with HUNGNAM.
When PW became 23rd Regtl CO, he realized the hopelessness of the NKA operation. From then on he had only one thing in mind, which was to surrender his entire Regt. He conducted his operations with surrender in mind.
PW believes that if there are any NKA units in North Korea, they are Koreans formerly from the CCF. Believes that Security Forces in North Korea cannot be considered an effective fighting unit.
For the Commanding Officer:
WEELDREYER
Executive
