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Date: 01-Aug-98 CIA DOC ID: NI 210-1

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The Constitution now in effect in the Republic of Korea was adopted in 1948 and revised by amendment in 1952 and 1954. Embodying many constitutional principles unrelated to traditional or present-day Korean thinking, this document reflects the influence exerted by the United States, whose troops had occupied southern Korea to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in 1945 and were still in occupation during the framing of the constitution.

Confucianism was the general philosophy of government during the Yi dynasty, which lasted from 1392 until Japan annexed Korea in 1910. In accordance with its concepts, the principal function of government was to maintain, theoretically through example and admonition, the proper relationship among men in a hierarchy preordained by Heaven. In practice, the Korean monarchy was a typical oriental autocracy and, by Western standards, corrupt, inefficient, and stagnant. The indifference of the national government to local affairs led to the spontaneous development of quasi-democratic village governments, cooperatives, and guilds.

The Korean attitude toward government was also conditioned by contact with Japanese institutions and policies for more than 35 years. The Japanese Government General introduced certain Western forms that began to modify the traditional attitudes of the Korean people. Even though Koreans took little part in government affairs, they became familiar with these new forms through exposure to Japanese Government and education.

Although the introduction of Western-type institutions provided a democratic facade for its rule in Korea, from the outset Japan retained many of the older authoritarian practices common in the Far East. Freedom of political, economic, and religious association in Korea, as in Japan, was strictly controlled or suppressed. Government in Korea was in many respects more authoritarian than in Japan. The police and armed forces used particularly harsh methods in dealing with the civilian populace and held authority equal to that of the civil administration. Representative bodies developed slowly and functioned in a purely advisory capacity. Additional totalitarian practices were introduced in the final decade of Japanese rule.

Although Koreans became acquainted with the theoretical form of Western governmental institutions and political thought under Japanese rule, they also became accustomed to thoroughgoing authoritarian practices. As a consequence, Koreans are still slow to see the inconsistency between democratic theory and authoritarian practice or between a constitutional guarantee and its violation as a matter of policy. Despite Japanese attempts to insulate Koreans from a political philosophy at variance with the established order, foreign influences affected sectors of the population. Christian missionary activity, largely through education, did much to foster Western democratic political ideas. Of greater importance, however, was Marxist influence disseminated through radical intellectual groups in higher educational institutions and through small but militant labor movements. Although the outlook of these elements was more nationalistic and anti-Japanese than Communist, their organizational core was Marxist, and their leaders had ties with Communist groups in the U.S.S.R. and in China.

After independence demonstrations which took place in 1919, many Koreans fled to China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, where they were exposed to political concepts that differed greatly from those of the Korean tradition. The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Korea, adopted in November 1942 by a "Korean Provisional Government" of Korean exiles in China, gave expression to diverse constitutional concepts reflecting Chinese and Western political doctrine. Shortly before World War Ⅱ, the Chinese Communists began to exert a much stronger influence upon Koreans in China. A great many of these Koreans became closely associated with the Yenan Communists and embraced their theories. A number of Koreans from China, Manchuria, and Korea visited the Soviet Union. The strongest Soviet influence, however, was exerted upon Koreans of Soviet citizenship who had been transplanted in the late 1930's from an ancient Korean settlement in the maritime area of Siberia to Kazakhstan and other areas of Soviet Central Asia. Many of these Koreans entered Korea in 1945 with the Soviet occupation forces and aided in the administration of the northern zone. The Koreans in the United States accepted many American democratic principles but held widely divergent political views.

After liberation from Japanese rule, Koreans embarked upon a period of almost frenetic political activity. Nationalism, strengthened by years of Japanese suppression, dominated Korean aspirations and heightened the general interest in political and constitutional matters. The expatriate groups assumed leadership in political and constitutional development and introduced many foreign constitutional theories.

The division of Korea into U.S. and U.S.S.R. zones of occupation in 1945 initiated two divergent courses of constitutional development that continue to the present time. Each occupying power was able to influence the development of political institutions and the formulation of government policies in its zone through direct intervention or by exploiting political movements and by sponsoring large-scale propaganda and information programs. By 1948, therefore, when South Korea became the independent Republic of Korea and North Korea remained under Communist control, the Korean people as a whole had not developed any well-defined constitutional concepts. Political thinking was in a state of confusion. Koreans remained intensely nationalistic and united on the issue of independence but divided on the constitutional means of achieving this objective. Supporters could be found for constitutional principles representing all shades of political persuasion from traditional Confucianism to Communism. The constitutions framed in 1948 were thus not a synthesis of contending doctrines but rather a statement of the constitutional principles sponsored by the occupying powers, whose armies and opposing policies made the peninsula a microcosm of international tension.

Efforts by political factions to improve their positions in the struggle for power by means of constitutional changes have also been a major factor in shaping the constitution and its implementation in the Republic of Korea. This conflict has revolved around the question of a strong presidential versus a parliamentary system of government and had its inception in the drafting of the constitution in 1948. After heated debate in the drafting process, Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭng-man), then Chairman of the Constituent Assembly and the most likely candidate for the presidency, was able to obtain the adoption of his proposals which vested strong executive powers in a president who was not responsible to the legislature except for his election. The important rightist leaders and groups that opposed him advocated a parliamentary system, with primary executive powers vested in a prime minister fully responsible to the legislature. Since that time, President Rhee's political opponents have more or less constantly continued their opposition to a strong executive, not necessarily as a matter of principle but primarily out of a desire to curb the growing concentration of power in the hands of their chief antagonist. This basic constitutional issue has thus been the theoretical base of President Rhee's constant conflict with his opposition over the control of governmental policy and administration, and it is the cause of much of the vagueness, internal inconsistency, and incomplete implementation of the constitution.

The constitutional amendments adopted in 1952 and 1954 reflect this struggle for power. The 1952 amendment providing for the direct popular election of the President removed the Assembly's last real control over the presidency. The remaining features of a parliamentary system were invalidated by Rhee's appointment of acquiescent prime ministers. In 1954 even the outward remnants of a parliamentary system were abolished. Rhee's 1952 amendment may not serve to his advantage. Because of the possibility that Rhee may not be reelected in 1960 unless the people and the opposition are subjected to extreme pressures, a sizeable segment of the Liberal Party has been advocating the return to a parliamentary system by which the President would be elected by the National Assembly, now controlled by the Liberal Party.

The liberation of Korea in 1945 and the return of expatriate political leaders stimulated among south Koreans an almost unanimous desire for independence, which was expressed by vigorous opposition to the trusteeship provision of the Moscow Agreement, announced by the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom in December 1945, and to which Nationalist China later adhered. Under the Agreement the four powers established a trusteeship over Korea pending the establishment of a united government, and it was provided that the two occupying powers would formulate plans for a provisional united government through a joint commission, in consultation with Korean "democratic parties and social organizations."

The U.S. authorities, in endeavoring to implement the Moscow Agreement, viewed the divided occupation as temporary and did not in the beginning try to create a U.S.-oriented regime in South Korea. They took the agencies of the Japanese Government General, whose, central offices were situated in Seoul in the U.S. zone of occupation, as the structure of civil administration, restaffing them largely with U.S. officials and renaming them the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). As an impasse developed and continued in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, the U.S. authorities sought to develop Korean capacities for self-government, but nevertheless refrained from direct preparations for developing a separate regime in South Korea. An advisory legislative body, half elective and half appointed by the U.S. Military Governor, was established in late 1946, and the Korean elements in USAMGIK were designated the South Korean Interim Government in 1947. U.S. officials were relegated theoretically to advisory functions except at top levels. Until the establishment of the Republic of Korea in August 1948, however, the civil administration was clearly an occupation government and under U.S. control.

In the months preceding the formation of an independent government, Korean opinion became sharply divided on the question of how best to achieve such independence. Some believed that Korean independence and unification should be sought through consultation with the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission; others advocated that the Joint Commission should be bypassed and that immediate independence should be sought for South Korea. The moderate political groups and the Communists generally supported consultation with the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, but the rightist groups, which were the strongest, pressed for the establishment of a national constitution and a separate Korean government in the U.S. zone of occupation.

U.S. authorities refused to approve a constitution drafted in 1947 by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, the advisory legislative body established under the U.S. Military Government. However, in September 1947, after about two years of fruitless negotiations with the U.S.S.R. to establish a provisional government for all Korea in accordance with the Moscow Agreement, the United States submitted the Korean problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

On November 14, 1947, that body recommended a program, based largely on U.S. proposals, for solving the problem of Korean independence. This program provided for the election of Korean representatives to a constituent assembly for the purpose of drafting a constitution and forming a national government. It also called for the creation of a UN Temporary Commission on Korea to observe the election and to advise the government during its formative period. When it was determined that the Soviet occupation authorities would not participate in this program, the UN Temporary Commission, acting upon the counsel of the Interim Committee of the UN General Assembly, proceeded to implement the plan in the U.S. zone. Both as sponsor of the UN program and as occupying power, the United States was closely involved in the entire procedure.

The legal procedures of establishing a government in South Korea were accomplished within a short period. It was announced on March 1, 1948, that elections for a national assembly would be held on May 10. The newly elected National Assembly, which was predominantly rightist in political orientation, convened on May 31 and promptly delegated most of the responsibility for preparing a constitution to a Committee for Drafting the Constitution and Organic Laws. Owing to his long and active struggle for Korean independence against the Japanese, and later against the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission over the trusteeship issue, Syngman Rhee had achieved a position of leadership which enabled him to influence the drafting committee to provide for a strong presidential government. His influence at this time, however, was not sufficient to eliminate from the draft certain parliamentary features of government, including Assembly election of the president. Most of the work of the drafting committee, in turn, was done by a staff of 10 legal experts, all of whom were close to the Korean (Hanguk) Democratic Party, which represented conservative Korean landowning and business interests. (For discussion of this party, see this Chapter, Section 53, under Political Parties.) These men were recognized as leading jurists in South Korea, and they were responsible for the definition of political concepts embodied in the document. These concepts were so foreign to most of the assemblymen that during the debate on the constitution in the National Assembly, only these legal experts were able to interpret and rationalize these concepts, which they derived from their study of the administrative techniques used by the former Japanese Government General and U.S. Army Military Government in Korea.

The Committee for Drafting the Constitution and Organic Laws began its work on June 4, 1948, and submitted a draft constitution to the National Assembly on June 23. The entire Assembly membership, forming a committee of the whole, deliberated on the draft. Efforts were made to expedite Assembly approval by limiting debate and by reducing the vote required for the passage of individual articles. In the Assembly debate the fundamental and controversial question of presidential versus parliamentary forms of government did not receive as much attention as had been expected, because the majority of members accepted the draft favoring the strong presidential system which had been evolved after bitter debate in the Committee. An intensive debate, however, developed over explicit protective labor provisions in the draft, and it was finally decided to leave specific provisions for subsequent legislation. There was also considerable debate over the wording of the civil rights sections. The draft was approved on July 12 by unanimous vote and was promulgated on July 17 as the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. The constitution, however, did not actually become effective until the end of the U.S. occupation and the inauguration of the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) on August 15, 1948.

The promulgation of the constitution in many respects merely marked the beginning of constitutional development in the Republic of Korea. Although the Constituent Assembly excluded Communists and was composed mostly of rightists, there was no consensus of constitutional thinking among its members. The views expressed in the Assembly reflected much independent judgment but little knowledge of constitutional principles. Pressures outside the Assembly played a greater role in determining the nature of the constitution than did the individual attitudes of the assemblymen. First, the formation of the government was taking place under the sponsorship of the United States and the auspices of the United Nations, and these relationships had an inevitable psychological influence on the process. The institutions to be taken over by the new government, according to the constitution, had been developed by the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea and were unfamiliar to most Koreans. Finally, the Assembly considered it politically necessary to produce a more democratic constitution than the draft constitution publicized by the authorities in the northern zone. Thus the final document reflected the influence of the background of the drafters and assemblymen and the circumstances attending the formation of the new constitution. The result was a presidential-parliamentary form of government with a definite tilt toward the presidential side. Specifically, it provided for 1) the election by the legislature of a president and vice president for four-year terms; 2) a prime minister to be appointed by the president with the legislature's approval; 3) a State Council to be appointed by the president without legislative approval; 4) a veto by the president over legislation, with the legislature having the power to override vetos; 5) emergency powers in the hands of the president; 6) a unicameral national assembly, its members to be elected directly by the people for four-year terms; 7) a separate judicial branch composed of a supreme court and lower courts; 8) conditional guarantees of civil, social, and economic liberties; 9) a considerable degree of government control over natural resources, transportation, finances, and education.

Although presidential and Assembly elections have contributed to constitutional development toward a strong presidential government, major changes have been the result of amendments adopted under the leadership of Syngman Rhee, who claimed to represent the "will of the people" and who used strong-arm tactics to intimidate assemblymen. In early 1950, before the first regular Assembly election under the new constitution in May, President Rhee succeeded in gaining the support of a temporary majority in the Assembly to defeat an amendment that would have made the State Council responsible to the Assembly. In November 1951, in anticipation of the presidential election scheduled for the summer of 1952, President Rhee proposed a constitutional amendment calling for direct popular election of the President and Vice President to replace the existing system of election by the National Assembly. This amendment also provided for the establishment of a bicameral legislature. The opposition party in the Assembly defeated his proposal in January 1952, developed enough strength in the Assembly to ensure President Rhee's defeat in a presidential election by that body, and then proposed an amendment providing for a parliamentary-type government such as the party had originally advocated in 1950.

A serious political crisis developed in late May 1952 when President Rhee, invoking extensive wartime powers granted by the constitution, declared martial law, attempted to intimidate the opposition in the Assembly by arresting 13 assemblymen and temporarily detaining more than 40 others, and threatened to dissolve the Assembly by force if it did not accede to his proposed amendments, although there was no provision in the constitution for dissolution of the Assembly. President Rhee's act in ordering the arrest and detention of the assemblymen violated Article 49 of the 1948 Constitution, which stated, "When the National Assembly is in session no member of the National Assembly shall be arrested or detained without consent of the National Assembly except when apprehended flagrante delicto" On July 4, 1952, the deadlock was broken when the Assembly hurriedly adopted "compromise" amendments combining the principal features of both proposals. The amendments provided for: 1) direct popular election of the President, 2) creation of a bicameral legislature, and 3) appointment of State Council members by the President on recommendation of the Prime Minister; they also granted to the Assembly a limited power to vote no confidence in the State Council and thereby require the dissolution of the State Council. In pushing the amendments through under pressure from President Rhee, the Assembly ignored several procedural requirements of the constitutional amendment process and thus cast some doubt on the legality of the amendment bill. However, its legality has not been openly challenged.

Although the 1952 amendments provided for the establishment of an upper house, the National Assembly, controlled by President Rhee and the Liberal Party, has procrastinated in its creation, and finally passed a law on December 24, 1958, which relinquished to the President the authority to set the date for the election. President Rhee apparently felt free to ignore in essence those portions of the amendments originally proposed by the opposition to restrict his powers. The amendments had provided for a stronger Prime Minister and State Council responsible to the National Assembly; however, President Rhee appointed State Council members obedient to his will, and when his choices were not approved by the National Assembly, resorted to the tactic of using acting ministers until the legislature acquiesced. At the same time he agitated for constitutional amendments which would uphold his actions.

These amendments were enacted on November 29, 1954, when 35 sections of the constitution were revised in accordance with his desires. The office of prime minister was abolished and its powers were transferred to the President. The State Council no longer could be dissolved as a body by the National Assembly, and it became in effect an executive staff of the President. Constitutional amendments could be proposed by 500,000 eligible voters. Any legislation, including constitutional amendments, passed by the National Assembly concerning "important matters pertaining to a national crisis which might limit the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea or cause a change in its territory" would become retroactively null and void unless confirmed by a national referendum. The voters to date have not exercised either of the latter two powers, but should the occasion arise, these provisions could be used as a constitutional basis for Rhee to claim the "will of the people" as support for actions similar to those he took in 1952. Another amendment made a constitutional limitation of two terms for the President inapplicable in the case of President Rhee. Economic amendments designed to reduce the government's role in economic affairs and strengthen the private sectors of the economy were presumably added by Rhee to show U.S. officials that he was in favor of free enterprise, since the R.O.K. could easily have divested itself of ownership of business enterprises without constitutional amendments.

Even though bribery was used to build up a favorable Assembly vote, the pressures exerted by the administration were considerably less than those used in 1952. At the last moment sharp practice was used. According to the opposition, the Liberals had 135 votes, or one vote short of the necessary two-thirds. On the assumption that 136 out of the then total of 203 votes were necessary to constitute the required two-thirds, Vice Speaker Choe Sun-chu declared that the amendments had failed to pass. Rhee expressed great displeasure; the following day the Office of Public Information announced that the bill had been passed. The grounds given were that two-thirds of 203 was exactly 135.33; since Korea had no precedent for counting fractional votes and since prevalent custom was to discount a fraction less than half, 135 was considered as constituting two-thirds of 203. The correction was made in the Assembly's Journal the following day, which resulted in a walkout by the opposition-independent members.

a. GENERAL DESCRIPTION - The constitution of the Republic of Korea follows the format of the U.S. Constitution and other Western democratic constitutions and defines governmental functions and individual rights in a generally similar manner. However, the introduction of elements characteristic of a parliamentary system into a predominantly presidential form of government and the omission of certain checks and balances among the three branches have confused responsibility and heightened conflicts between the executive and legislative branches. The measure of political stability that has existed in spite of these conflicts seems to have been largely the result of President Rhee's ability to increase the powers of the executive and to control the legislature through the majority Liberal Party. In the absence of such a dominant personality in the presidency, the present constitutional structure may not be able to prevent conflicts between the executive and legislative branches from affecting political stability, particularly during a period of struggle for power which is likely to follow Rhee's death.

Constitutional provisions for the rights and duties of citizens grant specified liberties and establish several social rights, such as equal opportunity for an education, the right-and duty-to work, and the equality of men and women in marriage. However, most of the enumerated liberties are qualified by clauses which state that the liberty is granted subject to restrictions specified by law.

Many provisions of the constitution have been only partially implemented by enabling legislation or executive action. Other provisions have been rendered inoperative by the stress of war, economic emergencies, and political conflicts. This apparent tendency to disregard parts of the constitution possibly stems from the inauspicious circumstances of its inception and particularly from the following factors: 1) the document was enacted hurriedly; 2) its concepts are largely foreign to Korean experience in general and to the present political leadership in particular; and 3) there is no tradition of judicial review of the constitutionality of the acts of the legislature and the executive.

Since the Republic of Korea has a central rather than a federal system of government, the function of its local government units is to administer the orders of the central government. To carry out this function, the constitution provides for local autonomous bodies which consist of a council in each local community. The specific organization and operation of these bodies is determined by organic law. On July 4, 1949, a Local Autonomy Law provided that city and town mayors and chiefs of townships would be elected by the councils at those levels, which were in turn directly elected by the voters. In early 1956 an amendment changed this to provide for the direct popular election of the mayors and township chiefs. This amendment was superseded in December 1958 by another one which made local executive positions appointive by the central government. The 1958 amendment is opposed by the opposition Democratic Party, which claims that the administration changed the law to tighten its hold on the local communities in order to be in a better position to control the 1960 presidential election, since the urban areas have been the center of opposition power. The Liberals, however, claim that the elective system for local principals has proved impractical, since such officials actually work almost wholly under the direction of the central government.

b. FLEXIBILITY - The power to amend the constitution rests with the National Assembly. An amendment may be proposed by the President, one-third or more of the members of the House of Representatives (lower house), one-third or more of the House of Councillors (upper house), or by the concurrence of 500,000 or more persons eligible to vote in the elections of representatives. Until the House of Councillors is established, an amendment may be proposed in the present unicameral Assembly by one-third or more of the members. The President must publicly announce the amendment at least 30 days before it may be submitted to a vote in the National Assembly. Adoption of an amendment requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of both the upper and the lower houses (temporarily, two-thirds of the members of the unicameral Assembly). The President must promulgate the amendment as soon as it has been adopted by the Assembly. According to Article 98, any amendment passed by the National Assembly concerning "important matters pertaining to a national crisis which might limit the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea or cause a change in its territory" becomes retroactively null and void under the provisions of Article 7-Ⅱ unless a petition signed by 500,000 voters is initiated within 30 days for a national referendum and unless the amendment is subsequently confirmed by the referendum.

Additional flexibility under the present system is derived from the general and vague terminology of the constitution. Election procedures, the organization of civil and military agencies, and the establishment of economic and financial systems were prescribed in detail by law after the adoption of the constitution. A number of the widest gaps in the constitution have been filled by a Government Organization Law, an Armed Services Law, a Law on Nationality, election laws, regulatory labor legislation, and other statutes. These laws may be revised by simple legislative action, and they also provide great latitude for the exercise of administrative discretion. These factors, together with the absence of a systematized concept of constitutional interpretation, make it relatively easy to enact substantive revision of organic legislation without having to amend the constitution.

What little influence the people have over the processes of constitutional change is exercised primarily through the popular election of the National Assembly and the President. As noted, the provisions of the constitutional amendments of 1954, which stipulated that voters could propose and in some cases confirm certain amendments, have never been used. The provision to have proposed amendments publicly announced at least 30 days before their submission to Assembly vote was ostensibly intended to facilitate public discussion and expression of opinion. However, the text of the 1952 amendments was never announced publicly prior to their passage on July 4, although the general terms of the original amendments sponsored by President Rhee and his opposition became widely known during the lengthy political conflict that preceded passage of the compromise. The failure then to make public announcement still constitutes a technical claim against the validity of the 1952 amendments. During the 1952 controversy President Rhee undertook to create an appearance of popular support for his proposed amendments by staging public demonstrations and inspiring mass petitions in his campaign of pressure on the Assembly, but there was no open public debate or representation of public opinion in the amendment process. A similar campaign was staged in 1954 by forming "The People's Human Rights Committee for Demanding Constitutional Amendments," which was responsible for organizing demonstrations in favor of the new amendments.

c. INTERPRETATION - The framers of the constitution of the Republic of Korea did not conceive of constitutional interpretation in the Western sense as a fuller enunciation of previously written law, or, in particular, as a decisive function of the highest judicial body, in accordance with U.S. practice; rather, they fell back on the Japanese or Continental European practice of interpretation through legislation. Constitutional interpretation has also been complicated by the task of translating Western constitutional concepts into the Korean language.

Article 81 vests the Supreme Court with power to determine constitutionality only in matters involving executive orders, regulations, and actions. However, since the judiciary is to a large extent under the control of the executive, the Supreme Court has been unable to exercise even this power effectively (see below, under Constitutional Pattern of Government).

The constitution provides for the constitutionality of laws passed by the National Assembly to be determined by a Constitution Committee, comprised of five justices of the Supreme Court, five members of the present National Assembly (or three members of the House of Representatives and two of the House of Councillors when it is formed), and the Vice President, who acts as chairman. The committee is to function only when a decision as to the constitutionality of a law or laws is essential to the settlement of a specific case and is requested by the courts, and the concurrence of two-thirds of the committee is required to declare a law unconstitutional. Available information indicates that the Constitution Committee has never been called upon to deliberate the constitutionality of a law.

Questions of constitutional interpretation that have arisen since the establishment of the Republic of Korea have been settled provisionally on a basis of political expediency rather than by legal interpretation of the constitutional issues involved. Thus far the most important questions have concerned 1) the right of members of the State Council (cabinet) to be elected to the National Assembly; 2) the status of bills returned to the legislature by the President with suggestions for change; 3) the validity of the 1952 constitutional amendments and the lack of specific procedures for implementation; and 4) the validity of the two-thirds majority involved in the adoption of the 1954 amendments. Settlement of these and other problems of interpretation has either been deferred or achieved temporarily by legislative resolution or agreement with the executive branch.

The framers of the constitution of the Republic of Korea attempted to synthesize presidential and parliamentary concepts of government as a compromise solution to the political controversy between Syngman Rhee and the Korean (Hanguk) Democratic Party while the constitution was being drafted. Thus, although the Constitution of 1948 established independent branches of government, it also introduced many parliamentary devices, of which the election of the President by the legislature was the most important. The conflict inherent in this attempted synthesis was aggravated by the 1952 amendments, which provided on the one hand for presidential election by secret popular vote, but on the other gave the Assembly power to vote no confidence in State Council members. The 1954 amendments strengthened the President's position by removing the office of the Prime Minister and transferring his powers to the President. The constitution does not separate powers so as to balance the judiciary against the executive and legislative branches. The relationships and distribution of power among the three branches, as provided in the constitution, are shown in FIGURE 51-1.

The President is elected to a 4-year term and, except for Syngman Rhee, can succeed himself only once. The constitution does not set forth specific qualifications for the President, but they are detailed in the election law, which provides that candidates for the presidency must be citizens who are 40 years of age and have been residents of the country for at least three years. The law also states that a person is not eligible for the presidency if he has been declared incompetent or partially incompetent, is serving a sentence of imprisonment or has such a sentence pending, or has had his citizenship suspended in accordance with a court's decision. Those who have been sentenced to imprisonment are not eligible for election until three full years have elapsed after completion of the sentence. Furthermore, members of election committees and appointed public officials are declared by law to be ineligible.

FIGURE 51-1. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

President Rhee's preponderant control has engendered shortrun political stability, but his constant efforts to preserve and expand his broad constitutional powers since the establishment of the Republic of Korea have created a fundamentally unstable political situation. The President's control over governmental policy rests in the first instance upon his power to appoint the members of the State Council. The constitution provides that all acts of the President shall be executed in writing and be countersigned by the State Council members concerned, and that all important executive matters of government shall be decided by the State Council acting as a collegiate body. Although these provisions were apparently intended to qualify the power of the President and to increase the responsibilities of individual ministers, the constitution is not clear in its precise provisions for written endorsement of the President's acts by the State Council members. In any event, President Rhee generally has not sought the concurrence of the State Council or of individual ministers in state policies. Furthermore, the presidential power of appointment provides ultimate control over the executive operations of government.

The vague and general terms of the Government Organization Law and other enabling legislation of this type provide the President with broad discretionary authority. The President may issue any orders within his delegated powers and such orders as are necessary for enforcement of laws passed by the National Assembly. These delegated powers include suspension or repeal of orders or dispositions established by the department heads or heads of local administrative bodies if these orders are deemed improper or illegal. The President also establishes regulations concerning the organization of the various government agencies and the classification, number, and compensation of government employees.

The President is commander in chief of the military forces and has prime initiative and responsibility in the conduct of foreign relations, although treaties are subject to the approval of the National Assembly. Article 57 of the constitution, one of the most important sources of presidential power, provides that in cases of emergency arising from civil war, disturbed foreign relations, natural calamity, or serious economic crisis, the President may issue any order he deems appropriate and may make financial dispositions, either action having the force of law. The article attempts to prevent abuse of these extensive powers by restricting their exercise to occasions when the National Assembly cannot be convened in time and by requiring that the Assembly approve any such action "without delay." The Assembly may invalidate presidential action taken under this article by withholding its approval. Despite these restrictions, President Rhee made effective use of these emergency powers against his political opposition in May and June 1952. After declaring emergency martial law, Rhee invoked Article 57 as the legal basis for many of his attacks on opposition members of the Assembly, including the arrest and trial of some members for subversive activities. Contrary to constitutional provisions requiring him to do so, President Rhee did not revoke martial law at the demand of the National Assembly. The President now wields such great personal power that he could probably assume dictatorial authority whenever necessary to crush internal political opposition.

President Rhee maintains the predominance of the executive over the legislature primarily by exploiting his extensive constitutional powers and personal prestige and by his undisputed control of a majority party. In theory, the President plays a limited role in legislation under the constitution. He may initiate bills and propose constitutional amendments through the State Council. The President and executive officials may address the Assembly and submit written opinions for its consideration. The President may veto any bills passed by the Assembly, but his veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of that body. The constitution does not require the President to submit his reasons for vetoing bills. President Rhee has occasionally returned bills to the Assembly with the informal request that they be amended, a practice that has created confusion over the legal status of such bills. He has also delayed promulgation of laws passed over his veto.

The term, qualifications, and method of election for vice president are identical with those of the president. The constitution provides that the vice president shall act for the president in case the latter is unable to perform the duties of his office, and makes him chairman ex officio of the House of Councillors, the Impeachment Court, and the Constitution Committee. In practice the vice president has had no opportunity to serve in these capacities and has fulfilled at most a purely ceremonial role. President Rhee, however, has failed to delegate even this ceremonial function to the present Vice President, Chang Myŏn, a member of the opposition party who was elected to office in May 1956. Since Chang became Vice President, the Liberal Party has considered amendments to the constitution to make it mandatory for the President and Vice President to come from the same party, but to date it has not attempted to introduce such legislation into the National Assembly.

According to the provisions of the 1948 Constitution, as amended, when the President is incapacitated and the Vice President acts for him, he serves only for the remaining period of the term. A member of the State Council is third in line of succession. A vacancy in the vice-presidency is filled by a by-election to be held within three months after the date of such vacancy.

The constitution provides that "important national policies which come within the scope of the powers of the President" shall be decided by majority vote of the State Council, composed of the President as presiding officer and 8 to 15 ministers. Although the directors of the Office of Public Information and the Office of Legislation, and the General Secretary of the Office of General Affairs are not of ministerial rank, they attend State Council meetings but have no vote. Article 72 specifies the important matters to be decided by the State Council as including fundamental national policies, declarations of war, proposed orders of the President, the budget, high level appointments, administrative policies, the coordination of operations of executive agencies of the government, and any other items submitted by the President. In general, the important functions delegated to this collegiate body have been circumscribed by President Rhee's strong personal control of national policy, appointments, and the operations of the executive branch. In large measure, his power to remove the members of the State Council negates the authority given them by the constitution. President Rhee has issued orders and instructions and has coordinated the operations of the executive agencies through the State Council but has not permitted its members to decide national policies.

Members of the State Council are eligible to hold portfolios as ministers in charge of executive departments. In practice, them has been at least one minister without portfolio on the State Council. The constitution delegates general authority to the ministers to issue orders concerning the affairs in their respective departments. The organization and functions of each department are established by the Government Organization Law, which supplements the brief and general provisions for organization of the executive branch contained in the constitution. Although the ministers are permitted to exercise some administrative authority in directing their departments, real initiative and ultimate control over important policies, appointments, and administrative decisions remain largely in the hands of the President.

The 233 members of the present unicameral National Assembly, who will comprise the House of Representatives when the upper house is formed, are elected to 4-year terms. The constitution does not stipulate specific qualifications for election to the Assembly, but organic legislation states that a citizen 25 years of age or older is eligible for election to the Assembly if he has not been declared incompetent, is not serving a prison sentence and has not served such for three years prior to the election, has not been deprived of his civil rights by court order, and is not a member of the armed forces on active service, an election committeeman, or an appointed official in the government. The amendment bill of 1952 provided that members of the upper house would serve 6-year terms, but other qualifications and conditions remain to be established by enabling legislation.

Article 39 of the Constitution as amended provides that "bills may be introduced by the members of the National Assembly or by the executive," but Article 72 adds the requirement that legislative bills must be referred by the President to the State Council for decision. The constitution further provides that all "bills, budgets, and other proposals" shall be presented first to the House of Representatives. Ordinary legislation is enacted by a simple majority vote of the members. A bill rejected by the House of Representatives may not be sent to the House of Councillors or to a joint session of the two Houses.

When a bill has been passed by the Assembly, it is referred to the President for his signature and promulgation within 15 days of passage. If the President vetoes a bill, he must return it to the Assembly within 15 days for reconsideration. The Assembly may override the President's veto by a two-thirds vote in each constituent house with a quorum consisting of two-thirds of the members. If the President fails to promulgate the enacted legislation or to return it to the Assembly within 15 days, the bill automatically becomes law.

Since the passage of the 1954 amendments, the only remnants of a parliamentary system are contained in Article 70, which provides that any member of the State Council shall resign when a resolution of no confidence is adopted against him by a majority of the House of Representatives, and Article 44, which provides that the members of the State Council and representatives of the executive shall, by request of the National Assembly, attend any meeting of the National Assembly and answer questions. The Democratic Party has attempted to use the power of no confidence, but owing to its minority position has failed to obtain the majority vote required. However, it has exercised its power of interpellation to bring various scandals and inefficiencies to the attention of the public, and has occasionally brought about the resignation of an individual minister. In practice, these interpellations, together with plenary debate, committee hearings, and the requirement that the executive obtain Assembly approval of its budget, have been the most effective instruments of independent power available to the National Assembly.

The National Assembly has also used its authority to investigate executive policies, agencies, and officials. The Assembly has conducted thorough and well-publicized annual "inspections" of the executive branch in connection with its deliberations on the national budget. Furthermore, during the Korean hostilities the Assembly conducted its own investigations on reports of corruption, maladministration, and misbehavior by police and military personnel. Although the Assembly is unable to enforce its conclusions based on these investigations, the public release of committee reports and Assembly debates has exerted a restraining influence on the executive branch.

The constitution empowers the National Assembly to initiate impeachment proceedings against executive and judicial officials as follows: 1) a motion of impeachment is introduced into the House of Representatives with the signature of 30 or more members; 2) the motion of impeachment is adopted by "a majority of the members of each House;" 3) the motion of impeachment is referred for trial to the Impeachment Court, a permanent interbranch committee composed of five justices of the Supreme Court, five members of the House of Councillors (or five members of the present National Assembly ad interim), and the Vice President, who serves as presiding officer, unless the President or Vice President is on trial, when the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides. The concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the Impeachment Court is required for conviction, and a decision against the accused official forces his removal from office but does not exempt him from civil or criminal responsibility.

The Assembly's financial control over the executive has been only moderately effective, although the annual interpellation of government officials and the inspection of executive agencies to assist the Assembly in considering general appropriation bills have provided an opportunity for severe criticism of executive action and have forced important modifications in the policies and operations of the administration. Legislative inexperience and the urgency of the government's fiscal requirements since the Republic was established have contributed to the Assembly's failure to control both the amount and the direction of governmental expenditures.

Finally, the Assembly has always defended its independence from executive encroachment by criticizing executive officials and their acts in debates, interpellations, and resolutions. The Assembly has no power to enforce its resolutions, and their passage has frequently brought direct executive pressures to bear on various individual members for their outspoken criticism. The Assembly has, however, successfully preserved and exploited its right to open discussion and candid criticism of the policies and actions of the executive branch.

The constitution does not set forth the detailed organization of the courts or the qualifications of judicial personnel, stating only that these things shall be determined by law. The constitution provides for a Supreme Court and lower courts with the chief justice appointed by the President and approved by the National Assembly. It states that the tenure of judges shall be 10 years, that they shall be appointed and reappointed in accordance with law, and that they cannot be dismissed or suspended from office except by impeachment, or upon conviction of criminal activity or of breaches of discipline. The constitution provides that the Supreme Court, under the chief justice, may establish its own internal regulations and rules pertaining to routine matters, but it does not make any specific provision for the organization and administrative supervision of the lower courts. The rights of individual citizens before the courts are set forth in general terms in the part of the constitution dealing with civil liberties. A citizen is entitled "to be tried in accordance with the law by judges whose status has been determined by law." All defendants under the criminal code are also provided the right to public trial without unreasonable delay "unless there is proper reason for not doing so."

By comparison with the situation in the United States or the United Kingdom, the judiciary occupies a less influential position, and the occasions for conflict between it and the other branches of the government are more limited by both tradition and the constitutional functions assigned to it. Under the constitution, the judiciary does not have the opportunities to operate as a counterweight to the executive and legislative branches in the manner of its U.S. counterpart. It does not have, for example, the power independently to determine the constitutionality of legislation, but shares this power with the legislature itself. It also does not have the power to try impeachment cases. It has the power to determine the legality of acts and dispositions of the executive branch, and it is protected from executive reprisal by constitutional provisions against arbitrary dismissal and reduction of salaries. However, the fact that the executive wields the power of appointment, through which it can exert considerable pressure on the judiciary, inhibits the willingness of members of the judiciary to take action against the executive. Finally, the U.S. tradition which permits the Supreme Court to act as the initiator of legal precedents arising out of original interpretations of the constitution is entirely foreign to Korean jurisprudence. Like that of Japan, Korean jurisprudence is in the Continental European rather than the Anglo Saxon tradition. Within this tradition, the role of the judiciary is limited to the application of the specific provisions of the law, and the extension of the principles and provisions of existing law to cover circumstances or situations not explicitly provided for is considered outside the legitimate authority of the judiciary.

The judiciary was thus not impowered to check the operations of either the executive or the legislature. In practice the executive branch has exercised a high degree of control over the judiciary, and for political purposes has even influenced the outcome of individual trials. During the Korean hostilities, when large sections of the country were placed under emergency martial law for extended periods of time, the executive branch transferred much of the judicial function to the military courts. When National Assemblymen were tried in courts-martial during the political crisis which developed in May 1952, it was determined by executive order that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over cases originating or assumed under the emergency powers of the President. The Supreme Court's decision in the Cho Bong-am case in February 1959, in which an opposition political leader was sentenced to death on questionable evidence, suggests that judicial decisions continue to be influenced by political considerations. During 1958 and early 1959 the judiciary showed signs of independence by declaring the elections of certain Liberal Party assemblymen invalid because of election law violations. However, the President declined to reappoint a number of District Court judges who acted independently in these and in similar cases, although they had been recommended by the Council of Justices, which consists of the nine justices of the Supreme Court.

A considerable gap exists between the possible scope of civil rights under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the actual practices of the government, reflecting as they do definite authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies. In part, this disparity reflects the uncertainties and problems of a new, independent government dominated by a man of strong will and operating under emergency conditions and by a set of constitutional principles the spirit of which is completely foreign to its experience and background. This disparity also reflects the conditional manner in which civil rights are generally set forth in the constitution, which allows the government wide latitude to depart from the apparent spirit of the document without violating the letter of the basic law.

Article 28 of the constitution reflects the Western concept of "natural rights," in asserting that the liberties of the people are not to be ignored simply because they may not be set forth in the constitution, but this is qualified by the next sentence which authorizes restrictions upon the liberties and rights of citizens "only when necessary for the maintenance of public order or the welfare of the community." Most enumerated civil rights are also qualified by such terminology as "except according to law" or "in accordance with the provisions of law." These ambiguous provisions, together with the President's great personal power and the lack of power of the judiciary, facilitate and legalize the abrogation of Korean civil rights.

Since almost all civil rights conferred by the constitution are granted only to citizens, the general regulations governing citizenship in the Republic of Korea are important. As in China and Japan, traditional practice in Korea treats the family register, maintained by local authorities, as evidence of nationality. The children of Korean fathers who are Korean nationals are regarded as Korean nationals regardless of their place of birth. If the father is unknown or is stateless, the child may derive Korean nationality from his mother. Foundlings or children of stateless persons are regarded as Korean nationals if they are born in Korea. A naturalization procedure has also been established by legislation.

The qualified rights enumerated in the constitution are larger in number and broader in scope than those in the older Western constitutions. They include social and economic rights as well as the usual political rights. Duties of the citizen are also specifically stated.

Political rights, based on the Western democratic concepts of equality before the law regardless of sex, religion, or social position, include freedom of person; freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association; and the right of petition. In addition to a speedy and public trial, the citizen is assured in general (see below) that no ex post facto law may be applied and that he may not be placed in double jeopardy. Article 5 states that the liberty, equality, and initiative of each individual shall be respected. In view of the heterogeneity of religions in Korea, and to eliminate a reversion to a state religion as instituted by the Japanese Government General, Article 12 enunciates freedom of religion and the separation of church and state.

The right to elect government officials and to hold public office is set forth specifically in the constitution. It is further provided that the election of President, Vice President, and members of the National Assembly shall be based upon the universal, direct, equal, and secret vote of all citizens over 21 years of age except criminals, incompetents, and certain categories of persons convicted of collaboration with the Japanese. As has been noted, however (see above, under Constitution, Principal Features), on December 24, 1958, an amendment to the Local Autonomy Law removed a large number of offices from direct popular control by making local executive positions appointive by the central government rather than elective. Likewise, there has from time to time and from area to area been interference with the suffrage right, the extent of this interference being in proportion to the position of the government in any given contest. The nature of this interference with the individual voter has run the entire range from outright police action on one pretext or another to unofficial but inspired rowdyism and terrorism.

The constitution lists the following economic principles: 1) the right to own property, subject to definition by law in conformity with public welfare; 2) the right to work, with the definition by law of standard working conditions and special protection for women and children workers; 3) the right of labor to organize, to bargain collectively, and to act collectively; 4) the right of laborers in private profit-making enterprises to share in profits; 5) a requirement to have farmlands distributed to farmers; and 6) a guarantee of the economic freedom of each individual within the limits of the attainment of social justice, the fulfillment of the basic requirements of all citizens, and the encouragement of the development of a balanced national economy. Legislation concerning most of these principles has been enacted but is not widely enforced.

In social and cultural fields the constitution asserts, in general terms: 1) the freedom of science and art; 2) equality of opportunity for education, to include at least compulsory free elementary education; 3) the protection of those who are indigent because of old age, infirmity, or incapacity; and 4) equality of "men and women in marriage," together with special protection of "the purity of marriage and the health of the family" by the state. Article 27 states that public officials, as "trustees of the sovereign people," are to be responsible to the people at all times and that a citizen may sue the government if he is injured by improper actions of an official; he may also initiate civil or criminal action against the official.

In its title, "Rights and Duties of Citizens," the second chapter of the constitution theoretically links the freedoms and the responsibilities of the citizens. Articles 29 and 30 declare that citizens have the duty of paying taxes and of defending the national territory, and Article 17 sets forth work as a duty as well as a right.

Civil rights are qualified legally in three important respects: 1) Article 101 of the constitution provides that the National Assembly may enact legislation to punish "malicious antinational acts committed prior to 15 August 1945," a power that definitely qualifies the constitutional article concerning ex post facto legislation; 2) almost all of the rights are granted only to citizens and therefore apparently do not extend to aliens; and 3) the government has exploited, to the detriment of civil liberties, the qualification of almost every right by such terms as "except according to law" or "in accordance with the provisions of law."

The legislature was in the main responsible for the civil rights potentialities written into the constitution, and in debate many Assembly members have heatedly supported democratic civil liberties. The Assembly has passed several laws designed to strengthen civil liberties, notably the law governing the Enforcement of Martial Law and the Law on Limitation of the Authority of Military Police and Army Intelligence to conduct security investigations. This body is jealous of the freedom of its own members and has occasionally censured highhanded actions of the executive in the field of civil liberties.

In general, however, the legislative record of the majority Liberal Party in the National Assembly does not indicate strong adherence to the civil rights principles of the constitution. Several laws passed by the National Assembly have greatly restricted the civil liberties of the people. For example, although as indicated above, the constitution contains the principle of privacy of correspondence, the Provisional Law on Mail Censorship gives the President power to order censoring of the mails. The National Security Law passed in 1948 established severe penalties for subversive activities, which it defined in very broad terms. Directed primarily against Communists, whom it termed "those who betray the constitution by posing as a government," the law also penalized "those, who in collusion with the betrayers, sought to consolidate or group together with the object of disturbing the tranquillity of the state" and "those persons who deliberately incite or indulge in propaganda to attain the aims of the organizations or groups mentioned ..." This law also provided that all members of any organization found to be engaged in sabotage or assassination are individually subject to criminal prosecution. The extent of Communist subversion in South Korea has made some type of stringent legislation necessary, but the terms of the law were broad enough to impose a significant restriction upon civil liberties in general. On December 24, 1958, the National Security Law was amended in such a way that civil and judicial rights enjoyed by suspects were further curtailed. In addition, the definition of sabotage activity was broadened to such an extent that almost any severe criticism of the executive could make a person subject to court action. Article 17, paragraph 5 of this amendment, which states that "anyone who has benefited the enemy by disturbing the people by means of reporting or spreading of false facts or distorted news shall be punished with penal servitude," has been severely criticized by the opposition, the press, and legal circles. The circumstances under which the law was passed left much to be desired from a democratic viewpoint.

Failure of the National Assembly to legislate in certain fields and the inability of the government to administer various programs related to civil rights have, in effect, also restricted civil rights. During the Korean hostilities, for example, it was impossible to establish the standards of public education prescribed by the constitution or by basic legislation on education. The rights of labor were enunciated by the constitution in general terms, but it was not until 1953 that detailed legislation defined these rights, and this legislation is not yet fully in force. Other provisions of the constitution on social welfare appear to be regarded merely as long-range goals that cannot be achieved until the political and economic situations have been stabilized.

Article 100 of the constitution provides that laws in effect in Korea at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Korea shall remain in effect to the extent that they do not conflict with the constitution. A great many of the laws in force in 1948 had a direct bearing on civil rights and were formulated in the Yi dynasty period before 1910, the Japanese Government General era from 1910 to 1945, or during the period of military government from 1945 to 1948. Some of these laws are still in effect. In 1949 the President established a Legal Code Compilation Committee charged with reviewing the laws in force in the Republic and with drafting a uniform legal code. In 1953, 1954, and 1957 respectively, the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedures, and Civil Code Laws were newly enacted and are technically comparable with the codes in effect in most democratic Western countries. However, those of the older laws left over from past eras which continue in force generally serve to further the political objectives and policies of the government in such matters as the control of public information, the prosecution of subversive cases, and the control of political campaigns. In 1958 and 1959, for example, regulations which had been promulgated by the postwar U.S. Military Government were used to ban demonstrations opposing the National Security Law.

The executive branch of government has done more than any other to restrict the civil rights of the people. The restrictive practices of the present government reflect traditional attitudes toward civil rights that prevailed under the Yi dynasty and during the period of Japanese control. Although it maintained an elaborate system of petitions, the government under the Yi dynasty had no comprehension of civil liberties. The Japanese Government General granted a few qualified civil liberties to Koreans, but in general behaved as an authoritarian regime. The measures of the U.S. Military Government to curb extremists movements and Communist-inspired subversion in South Korea were also generally restrictive of civil liberties.

The internal conditions that helped to shape the civil liberties policies of the military government have not changed materially since the establishment of the Republic in 1948. In fact, the enforcement of wartime security measures after June 1950 provided the present government with even more justification for limiting the civil liberties of the people. In many instances, however, civil liberties have been restricted for partisan political purposes only indirectly related to the security of the state.

The authoritarian outlook of the government is particularly evident in the type of controls instituted over public information and in harsh practices of the police and military. The executive branch has always been very sensitive to press criticism and, in many instances, has invoked restrictive ordinances dating from the Yi dynasty, the Japanese period, and the U.S. Military Government period to suppress such criticism. Existent laws were supplemented in 1949 by a set of "informal" executive rules formulated by the Office of Public Information (OPI). These rules prohibited the publication of any material favorable to the Communist regime in North Korea or critical of the Rhee government. For relatively minor infractions of the government's press code, a number of newspapers have been suspended. Nonetheless, the press in recent years became relatively free in its criticism of the government. During debates in December 1958 over tightening of the National Security Law, all opposition and independent newspapers censured further curbs of the right to criticize the government. In April 1959 the amended law was used for the first time to arrest two reporters of the Kyonghyang Shinmun, an opposition paper. Whether this is an isolated case or whether it is the first step in the elimination of freedom of the press remains to be seen. (See CHAPTER Ⅳ, SECTION 43, under Public Information, for a detailed discussion of government public information controls.)

At present the law affords the individual citizen little protection against arbitrary police power. Mass arrest without warrant, detention without valid evidence or charges, and forced confessions are common police practices.

The army has played an increasingly important role in police activities that impinge upon civil liberties of the people, especially since 1950. The military police and counterintelligence personnel have been particularly active in the investigation and prosecution of Communist subversion cases. Under the sanctions of martial law their activities have tended to encroach on civil police jurisdictions. Moreover, where martial law applies, the individual citizen has no right to appeal for judicial consideration of wrongs committed by police agencies or even for adjudication of his case.

With respect to the civil liberties of foreigners, the constitution merely states that "the status of aliens shall be guaranteed within the scope of international law and treaties." The foregoing has been ambiguously amplified by subsequent legislation to the effect that aliens shall enjoy all private rights except those prohibited by laws, ordinances, or treaties. Practically speaking, except for Japanese, foreigners do not suffer any particular molestation in the Republic of Korea so long as their activities are not considered inimical to the regime.

The information in this Section is generally reliable and adequate, but there are a few gaps concerning the independence movement and the specific application of certain constitutional amendments and laws. Source 11 contains most of the constitutional documents needed.

The discussion on constitutional developments and influences before 1945 is based almost entirely on information taken from nongovernmental publications. Source 5 contains most of the data used to describe the Confucian system as it existed before the Japanese assumed control of Korea. Sources 1 and 2, although reflecting a strong pro-Korean, anti-Japanese bias, are generally adequate and reliable in their treatment of the political influences of the Japanese Government General in Korea. Sources 2, 6, and 8, which deal with expatriate activities in China and the United States and with related nationalist activities in Korea, and which also show an anti-Japanese but no pro-Communist bias, are not as adequate or reliable on these subjects. There is very little information on expatriate activities in Communist China, maritime Siberia, and Soviet Central Asia. Source 17, which contains much new information from Soviet publications, describes Korean Communist activity within the U.S.S.R. in general terms.

Data on the constitutional system of the Republic of Korea were derived from sources considered reliable and generally adequate. Much of the material throughout this Subsection was taken from U.S. Government reports or substantiated by them. Considerable information and general perspective on the origin of the constitution is found in Source 2, as well as in U.S. Government reports. The discussion of the constitution itself is based on translations of the 1948 documents printed in Sources 11 and 15, and of the 1952 constitutional amendments contained in an annex to Source 13. Source 16 includes a translation of the constitution as amended in 1954. Translations of other important laws were obtained from the U.S. Embassy at Seoul. Sources 12, 13, and 14 contain the best collated summaries of constitutional developments in the Republic since 1949, including the conflict between the executive and legislature, laws pertaining to executive-legislative relations and the constitutional powers and relationships of the branches of government, and the general operations of the police, army, courts, and other governmental agencies. Sources 9, 10, and 16 provided the changes in the government structure since 1954. Source 16 contains a very good digest of Korean civil and criminal law. More information is needed on the economic amendments of 1954, on the degree of governmental enforcement of supplementary legislation pertaining to constitutional civil rights, and on the exact degree to which the President dominates policy and operations within the executive branch. Source 7 was written by a Rhee advisor who is quite biased in his treatment of the President.

1. GRAJDANZEV, ANDREW J. Modern Korea. Institute of Pacific Relations. International Secretariat. New York: The John Day Co. 1944.

2. McCUNE, GEORGE M. Korea Today. Institute of Pacific Relations. International Secretariat. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1950.

3. McCUNE, SHANNON. Korea's Heritage. Institute of Pacific Relations. International Secretariat. Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company. 1956.

4. ________. "The Occupation of Korea," Foreign Policy Reports. Vol. 23, no. 15, October 15, 1947, pg. 186-195. New York.

5. NELSON, M. FREDERICK. Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1945.

6. O'CONNEL, JAMES T. "The Korean Nationalist Movement," Amerasia. Vol. 2, no. 4, June 1939, p. 177-182. New York.

7. OLIVER, ROBERT. Syngman Rhee, The Man Behind the Myth. New York: Dodd Mead and Company. 1954.

8. _______. "The V-Front in Korea," Amerasia. Vol 6, no. 4, June 1942, p. 182-186. New York.

9. REPUBLIC OF KOREA. Principal Government Officials of the Republic of Korea. Based on the Official Gazette of the Republic of Korea. Seoul. 1959.

10. REPUBLIC OF KOREA. SECRETARIAT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. A Description of the National Assembly. Seoul. 1958.

11. TEWKSBURY, DONALD G. Source Materials on Korean Politics and Ideologies. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. International Secretariat. 1950.

12. UNITED NATIONS. GENERAL ASSEMBLY. OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE FIFTH SESSION. Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea. Supplement no. 16 (A/1350). New York. 1950.

13. UNITED NATIONS. OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE SIXTH SESSION. Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Supplement no. 12 (A/1881). New York. 1951.

14. UNITED NATIONS. OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE SEVENTH SESSION. Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Supplement no. 14 (A/2187). New York 1952.

15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Korea 1945 to 1948. Publication 3305. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. October 1948.

16. U.S. OFFISE OF THE ECONOMIC COORDINATOR. Digest of Korean Civil and Criminal Law. Seoul: Public Administration Division, OEC. 1956.

17. U.S. SENATE. The United States and the Korea Problem, Documents 1943-1953. Document No. 74. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1953.

18. WASHBURN, JOHN N. "Soviet Russia and the Korean Communist Party," Pacific Affairs. Vol. 23, March 1950, p. 59-65. New York.