795.00/5-2952: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea 註01
secret
priority
Washington, May 29, 1952-7:23 p.m.
887. Amb Muccio discussed Kor situation with Pres Truman full detail this morning. Pres personally gravely concerned domestic polit crisis in Kor and expressed profound disappointment with course recent events.
Bitter partisan conflict between Pres Rhee and Assembly groups receiving generally unfavorable reaction US press. Reurtel 1194 Dept sending info such reactions on current basis.
註02 In addition other govts participating UN action Kor have approached US expressing their concern at development indicating Kor disunity and failure follow legal and constitutional processes. Whole result present domestic polit crisis is undermine confidence in ROK and redound most unfavorably both immed and long-range interests Kor. Regardless statements already made by Pres Rhee and his ans to Amb Muccio foregoing represents both press and official reaction US and elsewhere. Expect such reaction become greatly intensified if polit crisis continues.
Specifically fol unfavorable results now taking place or foreseen:
1. Increasing danger renewed Commie offensive as they see opportunity exploit internal disunity within ROK.
2. Prejudicial effect on current and continuing efforts secure additional contribution forces for Kor action from countries presently participating or others.
3. Increased difficulty securing finan contributions UNKRA and highly competent personnel for UNKRA and UNCACK.
4. At very time when whole econ situation under review as result Meyer Mission increasing doubts as to whether ROK Govt sufficiently stable to warrant substantial dols payments.
5. Increased difficulty securing serious consideration within US Govt for additional milit assistance ROK armed forces.
We are urging Defense send msg Gen Clark which will be passed to you. Msg wld instruct him discuss milit dangers of present situation along foregoing lines with Pres Rhee.
Pres Truman has instructed Amb Muccio return Kor soonest possible (early next week) and convey Pres Truman’s personal concern directly Pres Rhee. You may so inform Pres Rhee. In addition gen line foregoing paras shld be followed both with Rhee and with opposition groups. While you shld let UNCURK, Clark and Van Fleet carry as much burden representation as possible believe whole emphasis formal and informal representations shld be upon need for restoration essential ROK unity. Both Rhee and opposition groups shld be encouraged find some reasonable means compromise perhaps through good offices UNCURK which will demonstrate to world ability Koreans meet and solve their polit problems through normal democratic processes. Early elimination martial law Pusan wld be major help creating more favorable public reaction outside Kor.
Bruce