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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 939　11 September 1950

FIELD REPORT (164 - LDI - 0747)　2 September 1950

Civilian occupation: Farmer

Education: None

The information is very reliable. The PW is sincere.

Inducted 2 Dec 48, at HANGYONG PUKTO, ONSON GUN, NAMYAN MYON with 45 others and placed in the 1927 Border Constabulary Bn. On lt Dec 48, 300 newly inducted soldiers were attached to the above unit. Between 20 Dec 4S and 5 Mar 49, the informant received basic infantry training. Between 13 Mar 49 and. 3 May 49, the informant and 5 others from the 1927 Border Constabulary Unit were sent on temporary duty as guards to PUSO-RI. On 8 May 49, the 1927 Border Constabulary Bn was transferred to CHORWON and he was attached to the 1st Brigade (Code Name: 31st Border Constabulary Brigade). O/a 25 May 49, 1927 Border Constabulary Bn was further transferred to KUMHWA. On 27 Jun 49) 151 troops from the 1927 Border Constabulary Bn were transferred to the 5th Border Constabulary Bn of the 1st Brigade in INSE. O/a 27 Jul 49 the. 5th Bn was transferred to HANGHAE DO, CHAN PUN GUN, CHAN PUN MYON, KUHARI. On 27 Jul 49 the three companies of the 5th Bn went to the 38th parallel and the remaining troops were used as a labor Bn constructing bridges and repairing roads until 25 Feb 50. On 25 Feb 50, the Engr Plt of the 5th B C Bn was transferred to the 7th B C Brigade in HWANGHAE DO, SUPYONG RI. On 10 Mar 50 the informant and 13 others were transferred to the 5th Bn of the 7th B C Brigade in KANWON DO, CHORWON GUN, YONG PUK MYON. Between 10 Mar 50 and 29 Jun 50 the informant served as cadre training newly-inducted troops. On 29 Jun 50 the 5th Bn of the 7th B C Brigade marched to SEOUL, arrived 2 Jul 50. On 5 Jul 50 the 5th Bn was redesignated the 2nd Bn and marched by night to YOJU, arrived 8 Jul 50. On 10 Jul. 50, the 2nd Bn was transferred to the 7th Div and was called the 2nd Bn of the 2nd Regt. On 15 Jul 50 the 2nd Bn marched by night, sleeping in the mountains by day, arrived at PYONGTAEK, 4 Aug 50. The 2nd Bn left PYONGTAEK, 11 Aug 50, marched by night and arrived at KURE, 14 Aug 50. On 19 Aug 50, the 2nd Bn at KURE was joined by a S Korean (NK Conscripted) Volunteer Bn. The 2nd Bn and the S Korean Bn marched by night and arrived at SAMCHONPO, 22 Aug 50. On 24 Aug 50, the 2nd Bn and the Volunteer Bn were joined by the 1st and 3rd Bn of the 2nd Regt. On 27 Aug 50, the 2nd Regt marched over mountains adjacent to the CHINJU-MASAN Highway to a point. 8 kms E of CHINJU, where it was joined by the 3rd Regt of the 7th Div on 29 Aug 50. Between 29 Aug 50 and 1 Sep 50 the 2nd and 3rd Regt were attacking the US Forces.

4 Rifle sqds, 1 Medic & 2 Runners in a platoon. (Approximately 40-45 men in a platoon) The weapons were same as above.

3 Rifle Plts, 1 HMG Plt in the 1st Co. Approx 160 men. (HMG Plt - 13 men, 2 M-1910 HMG’s; 1500 rds per gun)

Present strength was unknown but PW heard that casualties had been high.

4-T/34 Tanks were seen in TAEJON o/a 15 Aug 50. The informant was told that these tanks were to go to the TAEGU front. O/a 26 Jun 50, 20 armored cars were observed in UlDOJU.

Each Regt of the 7th Div had one (1) 122mm Howitzer Co and one (1) 45mm AT Plt (Number of guns unk), The 122mm Howitzers were truck-drawn while the 45mm AT Guns Were horse-drawn.

The troops of the 7th Div lived off the land. The Division did not carry its own food supply. The front-line troops on some days had two (2) meals and on others one (1) meal. The troops in the rear areas bad 3 meals a day. Food was not plentiful but was sufficient to keep the troops going.

The informant was told by his Plt Ldr and Co Comdr that ammunition was coming to N KOREA from VLADIVOSTOK. N Korean trains cross the border into the Soviet zone to haul ammunition for the N Korean Peoples Army. In payment for the ammunition rice and food supplies were given to RUSSIA, He was told, this info was secret.

The 7th biv received ite ammunition supply from WONSAN and SAMCHON PO (Seaport). Ammo from WONSAN was hauled by train to CHONAN and was brought to Div Hqs by truck at night. Ammo trucks are also reported to be operating between CHINJU and SAMCHON PO. From the Div dump the Ammo was delivered to the Regt Hq by truck at night. From Regt, the ammo was delivered to Bn by trucks, wagons or carried on A-frames by farmers of the newly occupied areas, The troops at Bn level did not receive sufficient ammunition. (Hearsay) Railroad. tunnels in CHINJU area were being utilized to store ammo.

The 1st Regt en 1 Sep 50 was in reserve. Location: 2 kms E of CHINJU on the MASAN-CHINJU Highway. The 7th Div Hqs on 1 Aug was located somewhere in the rear between CHINJU and the 1st Regt, The 2nd & 3rd Regts on 1 Aug were combined and were attacking the US Forces 8 kms E of CHINJU on the MASAN-CHINJU Highway,

The troops were reminded daily to fight to the last man because if they surrendered they would be interrogated than hanged as criminals. The troops were told to commit suicide if they felt that they would be taken prisoner. The Officers and NCO's were told by higher Hqs that the Chinese Communist Army is ready to join the war and the Russian Army is preparing to enter the war. The informant believes that the above statement was used to bolster the morale or the troops.

The 7th Div's mission is to advance along the CHINJU-MASAN Highway up to the NAKTONG River, then wait until the 6th Div (Right flank) and the 9th Div (Left flank) caught up with the 7th Div. The 7th Div is to make believe that they are going to cross the river by throwing a great volume of fire from its sector to confuse the US Forces, while the 6th & 9th Div attempt to cross the river under cover of darkness from the flanks.

Up until 27 Aug 50 the 6th, 7th. and 9th Div were fighting. the US Forces in 3 shifts. 2 Divs in reserve while one was fighting. Each Div had to reach its assigned objective before it was relieved by either one of the two divisions in reserve.

On 20 Aug 501 the 6th, 7th and 9th Div received orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the NKPA (Operation Order #81) to make an all-out attack which was started on 1909 hours 27 Aug 50. Prior to the all-out attack on 27 Aug 50 the troops in the informants company were informed by the company commander that the 6th & 9th Div were on the left and right flanks of the 7th Div. The informant came in contact with troops of the 6th Div at HADONG. The informant (although he has not seen troops of the 9th Div) is very sure that the 9th Div is on the right flank of the 7th Div because he has heard & seen his Regt Comdr & Bn Comdr making battle plans which included the 9th Div.

The 7th Div replacement troops are S Koreans who were conscripted in SEOUL. The replacement troops were untrained and were called volunteer troops. O/a 29 Aug 50 the informant heard that there were about 1800 newly-arrived replacements near CHlNJU at the Div Hqs. The replacements wore S Korean Army fatigues and S Korean Youth Organization uniforms. Whenever line companies needed troops, the replacements were brought from the volunteer unit. Replacement troops were issued weapons at the front line. In the event that there were not enough weapons, the replacements acted as ammo-carriers. To each volunteer squad there was one N Korean soldier who acted as Squad ldr and guard to make sure that the troops did not desert.

The casualty rate is unknown but the informant believes that it is very high. The NCO's were ordered not to tell the troops how many were killed or wounded. The troops wore ordered not to give aid to their own wounded during battle. They were told to take the rifle and ammunition from the wounded for their own use. The death rate among the wounded troops was vary high due to lack of medical attention. Medical supplies of Bn level were very scarce. The N Korean troops all carried a first-aid packet, but the S Korean conscripts did not have any. Lightly wounded troops (Flesh wound) did not receive medical. attention and they were ordered to keep on fighting. The seriously wounded were given medical attention after battle and they wore evacuated to the rear through Bn to Regt Hqs, then to Div Hqs. Evacuated troops are not sant to N KOREA. Destination unknown. When separated from their parent organization during battle the troops had to find their way back to their organization. If they try to join the adjacent unit, they are shot because of security reasons or because they could be deserters.

KIM Yo Su (김여수)

Capt, age 29, 1st Co Comdr (2nd Bn, 2nd Regt, 7th Div)

LEE Che Pil (김제필)

Major, age 29, 2nd Bn Comdr (2nd Regt, 7th Div)

LEE Ek Sung (리익성)

Maj Gen, age 40, 7th Div CG

All three (3) received military training with the CCF.

Although the troops are tired from long forced-marches, lack of food, sleep, etc. they are still able to fight because they have firm discipline and will follow an order to the end. The replacements have the lowest morale because they are raw recruits who lack training and discipline. The desertion. rate among the replacements was very high. Out of the 11 replacements in the informants company, 3 deserted. Aircraft has had a great effect on the troops. The troops are most afraid of aircraft. During the early part of the war the troops were certain that the NKPA would win, but after learning about American intervention, 75% of the troops felt that they would be beaten and that this might be the start of the 3rd World War. A large percentage of the officers feel that they would be beaten but are afraid to voice their opinions.

About 88 US PW's were observed in NAMWON on about 5 Aug 50. The informant was told that the PW' s were being sent to SEOUL for internment. The Regimental Political. Officer announced to the troops that on 18 Aug 50 the total PW's taken (US & S Korean) was 40,000. PW’s were evacuated to the rear through channels: Plt to Co-Co to Bn-etc. Every NK soldier who took an American prisoner was given a medal, If the number of prisoners taken was greater, the soldier was allowed to join the Communist Party automatically.

Prior to the outbreak of the war the informant saw about 20 NK AF pilots in PYONGYANG. Naval troops were observed in PYONGYANG, CHONGJlN and WONSAN. The informant saw a Haval Hqs in WONSAN. The highest ranking officer at the Naval Hqs was a Rear Admiral. (NKPA equivalent is Maj Gen). WONSAN & CHONGJIN on the East coast are naval bases and CHlNANPO on the West coast is also a Naval Base (No info on ships).

The true feeling of the people in. the newly captured areas is unknown due to the following reasons:

1. People are afraid to resist.

2. Resistance meant prison or possible death.

3. Anti-communist opinion meant prison.

Every newly occupied territory is now under the control of the Security Unit which is made up of underground S Koreans. The Political Police are mostly plain-clothes men with the exception of N Korean Internal Police for whom they work. The duty of the Security Unit is to arrest all anti-communist S Koreans.

The informant heard that a Uranium (우라늄) deposit was discovered in the farmland in the vicinity of PYONGAN PUKTO, SON CHUN. It is also said that the NK Government was exploiting this newly discovered Uranium field. (No further info.)

The NKPA uses 4 types of flares: Purple, White, Red & Yellow. Signal flares are shot by the use of very pistols. Illuminating flares are generally fired from field guns. The informant has seen 81mm Mortar shells which were used to scatter propaganda leaflets.

For the AC of S, G-2