Intelligence Report
IR 5889 May 5, 1952
Office of Intelligence Research
REPUBLIC OF KOREA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TAKES INITIATIVE AGAINST PRESIDENT RHEE
Since January, when It decisively defeated Rhee's efforts to amend the Constitution to provide for direct popular election of the President, the ROK National Assembly has contended itself with standing firm under mounting pressures and political maneuvers by Rhee. In three recent actions, however, the Assembly has taken the initiative in its conflict with the President, threatening to bring the conflict to a critical stage:
1. On April 16, the Assembly passed a bill reiterating immunities already held by Assembly members and election officials and candidates under the Constitution and law. This was a clever political move, obviously intended to focus public attention on Rhee's conduct toward the Assembly and the elections. It followed close after the indictment of one of the opposition leaders in the Assembly for alleged financial irregularities during earler tenure of an executive position and came in the midst of a local election campaign in which pro-Rhee candidates are predominant.
2. On April 17, the Assembly proposed a constitutional amendment favoring a parliamentary system of government. This major and direct assault on the President's powers is a sequel to similar efforts made in early 1950 and in late 1951, but holds more strength than the previous efforts: although only a one-third vote of the Assembly is required to propose an amendment, the April 17 action was taken by more than two-thirds -- adequate to pass the amendment after the 30-day waiting period if the Assembly holds firm.
3. On April 19, the Assembly reacted immediately to the forced resignation of Prime Minister CHANG Myon and passed an amendment to the Government Organization Law, by a vote of 66-0 out of 97, requiring that nomination to the Prime Minister post must be made within ten days after a vacancy occurs. This action was designed to prevent the President from circumventing the requirement of Assembly confirmation for the Prime Minister by designating an Acting Prime Minister.
The moves by the Assembly enumerated above were probably precipitated by the recent return of Prime Minister CHANG to Korea and by the imminence of local elections which began April 25. It appears probable, however that the political offensive now being staged by Rhee's opponents is motivated by fear of his growing power. Rhee has been improving his position in several ways. His few consistent supporters among the older Assemblymen and his new supporters elected in the February 5 by-elections have achieved some success in developing a pro-Rhee bloc in the Assembly. At the same time, he has developed a threat to the Assembly by using governmental organs as well as his partisan organizations to circularize petitions to recall Assembly members -- a device not provided for in, and inconsistent with, the Constitution. His Liberal Party has been conducting an intensive organizing campaign, as well as a campaign in the local elections. His agitation against the cease-fire and against the Japanese in the current ROK-Japanese negotiations also has afforded him some advantage, and he has been popularizing his demands for direct election of the President. Also, Rhee's opponents may be concerned over the fact that the militant clique of YUN Ch'iyong, Louise IM, and YI Pomsok has been gaining increasing ascendency within the pro-Rhee grouping. Having secured control of the Justice Department and of the power complex in the Homes Affairs Department and police in early 1952, this clique in late March gained the ministerial post in the other major power complex -- the Defense Department and Army, especially the Counter Intelligence Corps and the military police. In April, this clique was continuing to intrench itself in the Defense Department, and was approaching so complete a monopoly of power that it would not have feared resistance or counter-action such as the Communist spy ring allegations of December 1951.
Rhee's first response to the Assembly's action was conciliatory: he offered the Prime Minister post to CHANG T'aeksang, Vice-Speaker of the Assembly who has the support of some anti-Rhee elements in the Assembly although there are some evidences that he may have come to an understanding with Rhee. At the same time, Rhee is reported to be mustering all his political forces to oppose the constitutional amendment calling for parliamentary government, which will be decided upon by the Assembly 30 days after it is published, Since this amendment would strip Rhee of the governmental powers comprising a major element of his political strength, he must now in effect lose or win his fight for re-election before the decision on the constitutional amendment. Since the amendment was proposed with a strength more than adequate to adopt it, and the other actions of the Assembly against Rhee were taken by strong majorities, there remains a real possibility that he may soon veer toward even more intimidatory and forceful tactics than he has used in the past, even though his first thinking on the Prime Minister problem was in terms of conciliation. He has made a loyal supporter Acting Prime Minister, pending Assembly action on his nomination of CHANG, has vetoed the two bills described above, and apparently has not yet discharged his constitutional duty of publishing the proposed constitutional amendment.
