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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 789　28 August 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0590)　23 August 1950

PW cooperative, information very reliable.

PW joined the army 14 Sep 48 at NAMP’O (CHINNAMP’O). Six (6) months basic training as a Pvt at NAMP’O with the Arty Regt, 4th Div. At the end of six months, PW became a sqd ldr. PW remained a sqd ldr until Sep 49 at which time he received a field commission and was appointed Plt Ldr of the 3rd Plt, 2nd Btry, 1st Bn, Arty Regt, 4th Div. The Arty Regt departed NAMP’O by rail 10 Jun 50, passed thru P’YONGYANG, SARIWON and detrained at NAMCH’ON. The Regt then boarded trucks and drove SE, joining the 4th Div at a small town just North of the 38th parallel on about 22 Jun 50.

The 4th Div crossed the 38th parallel 25 Jun 50. The Arty Regt route south was SEOUL, YONGDUNGP’O, SUWON, CHONAN, KONGJU, NONSAN, KUMSAN, TAEJON, MUJU, HAMYANG, KOCHANG, HYOPCH’ON (place of capture). The only places the Arty Regt contacted the enemy were at the 38th parallel, YONGDUNGP’O, KONGJU, TAEJON and at the NAKTONG River.

The 4th Division was composed of the 16th Inf Regt, 5th Inf Regt (17th Inf Regt), 18th Inf Regt, one (1) Arty Regt (Code 469, AOP 4443) and one (1) SP-G Bn. The Arty Regt was composed of 1st, 2nd, 3rd Arty Bn’s, Hq Co, Transportation Platoon, Ordnance Platoon, Clothing Supply Section, Food Supply Section, Finance Section, Officers’ Classification and Assignment Section, EM Personnel and AG Section, Fuel Supply Section and Staff Section, The above units and sections are under Regimental Hqs. The breakdown of the unit and sections of the Arty Regt Hqs are as follows:

Hq Company composed of a Signal Plt, Recon Plt, Topographical Plt and an Intendance Sqd.

The Signal Plt was composed of three (3) wire squads and one (1) radio squad. The topographical plt was composed of two (2) squads (no photo-interpreter team). The intendance squad handled food, clothing and equipment.

The Trans Plt handled all transportation for the Regt.

The Repair Plt repaired trucks for the Trans Plt and weapons for the Ordnance Section.

The Food Supply Section handled the officer and EM messes.

The clothing supply section handled the officer and EM clothing.

The Finance Section handled officer, EM and indigenous finance matters.

The Officer Personnel Section handled Officers’ classification, assignment, grave registrations, etc.

The EM Personnel Section handled EM classification, assignment, grave registration, etc.

The Fuel Section handled gasoline supply.

The Ordnance Section handled all weapons supply for the Regt.

The Staff Section was composed Regt’l Operations Officer and Staff, Regt’l Recon Officer and Staff, Regt’l Geographical Officer, and Staff, and Regt’l Signal Officer and Staff.

Each Arty Bn consisted of 1st and 2nd 76 mm M1942 Gun Btry’s, 3rd 122mm M1938 Howitzer Btry, Staff Section Signal Plt, Supply Plt, Intendance Plt and a cultural section.

The Bn Staff Section had the same duties as the Regt’l Staff Section.

The Signal Plt was composed of three 93) wire (telephone) squads and one (1) radio squad.

The Supply Plt was responsible for the supply of ammunition between Regt and Company.

The Intendance Section handled food and clothing supply.

The Cultural Section handled politics and propaganda.

The Arty Company was composed of two (2) Arty Plt’s, Hq Section and Liaison Plt.

The Hq Section consisted of the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Medical and Company Sgt Major.

The Liaison Plt was composed of one (1) Arty FO sqd and one (1) liaison sqd.

The Arty Platoon was composed of two (2) Arty Sections.

122mm M1938/Howitzer Btry: 5 Officers, 83 EM. 4 x 122mm M1938 Howitzers, 9 x pistols, 6 x submachine guns, 8 x 14.5mm PTRD-41 AT rifle, M1944 Carbines (number unk) and 2 hand grenades per man.

76mm M1942 Gun Btry: 5 Officers, 68 EM, 4 x 76mm M1942 guns, 9 x pistols, 6 x submachine guns, M1944 carbines (number unk) and 2 hand grenades per man.

Artillery Battalion: 23 Officers, 230-240 EM, 4 x 122mm M1938 Howitzers and 8 x 76mm M1942 guns.

Artillery Regiment: 800-1,000 O and EM, 12 x 122mm M1938 Howitzers and 24 x 76mm M1942 guns.

Note: The above TO/E is the same for all arty regiments in the North Korean Army.

16th Regt: Not more than 200 men.

The Artillery Regt suffered about 10% losses in personnel, but most of its Arty pieces were destroyed through air strikes. The 1st Bn had three (3) 76mm M1942 guns, three (3) 122mm M1938 Howitzer and three (3) American 105’s. The U.S. 105’s were captured at KONGJU. Ammunition was picked up enroute. PW thinks the 2nd and 3rd Battalions lost about the same amount of equipment.

4th Div C.G.: Maj Gen LEE, KWON MU (李權武) (리권무)

4th Div C/S: Sr Col HO PONG HAK (許鳳学) (허봉학)

Arty Regt C.O.: CoL NO SOK SON (盧錫成) (노석섭) (C. O. until some time in Aug 50. This officer was transferred to another unit)

Lt Col CH’OE IL HYON (崔日鉉) (최일현) (Arty Regt Exec Officer until 3 or 4 moths ago. This officer was hospitalized - cause unknown)

Arty Regt, 2nd Bn C.O.: Maj LEE CHU HWAN (李周煥) (리주환)

Arty Regt, 1st Bn Exec Officer: Sr Capt HWANG CHU YONG (黃周永) (황주영)

Arty Regt, 1st Bn, 1st Btry C.O.: Capt KIM CHONG SE (金淸世) (김청세)

Arty Regt, 1st Bn, 2nd Btry C.O.: 1st Lt KIM CHO SA (金底砂) (김저사)

Arty Regt, 1st Bn, 3rd Btry C.O.: Capt LEE KIL CHE (李吉濟) (리길제)

C.O. of 1st Plt, 2nd Btry, 1st Bn, Arty Regt: 2nd Lt KIM HA SU (김하수)

A tank Bn of T-34’s was attached to the 4th Div when it crossed the 38th parallel. The fate of the unit is unknown. Three (3) T-34 tanks were observed at PW’s place of capture on 17 Aug 50. The SP-G Bn attached to the 4th Div was last observed at SUWON (date unk). Subject observed four (4) or five (5) SU-76s at that time.

Morale: The morale of the Arty Regt, 4th Div was hight until the unit reached the HYOPCH’ON Area. Morale dropped at this point because many were getting killed and there was a shortage of ammunition and food.

Replacements: Infantry replacements from North Korea joined the 4th Div just E of HYOPCH’ON o/a 12 Aug 50. Subject thinks there were about 700 men. According to one of the recruits, none of them had received any training.

About once a week rice is brought from the rear by the company trucks. The source is unknown.

Once a day or once every two or three days a truck loaded with ammo arrived at the unit area. The source is unknown. At time of capture, there were about 2 rounds per gun (to be used only in emergency). Ammo for the US 105’s was picked up enroute.

The officers of the Arty Regt were trained at the “First Military Academy“ located just SW of P’YONGYANG (location unk). NCOs and below were trained with the Regt at NAMP’O (CHINNAMP’O. Counter-battery fire was very accurate. While under fire, every one had to keep in his hole. Many men were lost thru counter-battery fire; however, it did not have much effect on the arty pieces.

The men are very much afraid of air attacks. In event of air attack, they crawl into holes and remain hidden. The weapons are under camouflage all the time; therefore, they are left as they are. The weapons that were issued had all been manufactured in Russia and bought into North Korea sometime in 1947. The maximum range for a 76mm M1942 gun is 12 Km. The maximum range of the 122mm M1938 howitzer is about the same as for the 76mm gun. The 76mm gun has the greater range of the two. The 76mm gun and the 122mm Howitzer are towed by trucks. Without trucks the pieces cannot be moved.

There were two types of ammo used bu the 76mm guns. One was the HE shell which exploded on contact and the other was AT projectile. The HE shell fuze was steel. The shell was painted very dark green and the case was brass. The AT projectile did not have a fuze. When the Regt crossed the 38th parallel there were 140 rounds for each 76mm gun and about 120 rounds per 122mm howitzer.

The unit had plenty of ammunition at the outbreak of the war. However, with no re-supply, the amount has dropped to almost nothing. There were no restrictions placed on firing; however, the unit hardly over saw anything but trucks to fire at. The organization of the position depends upon the situation. There were no set rules in regard to gun positions. It was at the discretion of the battery commanders. Anything that can be found is used for camouflage. The unit did not carry camouflage nets. The guns are dug in. There were no MG’s in the regiment.

The position are security was handled by the Arty troops. Infantry troops, MG’s, AT guns and mortars were not utilized for this purpose. The guns were employed singly and by battery, depending upon the target. The guns are generally employed in direct support, but occasionally they are used for general support. The guns are normally intended as defensive weapons. In general support, one battalion would accompany an Inf Regt, and a battery accompany an Inf Battalion.

As to who commands when an infantry-artillery team in formed, there is no general rule. As a rule, the highest ranking officer commands; but in an emergency, the firing can be controlled by either the Inf or Arty commander. Telephone and wireless were available to the Arty Regt. Usually, telephone communication was used within the Regt and wireless was used for communication with Div and the inf Regts.

PW never heard of observers being sent behind enemy lines. Wire and wireless are both used by Arty observers to communicate with the battery. Aircraft has never been used either before the war or since as observation for artillery units.

No man is used as liaison with the Inf units. All liaison is done by wireless or telephone. Subject has never heard any mention or reference to the azimuth/direction of American guns or of their having been located by sound or flash methods.

Meteorological information is not used.

The guns were calibrated.

Subject has never heard of any new type weapons.